Elroy v. United States Guagliardo Wilson v. Bohlender, s. 21

Decision Date18 January 1960
Docket Number37,Nos. 21,s. 21
PartiesMcELROY, Secretary of Defense, et al., Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES ex rel. Dominic GUAGLIARDO. Bruce WILSON, Petitioner, v. Major General John F. BOHLENDER, Commander, Fitzsimons Army Hospital
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Mr. Oscar H. Davis, Washington, D.C., for petitioners McElroy and others.

Mr. Michael A. Schuchat, Washington, D.C., for respondent Guagliardo.

Mr. Frederick Bernays Wiener, Washington, D.C., for petitioner Wilson.

Mr. Harold H. Greene, Washington, D.C., for respondent Bohlender.

Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.

These are companion cases to Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 80 S.Ct. 297, and Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 80 S.Ct. 310. All the cases involve the application of Article 2(11)1 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Here its application to noncapital offenses committed by civilian employees of the armed forces while stationed overseas is tested.

In No. 21 the respondent, a civilian employee of the Air Force performing the duties of an electrical lineman, was convicted by court-martial at the Nouasseur Air Depot near Casablanca, Morocco, of larceny and conspiracy to commit larceny from the supply house at the Depot. Before being transferred to the United States Disciplinary Barracks, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania, respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that the military authorities had no jurisdiction to try him by court-martial. This petition was dismissed. D.C., 158 F.Supp. 171. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered respondent discharged. It held that Reid v Covert, 1957, 354 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148, was binding as to all classes of persons included within the section and that each class was nonseverable. 104 U.S.App.D.C. 112, 259 F.2d 927. We granted certiorari, 359 U.S. 904, 79 S.Ct. 580, 3 L.Ed.2d 570, in view of the conflict with Grisham v. Taylor, 3 Cir., 261 F.2d 204.

In No. 37, petitioner, a civilian auditor employed by the United States Army and stationed in Berlin, was convicted by a general court-martial on a plea of guilty to three acts of sodomy. While serving his five-year sentence, petitioner filed a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for Colorado. The petition was dismissed, 167 F.Supp. 791, and appeal was perfected to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Prior to argument we granted certiorari.2 359 U.S. 906, 79 S.Ct. 601, 3 L.Ed.2d 571.

We first turn to respondent Guagliardo's contention that Article 2(11) is nonseverable. As desirable as it is to avoid constitutional issues, we cannot do so on this ground. The Act provides for severability of the remaining section if 'a part of this Act is invalid in one or more of its applications.' 70A Stat. 640. The intention of Congress in providing for severability is clear, and legal effect can be given to each category standing alone. See Dorchy v. State of Kansas, 1924, 264 U.S. 286, 290, 44 S.Ct. 323, 324, 68 L.Ed. 686.

We believe that these cases involing the applicability of Article 2(11) to employees of the armed services while serving outside the United States are controlled by our opinion in Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 80 S.Ct. 297, and Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 80 S.Ct. 310, announced today. In Singleton we refused, in the light of Reid v. Covert, 1957, 354 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148, to apply the provisions of the article to noncapital offenses committed by dependents of soldiers in the armed services while overseas; in Grisham we held that there was no constitutional distinction for purposes of court-martial jurisdiction between dependents and employees insofar as application of the death penalty is concerned. The rationale of those cases applies here.

Although it is true that there are materials supporting trial of sutlers and other civilians by courts-martial, these materials are 'too expisodic, too meager, to form a solid basis in history, preceding and contemporaneous with the framing of the Constitution, for constitutional adjudication.' Concurring opinion, Covert, 354 U.S. at page 64, 77 S.Ct. at page 1255. Furthermore, those trials during the Revolutionary Period, on which it is claimed than court-martial jurisdiction rests, were all during a period of war, and hence are inapplicable here. Moreover, the materials are not by any means one-sided. The recognized authority on court-martial jurisdiction, after a careful consideration of all the historical background, concluded: 'That a civilian, entitled as he is, by Art. VI of the Amendments to the Constitution, to trial by jury, cannot legally be made liable to the military law and jurisdiction, in time of peace, is a fundamental principle of our public law * * *.'3 But it is contended that Ex parte Reed, 1879, 100 U.S. 13, 25 L.Ed. 538, is controlling because the forces covered by Article 2(11) are overseas and therefore 'in the field.' Examination of that case, as well as Johnson v. Sayre, 1895, 158 U.S. 109, 15 S.Ct. 773, 39 L.Ed. 914, however, shows them to be entirely inapposite. Those cases permitted trial by courts-martial of paymasters' clerks in the navy. The Court found that such a position was 'an important one in the machinery of the navy,' the appointment being made only upon approval of the commander of the ship and for a permanent tenure 'until discharged.' Also the paymaster's clerk was required to agree in writing 'to submit to the laws and regulations for the government and discipline of the navy.' Moreover, from time immemorial the law of the sea has placed the power of disciplinary action in the commander of the ship when at sea or in a foreign port. None of these considerations are present here. As we shall point out subsequently, a procedure along the lines of that used by the navy as to paymasters' clerks might offer a practical alternative to the use of civilian employees by the armed services. As was stated in the second Covert case, supra, 354 U.S. at page 23, 77 S.Ct. at page 1233, 'there might be circumstances where a person could be 'in' the armed services for purposes of Clause 14 even though he had not formally been inducted into the military * * *.'

The only other authorities cited in support of court-martial jurisdiction over civilians appear to be opinions by the Attorney General and the Judge Advocate General of the Army. However, the 1866 opinion of the Judge Advocate General (cited in support of the Government's position) was repudiated by subsequent Judge Advocate Generals.4 To be sure, the 1872 opinion of the Attorney General, dealing with civilians serving with troops in the building of defensive earthworks to protect against threatened Indian uprisings, is entitled to some weight. However, like the other examples of frontier activities based on the legal concept of the troops' being 'in the field,' they are inapposite here. They were in time of 'hostilities' with Indian tribes or were in 'territories' governed by entirely different considerations. See second Covert, 354 U.S. at pages 12—13, 77 S.Ct. at page 1228. Such opinions, however, do not have the force of judicial decisions and, where so 'episodic,' have little weight in the reviewing of administrative practice. Moreover, in the performance of such functions as were involved there, the military service would today use engineering corps subject to its jurisdiction. This being entirely practical, as we hereafter point out, as to all civilians serving with the armed forces today, we believe the Toth doctrine, United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 76 S.Ct. 1, 100 L.Ed. 8, that we must limit the coverage of Clause 14 to 'the least possible power adequate to the end proposed,' 350 U.S., at page 23, 76 S.Ct. at page 8, to be...

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