Pik-Kwik Stores, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities

• Decision Date: 09 March 1976
• Docket Number: PIK-KWIK
• Citation: 170 Conn. 327,365 A.2d 1210
• Parties: , 26 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 848, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,828 STORES, INC. v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 1210

365 A.2d 1210

170 Conn. 327, 26 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 848,

11 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,828

PIK-KWIK STORES, INC. v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

March 9, 1976.

Sidney D. Giber, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., and Bernard F. McGovern, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant (defendant).

William J. Larkin, Waterbury, with whom was Paul S. Lux, Waterbury, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and BARBER, JJ.

BARBER, Associate Justice.

A job applicant, hereinafter called 'complainant,' applied to the plaintiff corporation, which operates numerous supermarkets in the Waterbury area, for any type of work that was available. The complainant was interviewed and told that he could have a job, provided he cut his hair to comply with the plaintiff's grooming standards, but the complainant, who wore his hair long, refused to shorten it. Instead, he filed a complaint with the defendant commission alleging that the plaintiff's grooming standards, which require male employees to have neat, well-groomed hair, off the collar and above the ears, but which do not restrict female employees to collar-length hair, discriminate against males.

Pursuant to to § 31-127 of the General Statutes, the commission investigated the complaint and, finding reasonable cause to believe that the plaintiff was engaging in an unfair employment practice, held a hearing on the complaint. The commission determined that the plaintiff's grooming standards did discriminate against male job applicants, in violation of § 31-126(a) of the General Statutes. ¹ The commission thereupon ordered the plaintiff to offer the complainant a job and pay him back wages, to cease enforcing its 'discriminatory hair dress policy,' to promulgate a nondiscriminatory hair dress code, and to poss nondiscrimination notices throughout its business establishments.

The plaintiff appealed the commission's order to the Court of Common Pleas which, in its memorandum of decision, held that the plaintiff's grooming code did not discriminate on the basis of sex. The court, therefore, rendered judgment sustaining the appeal and setting aside the commission's order, from which judgment the commission has appealed to this court.

The scope of judicial review in an appeal from an administrative agency such as the defendant commission is limited by § 4-183(g) which provides, in part, that '(t)he court may reverse or modify the decision (of the administrative agency) if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the . . . conclusions, or decisions are: . . . (4) affected by . . . error of law.' The Court of Common Pleas sustained the plaintiff's claim that the conclusion of the commission that the grooming code of the plaintiff constituted sex-based discrimination was based on an error of law. We agree with the trial court.

We have on two recent occasions considered claims of sex-based discrimination in employment practices; Evening Sentinel v. National Organization for Women, 168 Conn. 26, 357 A.2d 498; Veeder-Root Co. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 165 Conn. 318, 334 A.2d 443; but the precise issue raised in this appeal, whether an employee grooming code discriminates on the basis of sex, is one of first impression for this court. A number of federal courts, however, have considered this precise issue in the context of claims brought under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). ² At the Court of Appeals level, the decisions have uniformly held that grooming codes do not discriminate on the basis of sex. Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir.) (en banc, reversing 482 F.2d 535); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir.); Dodge v. Giant Foods, Inc., 160 U.S.App.D.C. 9, 488 F.2d 1333; Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 157 U.S.App.D.C. 15, 481 F.2d 1115. In addition, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, interpreting a statute (N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 354-A: 8(I)) identical to the Connecticut provision, has also held that employee grooming codes do not discriminate on the basis of sex. Planchet v. New Hampshire Hospital, H.H., 341 A.2d 267.

Although the language of the federal statute and that of the Connecticut statute differ slightly, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in adopting 1967 Public Acts, No. 426 (which extended the provisions of the Fair...