People v. Stanfield
| Citation | 330 N.E.2d 75,36 N.Y.2d 467,369 N.Y.S.2d 118 |
| Parties | , 330 N.E.2d 75 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Robert STANFIELD, Respondent. |
| Decision Date | 05 May 1975 |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty. (Lewis R. Friedman and Sharon M. Lynch, New York City, of counsel), for appellant.
Henry Mark Holzer and Erika Holzer, New York City, for respondent. JASEN, Judge.
At issue on this appeal is whether the crime of criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of the crime of manslaughter in the second degree.
The defendant was indicted for manslaughter, second degree, for the death by shooting of Thomasina Banks, a woman with whom he maintained a common-law relationship. There were no other witnesses to the shooting and the People's case was proved almost entirely by the defendant's own oral and written statements, judicially determined to be voluntary or otherwise unobjected to. The essential facts, as reconstructed from the defendant's statements, are these. The defendant and Thomasina, parents of three girls, at the time maintained separate residences. On January 28, 1969, at about 10:00 P.M., he decided to visit Thomasina. Before reaching her apartment, he telephoned a friend, Willie Nyland, the boyfriend of Thomasina's sister, and during a lull in the conversation thought be heard Thomasina's voice in the background. He proceeded to her apartment, arriving at about 10:30 or 10:45 P.M., but was told by the children that she was not home. He then walked to a nearby subway station and a short time later met Thomasina there. The two then returned to Thomasina's apartment, each apparently in good spirits.
Thomasina then changed clothes and the two drank some wine. At least two of the children were in the apartment at the time. Together they discussed purchasing a car and Thomasina tried without success to mend her daughter's dress. Thomasina and the defendant were alone in the bedroom, sitting on the bed with the door closed. The defendant asked whether she had been at Willie's house a short time before. She answered no, explaining that she had been at a friend's. The defendant then said that he had a gun and that he was going to shoot her. He then went to the dresser and took from the drawer a .38 caliber two-shot derringer. The pistol had been purchased about a year and one half before, test fired once at that time and usually was kept at Thomasina's apartment in a loaded condition. The defendant then cocked the hammer and standing very close to Thomasina with the barrel pointed upward at about a 45 degree angle, but in her direction, repeated 'I'm going to shoot you.' Thomasina responded, 'Bob, don't mess with the gun like that', and then slapped his hand or arm. The weapon discharged, inflicting a mortal wound through the left breast.
The defendant related an unsuccessful attempt to revive her, unsuccessful efforts to telephone for police assistance and a frantic telephone call to his mother in North Carolina, who advised him to contact the police. He then summoned a policeman on foot patrol in front of 216 W. 62nd Street. The statements thereafter made relate that he did not intend to shoot, but only to scare Thomasina; that he cocked the hammer because, being familiar with the weapon, she would not otherwise have been frightened.
Ballistics evidence showed that the weapon discharged about 1 1/2 inches from the victim. Expert testimony established that in the fully cocked position, 14 pounds of pressure on the trigger would cause the weapon to discharge, but that even in the uncocked position a sharp enough blow on the hammer could cause it to fire. There was additional testimony that the weapon lacked a trigger guard and that this made it unsafe. A toxological report showed brain alcohol content of 0.075%, indicating that the victim had been drinking.
Upon this evidence and without the benefit of a requested charge on criminally negligent homicide, the defendant was convicted of the crime of manslaughter in the second degree. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction on the law and ordered a new trial 'in which the lesser included crime will be submitted to the jury.'
Subdivision 1 of section 125.15 of the Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40, in pertinent part, provides that a person is guilty of manslaughter, second degree, when he recklessly causes the death of another person. A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide (Penal Law, § 125.10), when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person. The Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 1.20, subd. 37, Consol. Laws, c. 11--A) provides that '(w) hen it is impossible to commit a particular crime without concomitantly committing, by the same conduct, another offense of lesser grade or degree, the latter is, with respect to the former, a 'lesser included offense."
The essential distinction between the crimes of manslaughter, second degree, and criminally negligent homicide is the mental state of the defendant at the time the crime was committed. (People v. Haney, 30 N.Y.2d 328, 333, 333 N.Y.S.2d 403, 407, 284 N.E.2d 564, 565.) In one, the actor perceives the risk, but consciously disregards it. (Penal Law, § 15.05, subd. 3.) In the other, he negligently fails to perceive the risk. (Penal Law, § 15.05, subd. 4). The result and the underlying conduct, exclusive of the mental element, are the same.
The People contend that the mental elements of the respective crimes are mutually exclusive and that, paraphrasing the definition of a lesser included offense, it is possible to commit the greater without concomitantly committing the lesser offense, and that, hence, the latter is not included in the former.
The argument, conceptually nice and mechanically accurate, is not persuasive. To begin with, the underlying conduct in each, exclusive of the culpable mental state, is the same. And at the outset the People are met with the equally hypertechnical counterargument that the Penal Law provision (§ 15.00, subd. 4) which includes within the definition of conduct 'an act or omission And its accompanying mental state' (emphasis supplied), is not fully applicable, at least for...
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