Fain v. Duff
| Decision Date | 15 January 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 72-604-Civ-J-M.,72-604-Civ-J-M. |
| Citation | 364 F. Supp. 1192 |
| Parties | Roger FAIN, Petitioner, v. Ed DUFF, as Volusia County Sheriff, and O. J. Keller, as Director of Division of Youth Services of Florida, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Thomas A. Goldsmith, Philip H. Elliott, Jr., Daytona Beach, Fla., for plaintiff.
John W. Tanner, Daytona Beach, Fla., and Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Fla., for defendants.
In 1970, petitioner Roger Fain, on account of certain misconduct, was adjudged a delinquent by Florida authorities competent to make such an adjudication. Shortly thereafter, an indictment for rape was returned against petitioner alleging the same acts on which the delinquency adjudication had been predicated. When the identity of the facts was pointed out to the trial judge, he dismissed the indictment. The State appealed to the First District Court of Appeals,1 which reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court of Florida heard the question on the merits and affirmed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals,2 but stayed its mandate until this Court might act.
Meanwhile, petitioner has been in the custody of juvenile authorities pursuant to his being adjudicated delinquent, and is presently held at Marianna, Florida, in the Northern District. At the hearing in this cause, the testimony of Mr. Lenox E. Williams, Superintendent of the Dozier School for Boys, established that the juvenile authorities are of the opinion that petitioner has been rehabilitated and the authorities are prepared to release him but for the probability that his release from the Dozier School for Boys would simply result in his rearrest by Volusia County authorities on the strength of the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.3 While it is true, as a technical matter, that the rape indictment is not outstanding so long as the Supreme Court of Florida's stay is in force, this circumstance in no way alters the fact that but for the indictment, waiting only a ministerial act to become effective, petitioner would be a free man.4
This Court's analysis commences with the axiomatic proposition that the central office of the writ of habeas corpus is to test the legality of a prisoner's present restraint. Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335, 88 S.Ct. 962, 19 L. Ed.2d 1215 (1968). The present case is analogous to the case where a person, in custody under one conviction and sentence, challenges another conviction and sentence that is to commence in the future. See e. g. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 88 S.Ct. 1549, 20 L.Ed.2d 426 (1968). In those cases, the authorities who are to take custody in futuro lodge a detainer with the authorities who have actual custody, and habeas jurisdiction arises because of the more stringent quality of present custody attributable to further incarceration anticipated elsewhere. In the present case, the testimony of Mr. Williams has established the same necessary link between petitioner's present status and anticipated incarceration elsewhere that the lodging of the detainer establishes in the Peyton line of cases. Of course, in the present case it is not merely the quality but the very existence of custody that is attributable to anticipated incarceration.
The present case is also highly unusual in that it is pretrial custody rather than an imposition of sentence that faces petitioner, and accounts for his present confinement. This difference is immaterial, however, both to the custody aspect of the case and to the question of exhaustion with which every state prisoner habeas case must deal. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). This is for the obvious reason that the trial court's ruling dismissing the indictment has permitted exhaustion of what is, in other circumstances, normally an interlocutory question. The "remedies available in the courts of the State," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), have been exhausted and the only argument to the contrary is the very strained one that the State appellate courts might reverse themselves on appeal from final conviction, a course that has been foreclosed unless the State appellate courts should overrule very recent precedent they have unanimously laid down. Moreover, it is clear that the federal system is designed principally to give the State an initial "opportunity to pass upon and correct" alleged violations of its prisoners' constitutional rights, and not for such speculative possibilities as respondents suggest. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed. 2d 837 (1963). Since the State of Florida has had this initial opportunity, the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) has been satisfied. Accord Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 92 S. Ct. 407. 30 L.Ed.2d 418 (1971).
The respondents have taken the position that, conceding jurisdiction in some federal district court, the only district court that has jurisdiction is the District Court for the Northern District of Florida, where petitioner is presently physically detained. Respondents have not taken the position that, if this Court determines that it has jurisdiction, venue might more properly be laid in the Northern District. Nor could they do so, because the only person from Marianna, Florida, whose presence was necessary at the hearing before this Court, Mr. Williams, appeared voluntarily, no subpoena having been issued. Any venue argument must, moreover, ring hollow at this point in the proceedings, since a full evidentiary hearing, for which everyone has appeared, has been already held. But this is not respondents' position. Rather, they assert that under the authority of Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 68 S.Ct. 1443, 92 L.Ed. 1898 (1948), the "prisoner must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court in order to obtain from it a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 191, 68 S.Ct. at 1444. This rule, which the dissent in Ahrens characterized as cutting "sweepingly at the roots of individual freedom," is not applicable here. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) as amended; and Peyton v. Rowe, supra. Accord Word v. North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1969 en banc).
The Supreme Court in Ahrens construed 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), "within their respective jurisdictions," as limiting the power of the federal district courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to only those petitioners confined within their territorial jurisdiction. (emphasis provided). However, Congress in 1966, expanded the jurisdictional grant of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by adding subsection (d), which vests jurisdiction in the district court not only where petitioner is confined, but also where he has been convicted and sentenced. See Act of September 19, 1966, Pub.L. 89-590; 80 Stat. 811, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (1948).5
Respondents, however, further assert that since petitioner is confined in the Northern District of Florida, and that since petitioner has not been sentenced and convicted by a state court within the Middle District of Florida, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) does not provide this Court with jurisdiction of the case. In effect, respondents submit that petitioner has only one forum to present his petition, that being the geographical district where petitioner is presently confined. This is simply on account of the fact that petitioner is challenging his present restraint which is caused not by any conviction and sentence but by pretrial proceedings.
This Court does not restrict 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) to such a narrow and formalistic construction. Cf. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963). (liberal reading of "custody" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2241). The intent of Congress when it enacted Section 2241(d) was to fairly distribute the workload between the federal districts in a multi-district state, clearly in accord with the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Act of September 19, 1966, Pub.L. 89-590, Legislative History at p. 2968. With this purpose in mind, and in view of the function of the Great Writ, which is to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever intolerable restraints the United States Constitution forbids, this Court does not consider it appropriate to limit jurisdiction under Section 2241(d) to post-trial inquiries. As enunciated by the Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia, supra, at 418 of 372 U.S., at 838 of 83 S.Ct., citing Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 194, 13 S.Ct. 40, 36 L.Ed. 934 (1892).
". . . while the Federal courts have the power and may discharge the accused in advance of his trial, if he is restrained of his liberty in violation of the Federal Constitution or laws, . . . the practice of exercising such power before the question has been raised or determined in the state court is one which ought not to be encouraged."
Since the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 has been satisfied in the present case, habeas inquiries can be appropriately extended to claims attacking restraints based on pretrial proceedings. Cf. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1960). (right to speedy trial). This Court's approach is clearly in line with the Supreme Court's policy that state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief after exhausting state court remedies should be able to do so at the earliest practicable time. Peyton v. Rowe, supra. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968). With this in mind, the Court now proceeds to an adjudication on the merits.
Respondents primarily assert that an adjudication by a juvenile court in which a child is adjudged a delinquent is not tantamount to a criminal conviction in adult court; and since a juvenile adjudication is not a criminal proceeding, jeopardy there does not attach. Therefore, respondents argue, an indictment returned against petitioner charging him with the same acts on which the delinquency adjudication had been predicated is not either...
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