In re Lyra Shipping Company, Ltd.

Decision Date02 July 1973
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 72-1010,72-992 and 72-1215.,72-973
Citation360 F. Supp. 1188
PartiesIn the matter of the complaint of LYRA SHIPPING COMPANY, LTD., as owner of the M/S GALAXY FAITH, for Exoneration from, or Limitation of Liability.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

Clarence Frost, Faris, Ellis, Cutrone, Gilmore & Lautenschlaeger, New Orleans, La., for Lyra Shipping Co., Ltd.

Joe L. Horne, New Orleans, La., for Tex-Barge, Inc. and Marine Tow, Inc.

F. A. Courtenay, Jr., Leach, Grossel-Rossi & Paysse, New Orleans, La., for Magnolia Marine Transport Co.

James G. Burke, Jr., Burke & Ballard, New Orleans, La., for Cabot Corp.

ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CASSIBRY, District Judge.

These cases grow out of the collision involving the GALAXY FAITH that occurred in the Inner Harbor Navigational Canal Locks. The defendant seeks to have the claims of various parties dismissed.

I. NATURE OF THE DAMAGES CLAIMED.

The damages claimed to have been sustained by the indicated claimants are as follows:

A. Tex-Barge, Inc. and Marine Tow, Inc.:

At the time of the collision described in the Complaint, the claimants' vessel M/V INLAND PILOT and its tow were bound from Mobile, Alabama, to Norco, Louisiana, to load cargo. Because of the collision referred to in the Complaint the vessel and its tow could not transit the Inner Harbor Navigational Canal Locks (hereinafter "Industrial Canal Locks") and the vessel and its tow were unable to reach Norco by that route. As stated in the Ninth Paragraph of their claim, Tex-Barge, Inc. and Marine Tow, Inc.

". . . have sustained damage consisting of delay and detention of the claimants' vessel M/V INLAND PILOT and Barges STCO-200, STCO-201, and STCO-202, loss of profits, additional fuel and other supplies consumed, additional crew hire paid, and other substantial expenses necessarily incurred. . . ."

B. Cabot Corporation:

Cabot Corporation had an agreement with Stellman Transportation Company, under which Stellman was to transport feedstock for Cabot from Pascagoula, Mississippi, to Krotz Springs, Louisiana, by the most direct water route. Stellman's vessel was unable to transit the Industrial Canal Locks because of the collision referred to in the Complaint and was required to return to Pascagoula. Stellman has made claim on Cabot for freight and demurrage and Cabot claims that if it is liable to Stellman, then Lyra Shipping is liable to it because of its negligence.

C. Magnolia Marine Transport Company:

Magnolia's vessel, the M/V VALDA, and its tow were bound from Buck's Landing, Alabama, to Port Arthur, Texas, but were unable to transit the Industrial Canal Locks because of the collision referred to in the Complaint. After waiting several days, the M/V VALDA and its tow

". . . proceeded down the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet in order to proceed along the coast of Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico to the mouth of the Mississippi River, up the Mississippi River to the Algiers Locks to the Intracoastal Canal and on to Port Arthur."

(See Paragraph 4 of Claim.)

Once in the Gulf, the tow encountered heavy ground swells which caused the tow to break up. As stated in the Sixth Paragraph 6 of its claim:

". . . the tow of the M/V VALDA broke up and all vessels were damaged and ultimately had to be rescued."
II. LEGAL CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Here, assuming for purposes of this motion that the claimants actually sustained the losses they describe, the defendant maintains that such losses are only indirect consequences of the collision of the GALAXY FAITH with the Industrial Canal Locks. The defendant argues that such damages are not recoverable because either (1) under admiralty law a third party has no right to sue a tortfeasor for damages which the third party has sustained as a result of a tort committed upon another, Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 1927, 275 U.S. 303, 48 S.Ct. 134, 72 L.Ed. 290; Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Marshland Dredging Co., Inc., 5 Cir. 1972, 455 F.2d 957; or (2) as a matter of law the losses claimed are too remote a consequence of the closure of the Industrial Canal Locks to constitute recoverable damages, Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2 Cir. 1968). Cf. Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2 Cir. 1964).

The plaintiffs claim they are clearly entitled to recover their damages, and seek to distinguish the cases cited by defendant. In Robins, for example, the time charterers of a vessel were seeking recovery for detention of the vessel resulting from negligent damage during shipyard repairs. The owners of the vessel had settled and released "all their claims." Robins thus held that an owner whose revenue-producing property is detained may indeed recover, but that one who happened to have a contract with the owner cannot also recover for his impairment from the same detention of the same property. Thus, plaintiff Tex-Barge argues, if its customers were the parties seeking recovery, Robins would likely be applicable; but here it is the owner of revenue-producing property and is as entitled to recover as were the settling shipowners in Robins.

Plaintiffs also argue that Congress has established a duty of all persons to keep free of obstructions any navigable waterway of the United States,1 and suggests further that this duty, if breached, will subject the person causing such obstruction to civil liability to whatever persons are injured thereby. That this civil remedy is available not only to the United States but to private parties or individuals as well as clearly established. In Lauritzen v. Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel District,2 the Court held that, while Federal navigation regulations prohibiting the obstruction of navigable waterways did not expressly provide for a cause of action for injured parties, such liability is clearly implied, and that civil liability is derived from 33 U.S.C.A. Section 403, pertaining to protection of navigable waters in favor of both the United States and private parties. Therefore, those who obstruct navigable waterways not only become liable to the United States, but in addition subject themselves to civil liability to any person or persons they particularly may have harmed as a result of the obstruction. Thus plaintiffs' claim that they are not merely third parties damaged incidentally by harms inflicted on others, but instead are persons directly aggrieved and possessing a cause of action in their own right.

Plaintiffs have also cited a case which defendant admits is on all fours with the present situation and in which liability was found to exist, In re China Union Lines, Ltd., 285 F.Supp. 426 (S.D. Tex.1967). In that case, the MV UNION RELIANCE negligently came into collision with the MV BEREAN in the Houston Ship Channel, and as a result, the channel was closed to all marine traffic for approximately two days. The plaintiff in that action filed suit against the UNION RELIANCE and her owners for loss of profits, additional fuel and other supplies consumed, additional crew hire paid, tug hire incurred to turn the vessel, debt time for longshoremen ordered in Houston and other substantial expenses. The plaintiff's argument was that the ship's obstruction of the channel created a public nuisance from which the plaintiff sustained special injuries, as distinguished from the theoretical and common injuries suffered by the public in general. This argument was based upon the statutorily created duty which has previously been discussed. The Court did not consider it necessary, however, to rely on such a theory in determining liability in that case. The Court stated that the case was simply one involving a negligent maritime tort, for which the vessel's owner is liable for all damages proximately resulting therefrom. The Court went further to say that the UNION RELIANCE certainly owed a duty to all those using or seeking to use the ship channel not to obstruct their passage. Further, the Court added that it was clearly foreseeable that a negligent collision in a narrow channel would effectively delay all traffic for at least some substantial period of time. When the negligence of the UNION RELIANCE caused the collision, the duty was breached, the foreseeable became fact, and defendant became liable for all the direct consequences thereof. Therefore, the Court held that such damages as the plaintiff was able to prove were incurred because they were denied normal access to the channel were recoverable. The Court's decision did not depend on whether the UNION RELIANCE was negligent in failing to clear the channel within a reasonable time; but instead the defendant was held responsible for all damages due to delay directly attributable to the negligent collision.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I believe that both the statutory "nuisance" doctrine and ordinary maritime tort law provide viable bases for recovery in this case. Under either rationale, it is plausible to argue that plaintiffs Tex-Barge, Inc. and Marine Tow, Inc., who incurred such additional expenses as extra fuel costs, wages, and the like can recover those damages upon proper proof, and I so hold.3 This, however, does not dispose of the problems of Cabot and Magnolia Marine Transport. Cabot Corporation occupies a position somewhat more remote from this accident that the plaintiffs Tex-Barge and Marine Tow. It, itself, was not a user of the Industrial Canal, but instead was a party having a contract with such a user, namely Stellman Transportation Co. The damages it seeks here, however, are the very ones which Stellman would be permitted to recover under my ruling with regard to Tex-Barge and Marine Tow. It does not attempt to recover additional sums growing out of impairment of its contractual obligations with more remote parties due to Stellman's late delivery.4 Under those circumstances, I can see no reason why Cabot cannot recoup any additional charges it may become liable to Stellman for as a...

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