Anderson v. Dassault Aviation, 361 F.3d 449 (Fed. 8th Cir. 3/4/2004), 03-2422.
| Decision Date | 04 March 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-2422.,03-2422. |
| Citation | 361 F.3d 449 |
| Parties | Beverly Anderson, Appellant v. Dassault Aviation, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Scott Melton, argued, Grand Rapids, MI (Ted Boswell and John Andrew Ellis, Bryant, AR, on the brief), for appellant.
John G. Pfeiffer, argued, Chicago, IL (David J. Adams and Kathryn Wyatt Zimmerman, Chicago, IL, and M. Stephen Bingham of Little Rock, AR, on the brief), for Appellee.
Before WOLLMAN, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
This is a product liability suit brought by Beverly Anderson, a Michigan resident, to recover for injuries that she suffered while working as a flight attendant on a Dassault Falcon business jet owned by her employer, Amway Corporation. The jet was on its descent into a Michigan airport when it underwent a series of pitch oscillations, allegedly buffeting Ms. Anderson about in the aircraft and causing her injuries. The jet was manufactured in France by Dassault Aviation, a French corporation. Business jets manufactured by Dassault Aviation, which account for the majority of the company's revenue, are sold under the trade name Falcon, and are exclusively sold and leased in the western hemisphere by Dassault Falcon Jet Corporation, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Dassault Aviation. (Dassault Aviation and various of its subsidiaries, including Dassault Falcon Jet, are known collectively as Dassault Aviation Group.) Dassault Falcon Jet bought the jet on which Ms. Anderson was injured from Dassault Aviation in France, and then flew the jet to Little Rock, Arkansas, where it completed the jet and sold and delivered it to Amway.
Ms. Anderson initially filed suit in the Western District of Michigan against Dassault Aviation, Dassault Falcon Jet, and Honeywell, Inc. (which manufactured the autopilot in the jet). The Michigan district court granted Dassault Aviation's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, leaving Ms. Anderson's action against Honeywell and Dassault Falcon Jet pending there. Ms. Anderson then re-filed the suit against Dassault Aviation in the Eastern District of Arkansas. The Arkansas district court granted Dassault Aviation's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, from which Ms. Anderson now appeals. We review the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction de novo. See Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 948 (1994). Because we conclude that Dassault Aviation has sufficient contacts with Arkansas to subject it to personal jurisdiction there consistent with due process, we reverse.
In a diversity action, a federal court may assume jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if the requirements of the forum state's long-arm statute are satisfied and the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Maples Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 1996). Arkansas's long-arm statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-4-101, gives the state's courts personal jurisdiction over persons and claims "to the maximum extent permitted by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution." The only issue in this appeal is thus whether the due process clause permits an Arkansas court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over Dassault Aviation.
In order for an Arkansas court to assert personal jurisdiction over Dassault Aviation consistent with due process, Dassault Aviation must "have certain minimum contacts" with Arkansas "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Dassault Aviation's contacts with Arkansas must be sufficient to cause it "reasonably [to] anticipate being haled into court there." Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Whether due process is satisfied depends not only on the quantity of contacts that Dassault Aviation has with Arkansas, but also on the "quality and nature" of those contacts, see International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. In assessing the nature of the contacts between Dassault Aviation and Arkansas, appropriate circumstances to consider include the burden on Dassault Aviation of litigating the case in Arkansas, the interests of Arkansas in adjudicating the dispute, Ms. Anderson's interests in obtaining convenient and effective relief, "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies." See Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 374 (8th Cir. 1990).
Dassault Aviation's contacts with Arkansas result, in large part, from its business relationship with Dassault Falcon Jet, which operates a large production site in Little Rock that completes Falcon jets to customers' specifications. The district court determined that Dassault Aviation itself was neither present nor doing business in Arkansas, and that Dassault Falcon Jet's activities there were relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry only if Ms. Anderson could "pierce the corporate veil" and show that Dassault Aviation's wholly owned subsidiary was actually its "alter ego." Concluding that Dassault Aviation did not sufficiently control and dominate the affairs of Dassault Falcon Jet to allow Dassault Falcon Jet's corporate existence to be disregarded, the district court granted Dassault Aviation's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The district court relied on Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 645-47 (8th Cir. 2003), in which we held that a holding company which owned stock in various companies, including a title and guaranty company, was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Arkansas based on the title and guaranty company's Arkansas activities. Dassault Aviation contends that we established a bright-line rule in Epps under which, when asking whether assertion of personal jurisdiction over a parent corporation comports with due process, the activities of the parent's subsidiary must be entirely disregarded unless the subsidiary's corporate veil can be pierced under state law. We did note in Epps that the plaintiffs were unable to pierce the subsidiary's corporate veil. See id. at 650. But in reaching our conclusion that the holding company's "mere ownership of [the title and guaranty company] is too distant and limited a contact with Arkansas to justify subjecting it to the District Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction," id., we also noted that the "circumstances in each case much be examined to determine whether a corporation through the activities of another corporation has subjected itself to jurisdiction in a state under its long arm statute," id. at 649 (internal quotations omitted).
We think that the district court placed undue reliance on the principle of piercing the corporate veil. Determining the propriety of jurisdiction at a particular place always involves applying principles of fairness and reasonableness to a distinct set of facts, and the determination is not readily amenable to rigid rules that can be applied across the entire spectrum of cases. In any event, this case is clearly distinguishable from Epps, because, as discussed below, Dassault Aviation's contacts with Arkansas go well beyond "mere ownership" of Dassault Falcon Jet. We agree with Ms. Anderson that neither physical presence in Arkansas nor piercing Dassault Falcon Jet's corporate veil is required to establish the minimum contacts necessary for the exercise of personal jurisdiction in Arkansas. Dassault Aviation's establishment of a distribution system in Arkansas, and marketing its products there, are matters that we may appropriately consider in determining whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction in Arkansas comports with due process.
We conclude that Dassault Aviation has sufficient contacts with Arkansas to support an Arkansas court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over it whether or not Dassault Falcon Jet is its alter ego. Dassault Aviation and Dassault Falcon Jet have a close, synergistic relationship that is not an abuse of the corporate organizational form, but is clearly relevant to the...
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