Ohio Eaton v. Price

Decision Date27 June 1960
Docket NumberNo. 30,30
PartiesOHIO ex rel. EATON, Appellant, v. PRICE, Chief of Police
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Messrs. Greene Chandler Furman and Elbert E. Blakely, Washington, D.C., and Mr. Frank W. Vanderhoof, Washington, D.C., Mr. Asher Bogin, Dayton, Ohio, and Mr. Stanley Robinson, Jr., Columbus, Ohio, of counsel, for appellant.

Mr. Charles S. Rhyne, Washington, D.C., and Mr. Joseph P. Duffy, Dayton, Ohio, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.

Mr. Justice STEWART took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice BLACK, and Mr. Justice DOUGLAS join.

The judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court in this case is being affirmed ex necessitate, by an equally divided Court. Four of the Justices participating are of opinion that the judgment should be affirmed, while we four think it should be reversed. Accordingly, the judgment is without force as precedent. The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 126, 6 L.Ed. 268; Etting v. Bank of the United States, 11 Wheat. 59, 78, 6 L.Ed. 419. In such circumstances, as those leading cases indicate, the usual practice is not to express any opinion, for such an expression is unnecessary where nothing is settled. But in this case, even before the cause was argued, four Justices made public record of their votes to affirm the judgment, and their basis therefor. 360 U.S. 246, 248—249, 79 S.Ct. 978, 979, 3 L.Ed.2d 1200. These four Justices stated that they were 'of the view that this case is controlled by, and should be affirmed on the authority of, Frank v. State of Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 79 S.Ct. 804, (3 L.Ed.2d 877).' Their opinion further states that they deemed 'the decision in the Maryland case to be completely controlling upon the Ohio decision.' In a longer opinion, one of the four Justices developed his views on the merits further. 360 U.S., at pages 249—250, 79 S.Ct. at pages 979—980. The usual practice of not expressing opinions upon an equal division has the salutary force of preventing the identification of the Justices holding the differing views as to the issue, and this may well enable the next case presenting it to be approached with less commitment. But the action we have described prevents this from being the case here; and so the reason for the usual practice is not applicable. Accordingly, since argument has been had, and votes on the merits are now in order, we express our opinion.1

This case involves Earl Taylor, who is in his sixties and has been working at his trade of plumber for 40 years, and the home at 130 Henry Street, in Dayton, Ohio, which he and his wife bought and in which they have lived for over a decade. He describes it as a little cottage, all in one floor, with a front room, a middle room, two bedrooms, a dining room and a little utility room, and a bathroom and a little kitchen at the back. What was evidently Taylor's first involvement with the criminal law occurred in this fashion. One day three men who were housing inspectors came to his door, and said they wanted to come into the house and go through the house and inspect the inside of the house. They had no credentials, only a sheet of yellow note paper, and Taylor said to them, 'You have nothing to show me you have got a right to go through my house.' The response was, 'We don't have to have, according to the law passed four years ago.'2

RepliedTaylor, 'That don't show me that you got anything in there that you want for inspection, and, further, I don't have nothing in my house that has to be inspected.' The man said, 'Well, you know, according to this ordinance, that we got a right to go through your house and inspect your house.' 'No, I don't think you have, unless you got a search warrant,' answered Taylor. This has been his position ever since, and it is the issue that divides us.

The men went away, but later there was a second attempt to gain access to Taylor's house, and a telephone call to the same end. Taylor said, 'I don't see what right that you got coming into my house. Until you show me in writing, or some kind of facts, that you got a right to come into my house and inspect the house, I will not let you in.' The third time the men came, there were two of them. One had some sort of credential with a photograph on it. Neither had a warrant of any kind. One said the housing inspector wanted to inspect Taylor's house. Taylor said, 'What do you have in there that you want to inspect? I have nothing in my house for inspection.' He was told: 'We have a right to come in your house, go through your house, inspect the whole inside of your house.' Taylor's reaction to this was: 'You have nothing wrote down on paper. You don't have a thing to show me you are going to come in there to inspect anything, and as far as that goes you aren't coming in unless you have a search warrant to get in.' The men never came back with a search warrant, but as they left, one said, 'If you ain't going to let us in, we are entitled to get in, and if you don't let us in, I am going to leave it up to the Prosecutor.' Whereupon Taylor said: 'I don't care what you do. You aren't coming in.' Taylor later testified that then the man 'walked over and got in his car and that was the end of it.'

But it was not. Taylor and his wife each received through the mail a registered letter from the city prosecutor, notifying them to appear at his office to answer a complaint against them. They did not appear; whereupon the police came to Taylor's home, and finally served him with a warrant—a warrant to appear in court to answer criminal charges brought against him for failing to admit the inspectors to his home. He appeared in court and was held for trial; and not being then able to make bond of $1,000, he was committed to jail, to await trial on the charges, which could have resulted in a fine of $200 and an incarceration of 30 days for each day's recalcitrance. One Eaton, an attorney, filed a petition for habeas corpus on Taylor's behalf in the State Common Pleas Court.3 The Common Pleas Court found the ordinance unconstitutional, and discharged Taylor from custody; but the Court of Appeals reversed, 105 Ohio App. 376, 152 N.E.2d 776, and its judgment was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court. 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523. We noted probable jurisdiction. 360 U.S. 246, 79 S.Ct. 978, 3 L.Ed.2d 1200.

The municipal ordinance in question provides numerous requirements for dwellings, deemed by the city to be appropriate in the interests of the public health, safety and comfort. Several of the requirements apply to private dwelling houses, such as the Taylors'. None of these requirements is at all questioned here. What is ques- tioned is the ordinance provision, Code of General Ordinances § 806—30, authorizing the Housing Inspector to enter at any reasonable hour any dwelling whatsoever, and commanding the owner or occupant to give him free access at any reasonable hour for the purpose of his inspection. It was armed with the naked authority of this provision, and not with any warrant (the ordinance provides for none) that the inspectors approached Taylor's door, even after he had made clear to them his intent not to admit them on this basis. Neither before a magistrate empowered to issue warrants, nor in this proceeding, have the inspectors offered any justification for their entry. They have not shown any probable cause or grounds to believe that a proscribed condition existed within the cottage, or even that they had suspicion or complaint thereof. They have not shown that they desired to make the inspection in pursuance of a regular, routinized spot check of individual homes, or in pursuance of a planned blanket check of all the homes in a particular neighborhood, or the like.4 These might be said to be the usual reasons which would impel inspectors to seek to gain admittance to a private dwelling; but none of them is shown by the record to have been present. Most significantly, on the initial recalcitrance of Taylor, the inspectors were not required to, and did not, repair before any independent magistrate to demonstrate to him their reasons for wanting to gain access to Taylor's cottage, and to obtain his warrant for their entry—the authorization on which Taylor was insisting. The judgment below is, on this record, bottomed on the proposition that the inspectors have the right to enter a private dwelling, and the householder can be bound under criminal penalties to admit them, though there is demonstration neither of reason to believe there exists an improper condition within the dwelling, nor of the existence of any plan of inspection, apart from such a belief, which would include the inspection of the dwelling in question. We think that affirmance of this judgment would reduce the protection of the householder 'against unreasonable searches' to the vanishing point.

In support of the judgment below, much reliance at the bar has been put on Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 79 S.Ct. 804, 3 L.Ed.2d 877. We would not be candid to say that on its own facts we have become reconciled to that judgment. To us, it remains 'the dubious pronouncement of a gravely divided Court.' Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 24, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 1413, 3 L.Ed.2d 5, 19 (concurring opinion). 'A single decision by a closely divided court, unsupported by the confirmation of time, cannot check' the course of constitutional adjudication here. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89, 69 S.Ct. 448, 454, 455, 93 L.Ed. 513 (concurring opinion). We continue to agree with Judge Prettyman in District of Columbia v. Little, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 242, 246, 178 F.2d 13, 17, 13 A.L.R.2d 954, affirmed on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1, 70 S.Ct. 468, 94 L.Ed. 599, that: 'To say that a man suspected of crime has a right to protection against search of his home without a warrant, but that a man not suspected of crime has no such...

To continue reading

Request your trial
67 cases
  • Miranda v. Hicks, Civ. No. 73-2775-F.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Central District of California
    • September 30, 1974
    ......Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 at 201, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1964). .         Likewise the mere ...Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 79 S.Ct. 978, 3 L.Ed.2d 1200 (1959) forecloses the question and definitely ......
  • People v. Superior Court (Dean)
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • May 2, 1974
    ...group. Moreover, as a minority opinion, the Marshall opinion is without binding precedential force. (Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price (1960) 364 U.S. 263, 80 S.Ct. 1463, 4 L.Ed.2d 1708; People v. McKinnon (1972) 7 Cal.3d 899, 911, 103 Cal.Rptr. 897, 500 P.2d 1097.) The six concurring and dissent......
  • Gideon v. Wainwright
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • March 18, 1963
    ...Black in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 530, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1552, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460. And see, Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274—276, 80 S.Ct. 1463, 1469—1470, 4 L.Ed.2d 1708. 1. It might, however, be said that there is such an implication in Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 60 S......
  • Conservatorship of Susan T.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • December 8, 1994
    ...... (Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, 648, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1687, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081; Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 ...personal or political spite" (Eaton v. Price (1960) 364 U.S. 263, 271, 80 S.Ct. 1463, 1468, 4 L.Ed.2d 1708) or be a subterfuge for a ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
6 books & journal articles
  • State courts and school funding: a fifty-state analysis.
    • United States
    • Albany Law Review Vol. 63 No. 4, June 2000
    • June 22, 2000
    ...only a `watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.'" (quoting Ohio ex tel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960))); JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES 7 n.31 (2d ed. 1996) (showing insta......
  • Judicial Legitimacy and Federal Judicial Design: Managing Integrity and Autochthony.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 132 No. 8, June 2023
    • June 1, 2023
    ...States of opportunity for reforms in legal process designed for extending the area of freedom"). (149.) See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (dissenting from the per curiam opinion and criticizing fundamental fairness approach as giving "license......
  • Libel: Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co.-a New Washington Standard
    • United States
    • Seattle University School of Law Seattle University Law Review No. 1-01, September 1977
    • Invalid date
    ...of law involved in Rosenbloom prevents it from being an authoritative determination of other cases. See generally Ohio v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264 (1960); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942). 31. For a summary of other decisions which extended the New York Times constitutional p......
  • THE TERRITORIES UNDER TEXT, HISTORY, AND TRADITION.
    • United States
    • Washington University Law Review Vol. 101 No. 1, August 2023
    • August 1, 2023
    ...only a 'watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.'" (quoting Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (322.) Bondi, 61 4th at 1323. (323.) Id. (324.) Id. (325.) See id. at 1333 (app.) (citing a Wyoming territorial statute from 1890 banning th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT