Knetsch v. United States, 23

Citation364 U.S. 361,81 S.Ct. 132,5 L.Ed.2d 128
Decision Date14 November 1960
Docket NumberNo. 23,23
PartiesKarl F. KNETSCH and Eva Fay Knetsch, Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Mr. W. Lee McLane, Jr., Phoenix, Ariz., for petitioners.

Mr. Grant W. Wiprud, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question of whether deductions from gross income claimed on petitioners' 1953 and 1954 joint federal income tax returns, of § 143,465 in 1953 and of $147,105 in 1954, for payments made by petitioner, Karl F. Knetsch, to Sam Houston Life Insurance Company, constituted 'interest paid . . . on indebtedness' within the meaning of § 23(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U.S.C.A. § 23(b), and § 163(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C.A. § 163(a).1 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deductions and determined a deficiency for each year. The petitioners paid the deficiencies and brought this action for refund in the District Court for the Southern District of California. The District Court rendered judgment for the United States, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 272 F.2d 200. Because of a suggested conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Bond, 258 F.2d 577, we granted certiorari 361 U.S. 958, 80 S.Ct. 589, 4 L.Ed.2d 541.

On December 11, 1953, the insurance company sold Knetsch ten 30-year maturity deferred annuity savings bonds, each in the face amount of $400,000 and bearing interest at 2 1/2% compounded annually. The purchase price was $4,004,000. Knetsch gave the Company his check for $4,000, and signed $4,000,000 of nonrecourse annuity loan notes for the balance. The notes bore 3 1/2% interest and were secured by the annuity bonds. The interest was payable in advance, and Knetsch on the same day prepaid the first year's interest, which was $140,000. Under the Table of Cash and Loan Values made part of the bonds, their cash or loan value at December 11, 1954, the end of the first contract year, was to be $4,100,000. The contract terms, however, permitted Knetsch to borrow any excess of this value above his indebtedness without waiting until December 11, 1954. Knetsch took advantage of this provision only five dats after the purchase. On December 16, 1953, he received from the company $99,000 of the $100,000 excess over his $4,000,000 indebtedness, for which he gave his notes bearing 3 1/2% interest. This interest was also payable in advance and on the same day he prepaid the first year's interest of $3,465. In their joint return for 1953, the petitioners deducted the sum of the two interest payments, that is $143,465, as 'interest paid * * * within the taxable year on indebtedness,' under § 23(b) of the 1939 Code.

The second contract year began on December 11, 1954, when interest in advance of $143,465 was payable by Knetsch on his aggregate indebtedness of $4,099,000. Knetsch paid this amount on December 27, 1954. Three days later, on December 30, he received from the company cash in the amount of $104,000, the difference less $1,000 between his then $4,099,000 indebtedness and the cash or loan value of the bonds of $4,204,000 on December 11, 1955. He gave the company appropriate notes and prepaid the interest thereon of $3,640. In their joint return for the taxable year 1954 the petitioners deducted the sum of the two interest payments, that is $147,105, as 'interest paid * * * within the taxable year on indebtedness,' under § 163(a) of the 1954 Code.

The tax years 1955 and 1956 are not involved in this proceeding, but a recital of the events of those years is necessary to complete the story of the transaction. On December 11, 1955, the start of the third contract year, Knetsch became obligated to pay $147,105 as prepaid interest on an indebtedness which now totalled $4,203,000. He paid this interest on December 28, 1955. On the same date he received $104,000 from the company. This was $1,000 less than the difference between his indebtedness and the cash or loan value of the bonds of $4,308,000 at December 11, 1956. Again he gave the company notes upon which he prepaid interest of $3,640. Petitioners claimed a deduction on their 1955 joint return for the aggregate of the payments, or $150,745.

Knetsch did not go on with the transaction for the fourth contract year beginning December 11, 1956, but terminated it on December 27, 1956. His indebtedness at that time totalled $4,307,000. The cash or loan value of the bonds was the $4,308,000 value at December 11, 1956, which had been the basis of the 'loan' of December 28, 1955. He surrendered the bonds and his indebtedness was canceled. He received the difference of $1,000 in cash.

The contract called for a monthly annuity of $90,171 at maturity (when Knetsch would be 90 years of age) or for such smaller amount as would be produced by the cash or loan value after deduction of the then existing indebtedness. It was stipulated that if Knetsch had held the bonds to maturity and continued annually to borrow the net cash value less $1,000, the sum available for the annuity at maturity would be $1,000 ($8,388,000 cash or loan value less $8,387,000 of indebtedness), enough to provide an annuity of only $43 per month.

The trial judge made findings that '(t)here was no commercial economic substance to the * * * transaction,' that the parties did not intend that Knetsch 'become indebted to Sam Houston,' that '(n)o indebtedness of (Knetsch) was created by any of the * * * transactions,' and that '(n)o economic gain could be achieved from the purchase of these bonds without regard to the tax consequences * * *.' His conclusion of law, based on this Court's decision in Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 60 S.Ct. 363, 84 L.Ed. 416, was that '(w)hile in form the payments to Sam Houston were compensation for the use or forbearance of money, they were not in substance. As a payment of interest, the transaction was a sham.'

We first examine the transaction between Knetsch and the insurance company to determine whether it created an 'indebtedness' within the meaning of § 23(b) of the 1939 Code and § 163(a) of the 1954 Code, or whether, as the trial court found, it was a sham. We put aside a finding by the District Court that Knetsch's 'only motive in purchasing these 10 bonds was to attempt to secure an interest deduction.'2 As was said in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469, 55 S.Ct. 266, 267, 79 L.Ed. 596: 'The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted. * * * But the question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended.'

When we examine 'what was done' here, we see that Knetsch paid the insurance company $294,570 during the two taxable years involved and received $203,000 back in the form of 'loans.' What did Knetsch get for the out-of-pocket difference of $91,570? In form he had an annuity contract with a so-called guaranteed cash value at maturity of $8,388,000, which would produce monthly annuity payments of $90,171, or substantial life insurance proceeds in the event of his death before maturity. This as we have seen, was a fiction, because each year Knetsch's annual borrowings kept the net cash value, on which any annuity or insurance payments would depend, at the relative pittance of $1,000.3 Plainly, therefore, Kentsch's transaction with the insurance company did 'not appreciably affect his beneficial interest except to reduce his tax * * *.' Gilbert v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 248 F.2d 399, 411 (dissenting opinion). For it is patent that there was nothing of substance to be realized by Knetsch from this transaction beyond a tax deduction. What he was ostensibly 'lent' back was in reality only the rebate of a substantial part of the so-called 'interest' payments. The $91,570 difference retained by the company was its fee for providing the facade of 'loans' whereby the petitioners sought to reduce their 1953 and 1954 taxes in the total sum of $233,297.68. There may well be single premium annuity arrangements with nontax substance which create an 'indebtedness' for the purposes of § 23(b) of the 1939 Code and § 163(a) of the 1954 Code. But this one is a sham.4

The petitioners contend, however, that the Congress in enacting § 264 of the 1954 Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 264, authorized the deductions. They point out that § 264(a)(2) denies a deduction for amounts paid on indebtedness incurred to purchase to carry a single-premium annuity contract, but only as to contracts purchased after March 1, 1954.5 The petitioners thus would attribute to Congress a purpose to allow the deduction of pre-1954 payments under transactions of the kind carried on by Knetsch with the insurance company without regard to whether the transactions created a true obligation to pay interest. Unless that meaning plainly appears we will not attribute it to Congress. 'To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose.' Gregory v. Helvering, supra, 293 U.S. at page 470, 55 S.Ct. at page 268. We, therefore, look to the statute and materials relevant to its construction for evidence that Congress meant in § 264(a)(2) to authorize the deduction of payments made under sham transactions entered into before 1954. We look in vain.

Provisions denying deductions for amounts paid on indebtedness incurred to purchase or carry insurance contracts are not new in the revenue acts. A provision applicable to all annuities, but not to life insurance or endowment contracts, was in the statute from 1932 to 1934, 47 Stat. 179. It was added at a time when Congress was developing a policy to deny a deduction for interest allocable to tax-exempt income;6 the proceeds of annuities were...

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