State v. Chapple
| Decision Date | 27 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 70637-9.,70637-9. |
| Citation | 145 Wash.2d 310,36 P.3d 1025,145 Wn.2d 310 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Damon L. CHAPPLE, Petitioner. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Backlund & Mistry, Jodi R. Backlund and Manek R. Mistry, Chehalis, for Petitioner.
Christopher Shea, Clallam County Prosecutor, Loren Oakley, Deputy, Port Angeles, for Respondent.
During his trial for second degree rape of a fellow prisoner, Damon Chapple was removed from the courtroom because of his disruptive and dangerous conduct. Chapple asserts that his exclusion violated his federal and state constitutional rights to be present at trial and his right to testify.
We hold that the trial court did not violate Chapple's constitutional rights to testify and be present at trial when it removed him from the courtroom. In so holding, we reiterate our prior decisions that in such circumstances great deference is to be given the trial court, which is in the best position to assess the relative threat and disruptiveness of the defendant within the limitations of the respective courthouse. The decision of the Court of Appeals is herein affirmed.
Damon Chapple has been incarcerated since 1989, serving a 125-year sentence for beating to death a drug dealer, beating and stabbing to death one woman, and robbing and raping another. In 1997, he was charged with second degree rape following an assault on a fellow prisoner. During a pretrial hearing for the rape and assault charges, Chapple was removed from the courtroom for interrupting the proceeding, swearing at the judge, and threatening to kill someone. It appears that Chapple was present for the trial, however, which ended with a hung jury.
At his second trial, Chapple spoke out several times, sometimes with the jury present and sometimes without. Although Chapple's interaction with the judge began respectfully, he became increasingly hostile as the trial progressed. Initially, Chapple raised objections without the jury present and the trial judge assured him that they were noted on the record. Later, Chapple became more emphatic and used offensive language.1 On the second day of the trial, before the jury entered the courtroom, Chapple interrupted his attorney and used a pejorative term for the jury.2 As the jury entered the courtroom, the following discussion ensued:
The jury returned. Soon after, during examination of a witness, the defendant interjected:
After Chapple's removal, the judge expressed concern that Chapple might be attempting to create a mistrial or pollute the jury with information about his first trial. The court then took suggestions from counsel that would permit Chapple to still participate in his trial. The prosecutor raised several options, including binding and gagging the defendant in the courtroom, removing him from the rest of the trial, and placing him in another room with a television system, bound and gagged if necessary. Defense counsel expressed doubts as to his ability to control Chapple's behavior, but suggested that he be allowed to discuss with the defendant the consequences of his removal from the trial.
The judge then heard testimony from Sergeant Reno, a corrections officer, regarding courtroom security if Chapple were allowed to return. Reno testified that Chapple had previously been convicted for several violent crimes and chronicled Chapple's extensive list of prison infractions including threats, possession of a weapon, and assault. Reno also testified to the defendant's size and extraordinary physical strength, reporting that Chapple could break handcuffs and had once pulled a cell door from a concrete wall. Chapple's threats of violence were taken very seriously; at least four security officers would attend his court appearances and he was required to wear a taser belt.5 Reno also reported that Chapple had planned to disrupt the trial and had boasted that he would make the news that day. Sergeant Reno concluded that Chapple was a threat to court personnel, even when bound to a chair, gagged, wearing a taser belt and guarded. Another officer testified that as Chapple left the courtroom, he was adamant that he would not cooperate, he would continue to disrupt the proceedings if allowed back into the courtroom, and, because he already had a 125-year sentence, there was nothing more that could be done to punish him.
Thus the judge determined that were Chapple allowed to return, even if bound, gagged, and guarded, he would still present a danger to staff and jury members. The courtroom was not equipped to shackle Chapple to the floor or any other stable structure. Although Chapple could view the trial through closed circuit television from the holding room next door, he might yell and scream or destroy the television. The judge ruled that the best option was to exclude the defendant from the remainder of the trial.
Defense counsel inquired whether the defendant would be allowed to testify. The court reiterated safety concerns and noted that transcripts of the defendant's previous trial testimony were available. The judge believed that Chapple had waived both his right to be present and his right to testify. However, the court asked counsel to speak with his client during recess regarding whether he could restrain himself sufficiently to return to the trial.
After the recess, defense counsel reported:
Certainly nothing occurred which would suggest things would be any different than they have been in terms of nothing like an agreement to conduct himself any differently. As far as testifying, his intent would be to testify although it is clear that that would be done according to his rules.... [He is] absolutely adamant about not being restrained by questions and answers.[6]
The judge concluded that Chapple had shown no change in attitude and remained dangerous. The court ordered that the trial proceed without Chapple and explained that defense counsel could use all or part of Chapple's testimony from the first trial, with redactions.
On the third day of trial, defense counsel restated Chapple's wish to testify in person. When questioned about his conversations with Chapple, however, defense counsel stated again that Chapple would insist on being allowed to talk freely to the jury. The court reiterated that Chapple presented a safety concern and declared that Chapple would not be allowed to return. Chapple was convicted and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
On appeal Chapple claimed that the trial court erred by excluding him from the second trial and admitting prior testimony. The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that Chapple had waived both his right to be present at trial and his right to testify. State v. Chapple, 103 Wash.App. 299, 12 P.3d 153 (2000). The court reasoned first that removal of a defendant for disruptive behavior is within the trial court's discretion. Applying the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970), the court determined that the trial court gave Chapple adequate warning regarding the consequences of continuing such disruptive behavior, the defendant nevertheless continued to disrupt the trial, the court took testimony about Chapple's proclivity for violence which eliminated alternatives to removal, and the court sent defense counsel to ask the defendant if he could behave appropriately if returned to the courtroom. Chapple, 103 Wash.App. at 310, 12 P.3d 153. We agree.
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be present in the courtroom at all critical stages of the trial arising from the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Washington State Constitution also provides a criminal defendant with "the right to appear and defend in person." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22. Additionally, Washington's criminal rules state that "[t]he defendant shall be present ... at every stage of the trial ... except ... for good cause...
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Brown v. State
...is no error on this ground, plain error or otherwise. In State v. Chapple, 103 Wash. App. 299, 12 P.3d 153 (2000), aff'd, 145 Wash.2d 310, 36 P.3d 1025 (2001), the trial court heard testimony concerning the defendant's "proclivity for dangerousness and violence," 103 Wash.App. at 310, 12 P.......
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State v. Anthony
...Allen standards to determine whether the defendant forfeited his right to testify in person through misconduct); State v. Chapple, 145 Wash.2d 310, 36 P.3d 1025, 1033–34 (2001) (relying on Allen and Ives to determine whether the defendant lost his right to testify by way of his conduct). We......
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People v. Johnson
...(2003) 2 A.D.3d 650, 769 N.Y.S.2d 569, 570 ; State v. Mosley (Tenn.Crim.App. 2005) 200 S.W.3d 624, 633-634 ; State v. Chapple (2001) 145 Wash.2d 310, 36 P.3d 1025, 1033-1034 ; State v. Anthony (2015) 361 Wis.2d 116, 860 N.W.2d 10, 22-25.) We explained in part II.A., ante , that the trial co......
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State v. Gasteazoro–Paniagua
...The due process right to be present during trial is not absolute. Irby, 170 Wash.2d at 881, 246 P.3d 796;see also State v. Chapple, 145 Wash.2d 310, 317–18, 36 P.3d 1025 (2001) (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970)). A defendant does not have the......