Kinsella v. United States Singleton

• Decision Date: 18 January 1960
• Docket Number: No. 22,22
• Citation: 361 U.S. 234,4 L.Ed.2d 268,80 S.Ct. 297
• Parties: KINSELLA, Warden, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES ex rel. SINGLETON
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

361 U.S. 234

80 S.Ct. 297

4 L.Ed.2d 268

KINSELLA, Warden, Appellant,

v UNITED STATES ex rel. SINGLETON.

No. 22.

Argued Oct. 22, 1959.

Decided Jan. 18, 1960.

Mr. Harold H. Greene, Washington, D.C., for appellant.

Mr. Frederick Bernays Wiener, Washington, D.C., for appellee.

Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.

This direct appeal tests the constitutional validity of peace time court-martial trials of civilian persons 'accompanying the armed forces outside the United States'¹ and charged with noncapital offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 802, 70A Stat. 37. Appellee contends that the dependent wife of a soldier can be tried only in a court that affords her the safeguards of Article III and of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution. The trial court held Article 2(11) of the Code unconstitutional as applied to civilian dependents accompanying the armed forces overseas and charged with noncapital offenses, D.C., 164 F.Supp. 707, and the Government appealed. We noted probable jurisdiction and permitted appellee to proceed in forma pauperis. 359 U.S. 903, 79 S.Ct. 581, 3 L.Ed.2d 569.

The appellee is the mother of Mrs. Joanna S. Dial, the wife of a soldier who was assigned to a tank battalion of the United States Army. The Dials and their three children lived in government housing quarters at Baumholder, Germany. In consequence of the death of one of their children, both of the Dials were charged with unpremeditated murder, under Article 118(2) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 10 U.S.C.A. § 918(2). Upon the Dials' offer to plead guilty to involuntary manslaughter under Article 119 of the Code, 10 U.S.C.A. § 919, both charges were withdrawn and new ones charging them separately with the lesser offense were returned. They were then tried together before a general court-martial at Baumholder. Mrs. Dial challenged the jurisdiction of the court-martial over her but, upon denial of her motion, pleaded guilty, as did her husband. Each was sentenced to the maximum penalty permitted under the Code. Their convictions were upheld by the Court of Military Appeals, and Mrs. Dial was returned to the United States and placed in the Federal Reformatory for Women at Alderson, West Virginia. Thereafter the appellee filed this petition for habeas corpus and obtained Mrs. Dial's discharge from custody. From this judgment the warden has appealed.

As has been noted, the jurisdiction of the court-martial was based upon the provisions of Article 2(11) of the Code. The Congress enacted that article in an effort to extend, for disciplinary reasons, the coverage of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to the classes of persons therein enumerated. The jurisdiction of the Code only attached, however, when and if its applicability in a given foreign territory was sanctioned under 'any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party' with the foreign sovereignty, or under 'any accepted rule of international law.' The existence of such an agreement here is admitted. The constitutionality of Article 2(11), as it applies in time of peace to civilian dependents charged with noncapital offenses under the Code, is the sole issue to be decided.

The question is not one of first impression, as we had before us in 1956 the constitutionality of the article as applied to civilian dependents charged with capital offenses, in the companion cases of Kinsella v. Krueger 351 U.S. 470, 76 S.Ct. 886, 100 L.Ed. 1342, and Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487, 76 S.Ct. 880, 100 L.Ed. 1352. At the original submission of those cases, we decided by a bare majority that the article was a valid exercise of the power of the Congress, under art. IV, § 3, to 'make all needful Rules and Regulations' for the 'Territories' of the United States. We held further that the 'procedure in such tribunals need not comply with the standards prescribed by the Constitution for Article III courts,' 351 U.S. at page 475, 76 S.Ct. at page 889, and specifically upheld court-martial jurisdiction in such cases against the contention that its procedures did not provide for indictment by grand jury or trial by petit jury. In short, we said that the failure to provide such protections raised 'no constitutional defect,' citing In re Ross, 1891, 140 U.S. 453, 11 S.Ct. 897, 36 L.Ed. 581, and the Insular Cases, such as Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 1922, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S.Ct. 343, 66 L.Ed. 627. After rehearing at the following Term, these opinions were withdrawn and judgments were entered declaring the article unconstitutional when applied to civilian dependents charged with capital offenses. Reid v. Covert, consolidated with Kinsella v. Krueger, 1957, 354 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148. The Court held² that the power over 'Territories,' as applied by the In re Ross doctrine, was neither applicable nor controlling. It found that trial by court-martial was the exercise of an exceptional jurisdiction springing from the power granted the Congress in art. I, § 8, cl. 14, 'To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,' as supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause of art. I, § 8, cl. 18.³ But as applied to the civilian dependents there involved it must be considered, the Court said, in relation to Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The majority concluded that, in those capital cases, trial by court-martial as provided could not constitutionally be justified.

The appellee contends that this result, declaring civilian dependents charged with capital offenses not to be subject to the provisions of the Code, bears directly on its applicability to the same class charged with noncapital crimes. She says that the test of whether civilian dependents come within the power of Congress as granted in Clause 14's limitation to the 'land and naval Forces' is the status of the person involved. Her conclusion is that if civilian dependents charged with capital offenses are not within that language, a fortiori, persons in the same class charged with noncapital offenses cannot be included, since the clause draws no distinction as to offenses. The Government fully accepts the holding in the second Covert case, supra. It contends that the case is controlling only where civilian dependents are charged with capital offenses, and that in fact the concurrences indicate that considerations of a compelling necessity for prosecution by courts-martial of civilian dependents charged with noncapital offenses might permit with reason the inclusion of that limited category within court-martial jurisdiction. It submits that such necessities are controlling in the case of civilian dependents charged with noncapital crimes. It points out that such dependents affect the military community as a whole; that they have, in fact, been permitted to enjoy their residence in such communities on the representation that they are subject to military control; and that realistically they are a part of the military establishment. It argues that, from a morale standpoint, the present need for dependents to accompany American forces maintained abroad is a press- ing one; that their special status as integral parts of the military community requires disciplinary control over them by the military commander; that the effectiveness of this control depends upon a readily available machinery affording a prompt sanction and resulting deterrent present only in court-martial jurisdiction; and that not only is court-martial procedure inherently fair but there are no alternatives to it. The Government further contends that it has entered into international agreements with a large number of foreign governments permitting the exercise of military jurisdiction in the territory of the signatories, and pursuant to the same it has been utilizing court-martial procedures at various American installations abroad. Its legal theory is based on historical materials which it asserts indicate a well-established practice of court-martial jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the armed forces, during Colonial days as well as the formative period of our Constitution. From this it concludes that civilian dependents may be included as a necessary and proper incident to the congressional power 'To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,' as granted in Clause 14.

In this field, United States ex rel. Toth v. Qualres, 1955, 350 U.S. 11, 76 S.Ct. 1, 100 L.Ed. 8, cited with approval by a majority in the second Covert case, supra, is a landmark. Likewise, of course, we must consider the effect of the latter case on our problem.⁴ We therefore turn to their teachings. The Toth case involved a discharged soldier who was tried by court-martial after his discharge from the Army, for an offense committed before his discharge. It was said there that the Clause 14 'provision itself does not empower Congress to deprive people of trials under Bill of Rights safeguards,' 350 U.S. at pages 21—22, 76 S.Ct. at page 8, and that military tribunals must be restricted 'to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops in active service,' id., 350 U.S. at page 22, 76 S.Ct. at page 8. We brushed aside the thought that 'considerations of discipline' could provide an excuse for 'new expansion of court-martial jurisdiction at the expense of normal and constitutionally preferable systems of trial by jury.' Id., 350 U.S. at pages 22—23, 76 S.Ct. at page 8. (Italics supplied.) We were therefore 'not willing to hold that power to circumvent these safeguards should be inferred through the Necessary and Proper Clause.' Id., 350 U.S. at page 22, 76 S.Ct. at page 8. The holding of the case may be summed up in its own words, namely, that 'the power granted Congress 'To make Rules' to regulate 'the land and naval Forces' would seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction to persons who are...