U.S. v. Mitchell
| Decision Date | 29 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-2859.,02-2859. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Byron MITCHELL Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Maureen Kearney Rowley, Chief Federal Defender, David L. McColgin, Supervising Appellate Attorney, Robert Epstein (Argued), Assistant Federal Defender, Federal Court Division, Defender Association
of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, for Appellant.
Patrick L. Meehan, United States Attorney, Laurie Magid, Deputy United States Attorney for Policy and Appeals, Michael L. Levy, Assistant United States Attorney, Robert A. Zauzmer (Argued), Assistant United States Attorney, Paul A. Sarmousaki, Assistant United States Attorney, Senior Appellate Counsel, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, for Appellee.
Before BARRY, BECKER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.
This appeal by Byron Mitchell from a judgment in a criminal case raises important questions concerning the admissibility of latent fingerprint identification evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 702. We adjudicate on the basis of a voluminous record developed at a Daubert hearing, see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and explore in considerable detail the application of the various Daubert factors to the prosecution's expert testimony. We conclude that the testimony passes Daubert muster, and that there are "good grounds," id. at 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786, for its admission. In a related matter, we must decide whether the District Court properly took judicial notice that "human friction ridges are unique and permanent throughout the area of the friction ridge skin, including small friction ridge areas, and that... human friction ridge skin arrangements are unique and permanent." App. 1472a. We conclude that the District Court erred in taking judicial notice, but that the error was harmless.
We also consider Mitchell's contention that the District Court erroneously excluded from trial significant portions of his proffered expert testimony on the unreliability of latent fingerprint identification. Portions of the colloquies between the Court and counsel are less than pellucid, but we are satisfied that what the Court really did was to operate on a three-tier theory of what expert testimony was admissible: allowing (1) specific criticisms and (2) general reliability criticisms, but excluding (3) testimony about whether latent fingerprint identification is a "science." Within that framework, the exclusion of evidence that latent fingerprint identification is a science was proper under Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999).
The final fingerprint-related issue concerns the putative withholding by the government of a Department of Justice solicitation for research proposals directed at validating the reliability of latent fingerprint identification. This solicitation, Mitchell contends, was not only improperly and intentionally withheld by the government in violation of its obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), but would have been powerful evidence, not only substantively but also to impeach the government's expert witnesses who testified that latent fingerprint identification was a well-established discipline with a strong and well-verified foundation. The District Court concluded that the solicitation was not material under the "reasonable probability of a different outcome" standard of Brady and its progeny. We agree.
The remaining issue on appeal is whether plain error was committed by the admission of testimony that a key government witness gave a statement to the FBI and testified at a prior proceeding. Mitchell characterizes the admission of this evidence as improper under the hearsay rules, Fed.R.Evid. 801, 802. We conclude that testimony about the existence of a statement is not itself a "statement"; that the testimony was not "offered ... to prove the truth of the matter asserted," Fed.R.Evid. 801(c), and thus not inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 802; and that, at all events, the plain error standard is not met. We will therefore affirm the judgment.
This case began in 1991 when two men with handguns robbed an armored car employee of approximately $20,000 as he entered a check cashing agency at 29th Street and Girard Avenue in North Philadelphia. The robbers then got into a beige car driven by a third person, engaging in gunfire with the armored car employees as they fled. The beige car, which had been stolen about an hour beforehand, was abandoned by the robbers roughly a mile from the agency. The government sought to prove at trial that the robbers were William Robinson (a/k/a "Bookie") and Terrence Stewart (a/k/a "T"), and that the getaway driver was Mitchell. According to the government, the robbery had a fourth participant, Kim Chester, who knew of the plans, helped case the robbery site, and assisted the others in spending the proceeds of the robbery. Chester testified for the prosecution at Mitchell's trial as an uncharged accomplice. Both Robinson and Stewart died before trial, and thus Mitchell was the sole defendant.
Mitchell was charged with conspiracy to commit and commission of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and use of and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). In the first trial, at which Mitchell was convicted of all counts, the government introduced into evidence an anonymous note that had been left in the front seat of the abandoned beige car, apparently written by someone who observed the robbers exiting the beige car and getting into a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Higgs v. U.S.A
... ... Sachs, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Baltimore, MD, for Petitioner. Deborah A. Johnston, Office of the US Attorney, Greenbelt, MD, Sandra Wilkinson, Office of the US Attorney, Baltimore, MD, Jeffrey B. Kahan, Department of Justice, Capital Case Unit, ... Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 327, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999) (a defendant may assert the privilege against self-incrimination in ... ...
-
United States v. Protho
...her methods were reliable. Falsifiability is the idea that a prediction can, in principle, be proven to be false. United States v. Mitchell , 365 F.3d 215, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). It is a cornerstone of modern science and part of what separates science from other fields of human inquiry. See Da......
-
Barber v. State
...F.3d 261, 265-70 (4th Cir.2003) (footnotes omitted). See also United States v. Janis, 387 F.3d 682 (8th Cir.2004); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir.2004). See generally Hannon v. State, 84 P.3d 320 (Wyo.2004); Christian v. Gray, 65 P.3d 591 (Okla.2003); State v. Cole, (Del. J......
-
U.S. v. John
...see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150-53, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). 30. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir.2004) (holding that a district court may dispense with a Daubert hearing entirely if no novel challenge is raised to the a......
-
Pretrial discovery
...However, a prosecutor’s bad faith can have additional relevance in determining a Brady violation or remedy. United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 255 (3d Cir. 2004) (court observed that it would be doubtful that a prosecutor would in bad faith suppress evidence unless he or she believed ......
-
Experts & investigators
...The test is flexible, not rote; courts have discretion as to which factors to apply in a particular case. [ United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 235 (3d Cir. 2004); FRE 702, Adv. Committee Notes.] Reliability is required not only from the expert’s methods in general, but in the applicat......
-
Discovering child pornography: the death of the presumption of innocence.
...Due Process Clause, the holding has been applied to the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause as well. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 254 (3d Cir. 2004). (122.) Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. While the Brady Court indicated that the duty only arose after a demand, the Supreme Cour......