Cooper v. Chrysler Grp., LLC

• Decision Date: 13 December 2011
• Docket Number: No. ED 96549.,ED 96549.
• Citation: 361 S.W.3d 60
• Parties: Kevin COOPER, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC, Defendant/Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

361 S.W.3d 60

Kevin COOPER, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC, Defendant/Respondent.

No. ED 96549.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Two.

Dec. 13, 2011.Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied Jan. 23, 2012.

Application for Transfer Denied

April 3, 2012.

Eric D. Holland, Steven L. Groves, Holland, Groves, Schneller & Stolze, LLC, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.

Maureen A. McGlynn, Benjamin A. Shelledy, Kortenhof McGlynn LLC, St. Louis, MO, for respondent.

KATHIANNE KNAUP CRANE, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff, Kevin Cooper, appeals from the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant, Chrysler Group, LLC, in his negligence action to recover damages for injuries suffered in a workplace slip and fall. The trial court entered summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff's exclusive remedy for damages caused by injuries arising from a slip and fall on his employer's premises was with the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (the Commission), where his workers' compensation claim was pending. We reverse and remand with directions to the circuit court to enter a stay of proceedings until the Commission has determined whether there was an “accidental injury” as defined by the Workers' Compensation Law.

UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 2, 2007, plaintiff slipped on the floor of his employer's ¹ place of business in the course and scope of his employment. On March 9, 2007, plaintiff filed a claim for compensation with the Division of Workers' Compensation for injuries to his back and to his body as a whole from the March 2, 2007, slip and fall. Defendant filed an answer to plaintiff's claim in which it admitted that plaintiff was an employee, that the parties were working under and subject to the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, and that plaintiff “sustained a workplace accident.” Defendant provided physical therapy to plaintiff as treatment for the injuries he allegedly sustained on March 2, 2007.

On October 15, 2009, counsel for defendant confirmed by letter that defendant disputed medical causation, and asserted that “claimant's surgery was not necessitated by the fall.” On January 28, 2010, counsel for defendant confirmed in an email to plaintiffs counsel that defendant “did not deny the accident, but rather, challenged whether surgery in 2008 was related to the accident.”

In the meantime, plaintiff filed a civil lawsuit against defendant. As amended, the petition sought “damages on the same set of facts and for the same injury as that alleged in his workers' compensation claim.” Defendant filed an answer in which it asserted as one of its affirmative defenses the exclusivity of plaintiff's remedy under the Workers' Compensation Law. Defendant thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment in the circuit court on the ground that plaintiffs exclusive remedy was under the Workers' Compensation Law. At the time the summary judgment motion was filed, plaintiff's workers' compensation claim was still pending. Plaintiff opposed the summary judgment motion on the ground that the Act was not the exclusive remedy because the fall was not “the prevailing factor” in plaintiffs injury and was not an “accident” as defined in the Workers' Compensation Law. The trial court entered summary judgment in defendant's favor.

DISCUSSION

I. Exclusivity of Workers' Compensation Law

For his sole point on appeal, plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment because “defendant's denial of plaintiff's workers' compensation claim on the basis that the March 2, 2007[,] slip and fall incident is not the prevailing factor in plaintiff's medical condition takes the claim outside the exclusive scope of the workers' compensation law in that plaintiff's incident is not an injury or accident as defined by the act.”

As a preliminary matter, we observe that plaintiff's point relied on is based on the assumption that defendant “denied” plaintiff's workers' compensation claim and did so on the ground that the slip and fall was not the “prevailing factor” in plaintiff's medical condition. The record that plaintiff cites does not support the assumptions that defendant “denied” the claim or that it claimed the slip and fall was not the “prevailing factor.” Rather, the record cited in plaintiff's brief shows that defendant admitted the applicability of the Workers' Compensation Law and that plaintiff had sustained an accident, but that the parties disputed whether claimant's 2008 back surgery was caused by the fall.

Plaintiffs legal theory is that because the 2005 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Law narrowed the definition of “injury,” if his injury was not within that definition, he has a right to bring a civil action. He relies on Missouri Alliance v. Dept. of Labor, 277 S.W.3d 670 (Mo. banc 2009) (plurality opinion). In Missouri Alliance, the plurality first reviewed the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law as set out in section 287.120 RSMo (Cum.Supp.2006).² It concluded: “This section makes the act the exclusive remedy for the employee only on account of ‘such accidental injury or death.’ In other words, it is the exclusive remedy only for those ‘injuries' that come within the definition of the term ‘accident’ under the act.” Id. The plurality then reviewed the definition of “accident” as contained in section 287.020.2, and concluded:

Read together, this means that if an “injury” comes within the definition of the term “accident” as defined in section 287.020.2, then it is included within the exclusivity provisions of the act, and recovery can be had, if at all, only under the terms set out in the act. If the “injury” is one that is not included within the term “accident” as defined in the act, however, then under section 287.120.1 an employer shall not be liable to the employee under the act and the injury, therefore, is not subject to the exclusivity provisions of the act....Id. It added: “Workers excluded from the act by the narrower definition of ‘accidental injury’ have a right to bring suit under the common law, just as they could and did prior to the initial adoption of the act.” Id. at 680.

Missouri Alliance did not address or purport to change the primary jurisdiction doctrine, under which the Commission has original jurisdiction to determine issues of fact within its jurisdiction. The primary jurisdiction doctrine provides that “courts will not decide a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal until after that tribunal has rendered its decision.” Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Mo. banc 1991). Pursuant to this doctrine, the Commission has original jurisdiction to determine the fact issues that establish whether or not a claim is subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. Hannah v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 723, 726 (Mo. banc 1982) (citing Sheen v. DiBella, 395 S.W.2d 296, 303 (Mo.App.1965)); see also State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Nixon, 219 S.W.3d 846, 849 (Mo.App.2007); Deckard v. O'Reilly Automotive, Inc., 31 S.W.3d 6, 14 (Mo.App.2000), overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Mo. banc 2003); State ex rel. FAG Bearings Corp. v. Perigo, 8 S.W.3d 118, 121 (Mo.App.1999). These questions arise “(1) where administrative knowledge and expertise are demanded; (2) to determine technical, intricate fact questions; (3) where uniformity is important to the regulatory scheme.” Killian, 802 S.W.2d at 160. See Deckard, 31 S.W.3d at 14. In other words, the primary jurisdiction doctrine applies to questions involving “administrative expertise, technical factual situations and regulatory systems in which uniformity of administration is essential.” Jones v. Jay Truck Driver Training Center, 709 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Mo. banc 1986), overruled on other grounds by McCracken v. Wal–Mart Stores East, LP, 298 S.W.3d 473, 479, 479 n. 3 (Mo. banc 2009). These questions include determinations of whether there was an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, Harris v. Westin Management Co. East, 230 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Mo. banc 2007); Killian, 802 S.W.2d at 160; State ex rel. Consumer Adj. v. Anderson, 815 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Mo.App.1991); Jones, 709 S.W.2d at 115, and whether an employee's injury resulted from an accident or an intentional act. Killian, 802 S.W.2d at 160–61; Nixon, 219 S.W.3d at 849; Deckard, 31 S.W.3d at 14–15; see also Perigo, 8 S.W.3d at 122. Thus, under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the circuit court does not have the authority to determine the question of whether there was an “accidental injury” within the definitions of the Workers' Compensation Law.

As applied to this case, the issue of whether there was an “accidental injury” and specifically the issue of whether the need for the 2008 surgery was caused by the March 2, 2007, workplace accident are clearly disputed questions of fact that the circuit court does not have the authority to decide because they are within the Commission's original jurisdiction. The trial court did not err in finding from the uncontested facts before it that this contested issue was within the Commission's jurisdiction. However, for the reasons that follow, the question whether summary judgment is the proper remedy at this stage of the proceedings merits plain error review.

II. Plain Error Review of Remedy

In his brief, plaintiff did not raise the question of whether summary judgment was the proper remedy if, as we have held, the trial court did not err in concluding that the issue of whether plaintiff sustained an accidental injury was within the exclusive authority of the Commission. Because plaintiff failed to brief this issue, we can reverse and remand only if we find plain error under Rule 84.13(c). That rule provides that “[p]lain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered on appeal, in the discretion...