Hodgdon v. United States

Citation365 F.2d 679
Decision Date12 September 1966
Docket NumberNo. 18251.,18251.
PartiesRobert Donald HODGDON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

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Douglas Hall, of Hall, Smith, Hedlund, Juster, Forsberg & Feikema, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellant.

Patrick J. Foley, Asst. U. S. Atty., Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee; Hartley Nordin, U. S. Atty., Minneapolis, Minn., on the brief.

Before VOGEL, Chief Judge, MEHAFFY, Circuit Judge, and McMANUS, District Judge.

McMANUS, District Judge.

This is an appeal in forma pauperis from a jury conviction in the United States District Court, District of Minnesota, on both counts of a two-count indictment. Count I charged the appellant with endeavoring by threats and force to intimidate a United States Commissioner in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1503. Count II charged appellant with forcibly assaulting a United States deputy marshal while engaged in the performance of his official duties, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 111. Appellant was sentenced to serve two years on Count I and eight years on Count II, the terms to run consecutively.

Appellant's grounds for appeal are as follows:

I. That the trial court erred in overruling appellant's motions to dismiss the indictment.

(a) for lack of jurisdiction

(b) for insufficiency of Count II, in that the marshal was attempting to arrest appellant on the basis of an invalid warrant when the assault occurred, and was therefore not engaged in the performance of his official duties within 18 U.S.C.A. § 111.

II. That there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction under Count I of the indictment.

III. That the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota was biased against appellant and therefore unable to afford him a fair trial.

IV. That appellant's right to a speedy trial under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution was violated.

V. That appellant was wrongfully prevented from adequately preparing his defense because his bail, in the sum of $50,000.00, was excessive, and because he did not have access to certain legal materials during his confinement.

VI. That certain exhibits from the files of the Minnesota Mental Hospital, Moose Lake, Minnesota, offered to show efforts by the defendant to learn of and protect his rights during his confinement there in 1962, were erroneously excluded.

We affirm.

The facts are as follows:

Appellant was committed to the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri, for psychiatric observation on May 18, 1965, by order of Chief Judge Edward J. Devitt of the District of Minnesota. The staff there determined that although appellant is a chronic schizophrenic, he could be returned to the court "with an adjudication of competency." It was found that he was able to understand the charges against him, to assist in his defense, and to cooperate with counsel. There is thus no question of his mental competency in these proceedings. Appellant's background, however, is relevant in describing the events which led to his conviction and subsequent appeal.

Appellant is a thirty-two year old male who has had mental difficulties most of his adult life. In June 1956, he was taken by request of his parents to Rochester, Minnesota for mental examination. A court hearing was held and he was committed to the Minnesota Mental Hospital at Moose Lake. He was released provisionally in October 1956, and thereafter was returned to the hospital four times for varying periods before his final discharge on September 21, 1963.

While on provisional release in 1962, appellant initiated a series of associations with various lawyers and public officials in connection with what he thought were certain unlawful actions by governmental agencies. These he referred to generally as "misprison of treason." He believed that his constitutional rights had been violated in his original commitment and subsequent returns to Moose Lake, and in medical treatment which he underwent during his confinement. Appellant views himself as a staunch defender of the individual liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. He believes that those who are not in accord with his interpretations of the Constitution are guilty of treason. He often made attempts to initiate proceedings against the governments of the United States and Minnesota and their agents to obtain what he called a "redress of grievances." He made frequent visits to federal offices in Minneapolis and became well acquainted with many federal officials. He also began to carry firearms because he feared his life might be endangered on account of his activities on behalf of the Constitution.

Starting in approximately November 1964, appellant began consulting United States Commissioner Bernard Zimpfer. He appeared at Mr. Zimpfer's office from time to time to discuss his rights and the administration of justice in general. In March 1965, appellant attended a Commissioner's hearing involving one Louis Alvin Thomas, who was charged with failure to pay a firearm tax on a sawed-off shotgun which had been found in his possession. Appellant believed the tax in question was an infringement on the peoples' constitutional right to keep and bear arms, and so informed the Commissioner after the hearing was concluded. Sometime after the hearing appellant called both Zimpfer and his law partner, expressing his displeasure with the Commissioner's handling of the Thomas matter. He informed the Commissioner that the charge against Thomas should have been summarily dismissed. Zimpfer testified that he was alarmed by the antagonistic tone of appellant's voice during this call.

Late in the afternoon of April 21, 1965, appellant appeared at Commissioner Zimpfer's office in Minneapolis. The two men had a private conversation, the nature of which is in dispute. Appellant first discussed several violations of constitutional rights which he alleged had been committed by the city police, the sheriff's office, United States Marshals, city, state, and federal courts, and the United States Attorney. He accused all parties concerned of treason. The discussion then turned to the Thomas hearing. According to Commissioner Zimpfer's testimony, appellant informed him that attorneys would not assist him in redressing his grievances because he had no money. He said that attorneys were mercenaries "similar to those in the American Revolution who were hired by England to fight the colonists." He added that the colonists killed mercenaries, and that he had a right to kill the mercenaries of today. Mr. Zimpfer is an attorney. Zimpfer testified further that appellant told him that the Commissioner, along with various law enforcement agencies, was his enemy, and he felt he had a right to kill all his enemies.

At this point appellant unzipped his jacket and removed a 9 mm. automatic pistol from a clip on his belt. He held it in the palm of his hand with the barrel pointing toward the Commissioner, and later placed it on his desk. The Commissioner testified that when appellant pulled the pistol, "my first thought was, my God, he's going to shoot me." After some further discussion, appellant left Zimpfer's office. The Commissioner's law partner and secretary both testified that the Commissioner emerged from his office after appellant left "white in the face * * * very shaken and very upset."

Appellant's version of the visit is quite different from that of the Commissioner. He testified that in regard to the Thomas matter, he told Commissioner Zimpfer that he had willfully refused to uphold the Constitutions of the United States and Minnesota, that this constituted treason, and that treason carries the death penalty. According to appellant the discussion thereafter concerned enemies of the Constitution in general, with no specific reference to the Commissioner, and with no reference to personal enemies of the appellant. Appellant denied making the statement that he had a right to kill his enemies. He testified further that he removed the pistol only to show the Commissioner the clip to which it was attached, hoping to enlist the Commissioner's aid in securing a patent for the clip. Appellant stated that the pistol was on safety, and that he immediately placed it on the Commissioner's desk without pointing it at anyone. He further testified that the Commissioner at no time appeared frightened during the visit.

On the following day Commissioner Zimpfer caused a complaint to be sworn out against the appellant. A warrant of arrest was issued on the basis of the complaint and two United States Deputy Marshals, Robert L. Allie and James H. Redpath, and Special Investigator Robert L. Rhoades of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Treasury Department went to execute the warrant at the appellant's residence, the Wisconsin Hotel in Minneapolis. Deputy Marshal Allie was shot by the appellant while the three officers were attempting to make the arrest. Appellant testified that the officers burst into his room unannounced, and that there was insufficient light in the room for him to recognize the officers. The officers testified that Deputy Marshal Redpath announced his name and that he had a warrant for appellant's arrest at least three times before attempting to open the door. They further testified that on their first attempt to open the door, it opened only to the length of a night chain and then was quickly shut from the inside. They then broke into the room, whereupon the appellant fired a pistol and hit Allie. After the shooting of Allie, the local police were called and appellant was eventually subdued.

I.

In attacking the jurisdiction of the trial court, appellant makes a novel argument. He points out that for several years he has attempted to prosecute certain actions against government agencies, state and federal, to obtain a "redress of grievances" for alleged violations of his rights. He claims that his rights were...

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