Easley by Easley v. Snider
| Decision Date | 18 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-1199,94-1199 |
| Citation | 36 F.3d 297 |
| Parties | , 3 A.D. Cases 1150, 6 A.D.D. 874, 5 NDLR P 392 Tracy EASLEY, by her next friend, Lucille EASLEY; Florence H., Appellees, v. Karen SNIDER, Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare; Kay Arnold, Deputy Secretary for Social Programs; Homemaker Services of the Metropolitan Area, Karen Snider and Kay Arnold, Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Atty. Gen., Susan J. Forney, Senior Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), Kate L. Mershimer, Senior Deputy Atty. Gen., John G. Knorr, III, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen., Harrisburg, PA, for appellants.
Ilene Shane, Robin Resnick, Disabilities Law Project, Philadelphia, PA, Stephen F. Gold (argued), Philadelphia, PA, for appellees.
Before: SCIRICA, LEWIS, and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.
This appeal, involving important legal and societal questions, arises out of an attack on the legality of the Pennsylvania Attendant Care Services Act (Care Act), 62 P.S. Sec. 3051 et seq. (Supp.1994). Pennsylvania enacted this legislation in 1986 as a program designed to enable physically disabled persons to live in their homes rather than institutions and, when possible, to become active and useful members of society.
The plaintiffs, Tracey Easley (Easley) and Florence Howard (Howard), both rejected as ineligible for the program, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the Care Act conflicts with the more recently enacted Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 12101 et seq. (Supp.1994), 1 because the Care Act requires that candidates for the program also be mentally alert. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the State of Pennsylvania from excluding them from the program. Following a bench trial, the district court concluded that the program developed under the Care Act violated the ADA and enjoined the State from excluding Easley and Howard from receiving attendant care services. The State appeals. We reverse.
The Care Act authorized the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (PDPW) to provide attendant care services to eligible individuals. The General Assembly declared that its purpose in enacting the law was to enable physically disabled but mentally alert adults between the ages of eighteen and fifty-nine to live in their own homes and communities. Additionally, they must:
1. experience a physical impairment expected to last a continuous period of at least 12 months;
2. be capable of selecting, supervising and, if needed, firing an attendant;
3. be capable of managing their own financial and legal affairs; and,
4. because of their physical impairment, require assistance to complete the functions of daily living, self-care, and mobility.
62 P.S. Sec. 3053. Persons who are physically disabled but not mentally alert are excluded from the program.
At the time of trial, Easley was a twenty-nine year old woman tragically disabled by a catastrophic car accident in 1982, just as she was to begin her sophomore year at Vassar College. Easley suffered a closed head injury which left her with minimal mobility and without speech. She apparently can communicate with her family by blinking her eyes and using other facial expressions. Presently, Easley is unable to care for herself and cannot be left alone. Easley is not capable of selecting, supervising, or firing an attendant, or managing her own financial and legal affairs.
In 1987, Easley resided in West Philadelphia, and through the use of a surrogate, in this case her mother, applied for and received attendant care services from Resources for Living Independently (RLI) which was under contract with the PDPW. Easley moved in 1991 to an area not serviced by RLI but by Homemaker Services Metropolitan Area, Inc. (HSMA), which was also under contract with PDPW.
At the time of trial, plaintiff Howard was a fifty-three year old woman with multiple sclerosis and undifferentiated schizophrenia. Howard is immobile from the waist down and, due to her condition, cannot live alone. Howard lived with her daughter until September 1991, but entered the Philadelphia Nursing Home when her daughter could not obtain attendant care services for her.
Howard has expressed dissatisfaction with her present situation. She wants to leave the nursing home and live in the community. To do this, she would need PDPW-funded attendant care services. PDPW, however, determined Howard ineligible under the Act because she was not mentally alert. Without using a surrogate, Howard is incapable of selecting, supervising or discharging an attendant and is not capable of managing her own financial and legal affairs.
The General Assembly stated the policies in pertinent part underlying the Care Act were as follows:
1. The increased availability of attendant care services for adults will enable them to live in their own homes and communities.
2. Priority recipients of attendant care services under this Act shall be those mentally alert but severely physically disabled who are in the greatest risk of being in an institutional setting.
3. Recipients of attendant care have the right to make decisions about, direct the provision of and control their attendant care services. This includes but is not limited to hiring, training, managing, paying and firing of an attendant.
62 P.S. at Sec. 3052.
The Care Act defines attendant care services as "[t]hose basic and ancillary services which enable an individual to live in his home and community, rather than in an institution, and to carry out functions of daily living, self-care and mobility." Id. at Sec. 3053. Basic services include assistance with getting in and out of bed, a wheelchair, or a car and also include assistance with routine bodily functions such as health maintenance activities, bathing and personal hygiene, dressing, grooming, and feeding. Id. Certain ancillary services may be provided which include homemaker services such as shopping, cleaning and laundry, companion-type services such as transportation, letter writing, reading mail, and escort, and assistance with cognitive tasks such as managing finances, planning activities, and making decisions. Id.
The PDPW contracts with various agencies to provide attendant care services pursuant to the Act and Department guidelines. The Department requires that the agencies offer three models of service delivery: the consumer model, the agency model, and the combination model. Under the consumer model the consumer advertises, interviews, hires, and fires the attendant. The consumer submits invoices to the respective agencies and receives money so that the consumer is responsible for the task of paying the care giver for his or her services. Under the agency model, the agency employs the attendant, but the consumer retains the right to reject an attendant that the consumer considers unsuitable. The consumer provides direction in developing the service plan and retains the responsibility for supervising the attendant in the home. Under the combination model, the consumer selects certain tasks to be performed and certain tasks the agency will perform. The consumer has the responsibility to choose the service delivery model that he/she most prefers. PDPW describes the combination model as "a menu with the consumer selecting what tasks he or she will do and what tasks the agency will do."
We must determine if the targeting of the programmatic services to physically disabled but mentally alert individuals is permissible or whether the State improperly excluded Easley and Howard from receiving attendant care services. We make this determination by examining the essential nature of the program to discover whether mental alertness is a necessary eligibility requirement and whether Easley and Howard can satisfy this requirement with a reasonable modification, here by using a surrogate. In reviewing this appeal, the court exercises a plenary standard of review when applying legal precepts to undisputed facts. Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 671 n. 1 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1668, 118 L.Ed.2d 389 (1992).
We begin our analysis with the passage of the ADA. Congress enacted the ADA to eliminate discrimination against handicapped individuals by extending the non-discrimination principles required at institutions receiving federal funds by the Rehabilitation Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall by reason of such disability be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.
Act, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 791 et seq. (Supp.1994), to a much wider array of institutions and businesses, including services provided by states and municipalities. 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 12101 et seq. Title II of the ADA provides:
Id. at Sec. 12132.
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