Federal Trade Commission v. Henry Broch Company

Decision Date06 June 1960
Docket NumberNo. 61,61
Citation80 S.Ct. 1158,363 U.S. 166,4 L.Ed.2d 1124
PartiesFEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. HENRY BROCH & COMPANY
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Mr. Daniel M. Friedman, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mr. Frederick M. Rowe, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr. Henry J. Bison, Jr., Washington, D.C., for the National Association of Retail Grocers of the United States, as amicus curiae.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 2(c) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,1 makes it unlawful for 'any person' to make an allowance in lieu of 'brokerage' to the 'other party to such transaction.' The question is whether that prohibition is applicable to the following transactions by respondent.

Respondent is a broker or sales representative for a number of principals who sell food products. One of the principals is Canada Foods Ltd., a processor of apple concentrate and other products. Respondent agreed to act for the Canada Foods for a 5% Commission. Other brokers working for the same principal were promised a 4% Commission. Respondent's commission was higher because it stocked merchandise in advance of sales. Canada Foods established a price for its 1954 pack of apple concentrate at $1.30 per gallon in 50-gallon drums and authorized its brokers to negotiate sales at that price.

The J. M. Smucker Co., a buyer, negotiated with another broker, Phipps, also working for Canada Foods, for apple concentrate. Smucker wanted a lower price than $1.30 but Canada Foods would not agree. Smucker finally offered $1.25 for a 500-gallon purchase. That was turned down by Canada Foods, acting through Phipps. Canada Foods took the position that the only way the price could be lowered would be through reduction in brokerage. About the same time respondent was negotiating with Smucker. Canada Foods told respondent what it had told Phipps, that the price to the buyer could be reduced only if the brokerage were cut; and it added that it would make the sale at $1.25—the buyer's bid—if respondent would agree to reduce its brokerage from 5% To 3%. Respondent agreed and the sale was consummated at that price and for that brokerage. The reduced price of $1.25 was thereafter granted Smucker on subsequent sales. But on sales to all other customers, whether through respondent or other brokers, the price continued to be $1.30 and in each instance respondent received the full 5% Commission. Only on sales through respondent to Smucker were the selling price and the brokerage reduced.

The customary brokerage fee of 5% To respondent would have been $2,036.84. The actual brokerage of 3% Received by respondent was $1,222.11. The reduction of brokerage was $814.73 which is 50% Of the total price reduction of $1,629.47 granted by Canada Foods to Smucker.

The Commission charged respondent with violating § 2(c) of the Act, and after a hearing and the making of findings entered a cease-and-desist order against respondent. The Court of Appeals, while not questioning the findings of fact of the Commission, reversed. 261 F.2d 725. The case is here on writ of certiorari, 360 U.S. 908, 79 S.Ct. 1297, 3 L.Ed.2d 1259.

The Robinson-Patman Act was enacted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing power. A lengthy investigation revealed that large chain buyers were obtaining competitive advantages in several ways other than direct price concessions2 and were thus avoiding the impact of the Clayton Act.3 One of the favorite means of obtaining an indirect price concession was by setting up 'dummy' brokers who were employed by the buyer and who, in many cases, rendered no services. The large buyers demanded that the seller pay 'brokerage' to these fictitious brokers who then turned it over to their employer. This practice was one of the chief targets of § 2(c) of the Act.4 But it was not the only means by which the brokerage function was abused5 and Congress in its wisdom phrased § 2(c) broadly, not only to cover the other methods then in existence but all other means by which brokerage could be used to effect price discrimination.6 The particular evil at which § 2(c) is aimed can be as easily perpetrated by a seller's broker as by the seller himself. The seller and his broker can of course agree on any brokerage fee that they wish. Yet when they agree upon one, only to reduce it when necessary to meet the demands of a favored buyer, they use the reduction in brokerage to undermine the policy of § 2(c). The seller's broker is clearly 'any person' as the words are used in § 2(c)—as clearly such as a buyer's broker.

It is urged that the seller is free to pass on to the buyer in the form of a price reduction any differential between his ordinary brokerage expense and the brokerage commission which he pays on a particular sale because § 2(a)7 of the Act permits price differentials based on savings in selling costs resulting from differing methods of distribution. From this premise it is reasoned that a seller's broker should not be held to have violated § 2(c) for having done that which is permitted under § 2(a). We need not decide the validity of that premise, because the fact that a transaction may not violate one section of the Act does not answer the question whether another section has been violated. Section 2(c), with which we are here concerned, is independent of § 2(a) and was enacted by Congress because § 2(a) was not considered adequate to deal with abuses of the brokerage function.8

Before the Act was passed the large buyers, who maintained their own elaborate purchasing departments and therefore did not need the services of a seller's broker because they bought their merchandise directly from the seller, demanded and received allowances reflecting these savings in the cost of distribution. In many cases they required that 'brokerage' be paid to their own purchasing agents. After the Act was passed they discarded the facade of 'brokerage' and merely received a price reduction equivalent to the seller's ordinary brokerage expenses in sales to other customers. When haled before the Commission, they protested that the transaction was not covered by § 2(c) but, since it was a price reduction, was governed by § 2(a). They also argued that because no brokerage services were needed or used in sales to them, they were entitled to a price differential reflecting this cost saving. Congress had anticipated such a contention by the 'in lieu thereof' provision.9 Accord- ingly, the Commission10 and the courts11 early rejected the contention that such a price reduction was lawful because the buyer's purchasing organization had saved the seller the amount of his ordinary brokerage expense.

In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 3 Cir., 1939, 106 F.2d 667, a buyer sought to evade § 2(c) by accepting price reductions equivalent to the seller's normal brokerage payments. The court upheld the Commission's view that the price reduction was an allowance in lieu of brokerage under § 2(c) and was prohibited even though, in fact, the seller had 'saved' his brokerage expense by dealing directly with the select buyer. The buyer also sought to justify its price reduction on the ground that it had rendered valuable services to the seller. The court rejected this argument also. Although that court's interpretation of the 'services rendered' exception in § 2(c) has been criticized,12 its conclusion that the price reduction was an allowance in lieu of brokerage within the meaning of § 2(c) has been followed13 and accepted.14

We are asked to distinguish these precedents on the ground that there is no claim by the present buyer that the price reduction, concededly based in part on a saving to the seller of part of his regular brokerage cost on the particular sale, was justified by the elimination of services normally performed by the seller or his broker. There is no evidence that the buyer rendered any services to the seller or to the respondent nor that anything in its method of dealing justified its getting a discriminatory price by means of a reduced brokerage charge. We would have quite a different case if there were such evidence and we need not explore the applicability of § 2(c) to such circumstances. One thing is clear—the absence of such evidence and the absence of a claim that the rendition of services or savings in distribution costs justified the allowance does not support the view that § 2(c) has not been violated.

The fact that the buyer was not aware that its favored price was based in part on a discriminatory reduction in respondent's brokerage commission is immaterial. The Act is aimed at price discrimination, not conspiracy. The buyer's intent might be relevant were he charged with receiving an allowance in violation of § 2(c). But certainly it has no bearing on whether the respondent has violated the law. The powerful buyer who demands a price concession is concerned only with getting it. He does not care whether it comes from the seller, the seller's broker, or both.

Congress enacted the Robinson-Patman Act to prevent sellers and sellers' brokers from yielding to the economic pressures of a large buying organization by granting unfair preferences in connection with the sale of goods. The form in which the buyer pressure is exerted is immaterial and proof of its existence is not required. It is rare that the motive in yielding to a buyer's demands is not the 'necessity' for making the sale. An 'independent' broker is not likely to be independent of the buyer's coercive bargaining power. He, like the seller, is constrained to favor the buyers with the most purchasing power. If respondent merely paid over part of his commission to the buyer, he clearly would have violated the Act. We see no distinction of substance between the two transactions. In each case the...

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