Philadelphia Mar. Tr. Ass'n v. INTERNATIONAL LONG. ASS'N, L. 1291, 15613.
Decision Date | 11 August 1966 |
Docket Number | No. 15613.,15613. |
Parties | PHILADELPHIA MARINE TRADE ASSOCIATION v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1291, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Abraham E. Freedman, Philadelphia, Pa. (Martin J. Vigderman and Freedman, Borowsky & Lorry, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellant.
Francis A. Scanlan, Philadelphia, Pa. (Kelly, Deasey & Scanlan, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Before McLAUGHLIN, HASTIE and FREEDMAN, Circuit Judges.
In this action to enforce an arbitration award under a labor management contract, the trial Court ordered enforcement and the defendant union appeals.
The plaintiff association is a non profit organization comprised of steamship owners, operators, stevedores and the like in the port of Philadelphia. The union is the bargaining agent of the Philadelphia deep sea longshoremen. The bargaining agreement, dated February 11, 1965, applied retroactively from October 1, 1964 and expires September 30, 1968. On April 26, 1965, there was a dispute between the association and the union over the meaning of Section 10, sub. par. 6 of the agreement. The general caption of Section 10 is "Hiring System". Subparagraph (6) reads:
The matter was correctly referred to an arbitrator, Milton M. Weiss, Esq. There were three hearings, April 30, 1965, May 3, 1965 and May 5, 1965. At the start of the first hearing the Arbitrator stated:
He then said:
To this Mr. Freedman, counsel for the Union, answered, Mr. Scanlan, counsel for the association, answered:
A thorough, well reasoned decision was filed by the Arbitrator June 11, 1965. In that opinion the Arbitrator properly stated the "Issue Involved" as follows:
"Whether the provisions in the Memorandum of Settlement referred to above, i. e. Section 10, subparagraphs 5 and 6, are to be considered together so that the Employer\'s right to set back a gang from 8:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. is conditioned solely upon the nonarrival of a vessel in port, or is the Employer\'s right under Section 10, subparagraph 6 to set back a gang without qualification?"
The Arbitrator ruled:
In making his Award, the Arbitrator held:
On July 30, 1965 the Union refused to acquiesce in Nacirema Operating Company, one of the Association employers, setting back an 8:00 A.M. start of work to 1:00 P.M.
According to the testimony which was not denied, the President of the Union, Mr. Askew, advised the executive director of the Trade Association, Mr. Corry, that "the arbitrator's award only applied to non-arrival of a ship." Told by Mr. Corry that "The arbitrator's award applies without qualification," Mr. Corry testified that Mr. Askew replied, "`It does not' and they were not going to live by it." Mr. Corry stated that Mr. Askew told him he would have to talk to the business agents. Mr. Corry said he did so, to Messrs. Johnson and Devine, that Mr. Johnson did most of the talking "— and Paul Johnson said that they were not going to abide by the arbitrator's decision on the setback, and Mr. Devine as much as said, `Yes, that's right,' and that was the extent of my conversation with them."
On August 2, 1965, the Association filed a complaint against the Union in the District Court. This set out the labor agreement between the parties, the Arbitration Award, "that the Union does not agree with the Arbitrator's Award and does not intend to comply with the terms of such award." The complaint went on to allege serious damage to the Employer, the owners and operators of the particular vessel and to the Port of Philadelphia. It stated that "The defendant's refusal to comply with the Arbitrator's Award constitutes a breach of the applicable provisions of the current Collective Bargaining Agreement between P.M.T.A. and the Union." It prayed for an immediate hearing and "an order enforcing the Arbitrator's Award" with "* * * such other and further relief as may be justified." The District Court issued an order to show cause to defendant, "why it has not complied with the Arbitrator's Award of June 11, 1965" and a hearing was set for August 3, 1965, 11 A.M. A motion was filed on behalf of defendant to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds it did not state a cause of action and that the Court was without jurisdiction to grant the relief sought which the motion called "injunctive".
At the hearing counsel for the plaintiff informed the Court that the action was under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185) for enforcement of the Arbitration Award, above quoted, under the bargaining agreement between the parties which the union had refused to abide by in connection with the employer's attempted set back of work on July 30th and that the union's position was that it "would not abide by the arbitrator's award."
Counsel for the union told the Court "We, that is, the union, make no bones about the fact that they are unhappy with the arbitrator's award, but we realize that we are stuck with it." He insisted several times more that the union would live up to the arbitrator's award. After argument on the question of jurisdiction, the Court held it possessed jurisdiction. Contention was made for the union that the employees had to be notified by 7:30 A.M. of a set back. Actually, all the award mentioned about 7:30 A.M. was, as seen above, to repeat the language of 10(6) of the employment agreement providing that the gangs "ordered for an 8:00 A.M. start Monday through Friday can be set back at 7:30 A.M. on the day of the work * * *." There is nothing regarding notification to employees by 7:30 A.M. In passing, that would be a physical impossibility where the set back itself did not take place until 7:30 A.M. This particular argument was not urged at the later hearing nor is it alluded to on this appeal.
At the August 3rd hearing the Court was advised by counsel for the plaintiff that because of the economic problem of keeping the ship idle, the objected to additional wages demanded had been paid and that the men had returned to work. The Court made the following statement:
The question of the construction of the Arbitrator's Award again came before the Court on September 13, 1965. At that time the Court said to counsel on both sides:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers
...F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828, 89 S.Ct. 92, 21 L.Ed.2d 99 (1968); Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1291, 365 F.2d 295 (3rd Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 64, 88 S.Ct. 201, 19 L.Ed.2d 236 (1967); Pacific Maritim......
-
Jones, Matter of
...(5th Cir.1972); 9 Moore's Federal Practice, supra, p 203.11, at p. 3-46 n. 2; but see Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 1291, 365 F.2d 295, 300 (3d Cir.1966), rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 64, 88 S.Ct. 201, 19 L.Ed.2d 236 (1967) (dictum), and yet......
-
GENERAL DY. CORP. v. LOCAL 5, IND. U. OF MARINE, ETC.
...to interpreting a provision of the collective bargaining agreement. Philadelphia Marine Trade, Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1291, 365 F.2d 295 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 64, 88 S.Ct. 201, 19 L.Ed.2d 236 (1967). We are merely being asked to give ju......
-
Local 336, American Fed. of Musicians, AFL-CIO v. Bonatz
...Drivers Local 89 v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517, 83 S.Ct. 789, 9 L.Ed.2d 918 (1963) (percuriam); Philadelphia Marine Trade Association v. Longshoremen's Local 1291, 365 F.2d 295 (3rd Cir. 1966). Thus, dismissal sua sponte pursuant to rule 12(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., may be sustained here only if no f......