Stephenson v. Chappell

• Decision Date: 13 May 1896
• Citation: 36 S.W. 482
• Parties: STEPHENSON et al. v. CHAPPELL et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

36 S.W. 482

STEPHENSON et al. v. CHAPPELL et al.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

May 13, 1896.

Appeal from district court, Dallas county; Edward Gray, Judge.

Action by Ella V. Thruston, as guardian of Eugenia W. and William A. Chappell, minors against Mary A. Stephenson and others, to recover their interest in the community estate of their grandmother. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Reversed.

Geo. H. Plowman and Joseph M. Cary, for appellants. Leake, Henry, Reeves & Greer and Word & Charlton, for appellees.

FLY, J.

In 1891, the suit from which this appeal resulted was brought by Mrs. Ella V. Thruston as guardian of the estates of Eugenia W. Chappell and William A. Chappell, her minor children by a former marriage. The statement of the matters pleaded made by appellees is correct, and we adopt it, as follows: "In 1877 Elizabeth A. H. Armstrong, grandmother of defendant in error, died intestate, leaving, surviving her, her husband, Samuel Armstrong, and three children, her only heirs, viz. Mary A. Stephenson, plaintiff in error and defendant in lower court, and William Armstrong, her children by her marriage with Samuel Armstrong, and John H. Chappell, a son by a former marriage. At the time of the death of the said Eliza A. H. Armstrong, she and her husband, the said Samuel A. H. Armstrong, owned community property, consisting of lands and personal property of the aggregate value of $10,000 and $25,000 in money. On November 10, 1880, said Samuel Armstrong qualified as survivor of the community estate in the manner prescribed by law. That he did not keep a fair and full account and statement of the community debts and expenses paid by him, and of the disposition by him of such community property, and had wholly failed to account to said minors for their interest in such community estate with the increase and profits thereof. That he sold and disposed of all the community personal property, and converted and appropriated to his own use all notes, accounts, claims, and moneys belonging to said community estate, which were on hand at the time of the death of Mrs. Armstrong. That the inventory filed by the said Samuel Armstrong on qualifying as survivor had been lost, and he had kept no account or statement of his doings and acts as such survivor or otherwise, and a better statement and account of the property coming into his hands and the disposition made thereof could not be ascertained and given. That portion of the land on hand at the time of Mrs. Armstrong's death had been sold by him, and the persons to whom sold, the amount received for each tract sold, and the date thereof, were set out, amounting in the aggregate to more than $100,000. That he had loaned out the community moneys at interest, and had failed to account to said minors for either the principal or interest thereon. On January 17, 1890, Samuel Armstrong died at the residence of the plaintiff in error, Mrs. Stephenson, then Mrs. Stevens, and at the time of his death he had in his possession $10,000 in money, a part of the community estate, and a large number of notes given in payment and part payment for community lands and community property so sold by him subsequent to November 10, 1880, amounting in the aggregate to $75,000, all of which were immediately seized and converted by her. Defendants in error prayed that an accounting might be had, and that it be ascertained in what amount the said Samuel Armstrong was indebted to them, and that an accounting be also had with plaintiff in error, and it be ascertained and determined how much of said notes, property, and moneys she had appropriated and converted, and for judgment against her for their interest therein, and that such judgment might be decreed to be a lien on the community estate now on hand. If not entitled to said relief, then defendants prayed for such relief as they might be entitled to under the law and the evidence."

There is no merit in the contention that a survivor, by paying over to the heirs pro rata shares of the inventoried value of the estate, becomes ipso facto the owner of the entire community estate. If heirs who were competent to contract should accept such sum or any other as their share of the estate they would, of course, have no claim on the estate, not because, however, they may have received their share as shown by the inventory, but because they had, by their acceptance, estopped themselves from claiming anything further in the absence of fraud or mistake. We think the survivor could make a settlement with the heirs, and that they could accept any sum for their share of the estate, provided the settlement was fairly made and the heirs were competent to contract; and, of course, the entire community estate in such case remaining after the settlement would be the property of the survivor. The object to be accomplished by the survivor is fixed by the statute, but the mode of carrying out and accomplishing the design is left largely to the discretion of the individual. He must pay off the community debts, but it is left to him to determine the manner of payment.

The vital question in this case, however, is, did the guardian of the minor children of John Chappell have the power and authority, under the law of her appointment, not only to receipt for money paid to her by the survivor, but thereby to release all the right, title, and interest that the minors had in the community estate? If she did, then the testimony as to the value of the lands and other property at the time of the settlement should have been admitted in evidence, and the issue should have been submitted to the jury; but if she did not have such authority, then the action of the court in excluding the testimony and in refusing to submit that issue was correct. We are of the opinion that the receipt of the guardian for the amount paid her by Samuel Armstrong did not relinquish the right and title that the heirs owned in the community estate, and its only effect was to make that amount with legal interest a charge against their portion of the estate. Upon the death of Mrs. Armstrong the legal title to his share of the land belonging to the community estate vested at once in John Chappell, and upon his death his children (the appellees) succeeded to all his rights, subject, of course, to the payment of community debts. Sayles' Civ. St. art. 1653. At the time that the guardian gave the receipt to the survivor, the title to their part of the lands had vested in the minors, and to divest them of their title it must be held that a guardian could sell the real property of the wards without any sanction or authority on the part of the court in which the guardianship was pending, and without the ceremony of...