School Committee of Springfield v. Board of Ed.

Citation311 N.E.2d 69,365 Mass. 215
PartiesSCHOOL COMMITTEE OF SPRINGFIELD v. BOARD OF EDUCATION (and a companion case 1 ).
Decision Date01 May 1974
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

William C. Flanagan, Springfield, for School Committee of springfield.

Francis X. Spina, Boston (Robert D. Fleischner, Springfield, with him), for The Quality Integrated Ed. Committee.

Sandra L. Lynch, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Bd. of Ed.

Stephen W. Silverman, Springfield, for Hampden County Chapter of Civil Liberties Union of Mass., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Before TAURO, C.J., and REARDON, QUIRICO, BRAUCHER and WILKINS, JJ.

TAURO, Chief Justice.

These cases bring before us for the second time questions concerning the application of the Massachusetts racial imbalance law 2 to the city of Springfield schools. We first considered the matter in SCHOOL COMM. OF SPRINGFIELD V. BOARD OF EDUC., ---MASS. --- , 287 N.E.2D 438 (1972)A 3 (Springfield I). The present cases were brought separately by the school committee and by The Quality Integrated Education Committee (QIEC), an intervener in the administrative proceedings below, to obtain judicial review of an opinion and order entered by the State board of education (board) pursuant to its powers under G.L. c. 15, §§ 1I, 1J.

PRIOR PROCEEDINGS.

After our remand of the prior case to the Superior Court, at a hearing on November 3, 1972, the judge found that the board, in compliance with our order, had submitted specific recommendations to the school committee and that the next step for the school committee was to file a short-term racial balance plan with the board. At the Superior Court hearing the school committee represented that a short-term racial plan would be filed with the board by the first part of 1973. On the strength of this the matter was continued by agreement.

By the spring of 1973, the school committee had not approved and submitted to the board any short-term plan and the board asked for a hearing in the Superior Court. On June 20, 1973, the Superior Court directed the school committee to file a short-term plan with the board immediately. A plan to balance only the fifth and sixth grades of the five imbalanced elementary schools was filed by the school committee with the board on June 29, 1973. Previous to filing, the school committee had not approved this plan for implementation.

An order of notice was issued on July 18, 1973, for hearings to begin on August 1, 1973. A hearing examiner was appointed by the board 'for the purpose of conducting hearings on plans submitted to the Board by the Springfield School Committee and the staff of the Task Force on Racial Imbalance, which plans were or will be submitted pursuant to G.L. c. 71, § 37D.' 4 During those hearings, which began on August 1, 1973, and continued for nine days, the hearing examiner in fact considered three different plans: the plan submitted (but not approved) by the school committee which was designed to racially balance only the fifth and sixth grades of the imbalanced schools (the school committee plan); a plan submitted by the Task Force which would divide the city into six school districts and would achieve racial balance in all the schools (the Task Force plan); and a plan submitted by QIEC which would divide the city into five school districts and would achieve racial balance in all the schools (the QIEC plan). After lengthy hearings the hearing examiner issued a comprehensive and detailed 'Report and Recommendations.'

As to the school committee plan, the hearing examiner found that it was not properly before him both because it was not submitted in a timely fashion and because it had never been approved by the school committee. In addition, he found that, even if the plan were properly before him, it failed in several respects to satisfy the requirements of the racial imbalance law: most importantly, it did not racially balance the schools. As to the QIEC plan, the hearing examiner found that, while it satisfied the requirement of racial balance, it was deficient in several other respects, namely, it failed to fulfil safety requirements, it contained no evaluation of the need for additions to school buildings, and it proposed districts which showed no relation to existing neighborhoods. Finally, as to the Task Force plan, the hearing examiner concluded that it complied in every respect with the racial imbalance law and he recommended its adoption. He reached this conclusion after careful consideration of the details of the plan in light of the statutory standards.

After receipt of the school committee's and QIEC's objections, the board heard oral argument on the hearing examiner's report and recommendations. The board then issued its own opinion and order in which it considered and rejected each objection raised by the parties. The board approved and adopted, with slight modification, the Task Force plan and issued an order in which it established a timetable for implementation of the plan by the school committee.

The school committee on November 12, 1973, filed a bill for judicial review (G.L. c. 15, § 1J, and c. 30A, § 14), declaratory relief G.L. c. 231A) and injunctive relief. Thereafter the board filed an answer and a counterclaim which sought enforcement of its opinion and order. The school committee then filed a demurrer and answer to the counterclaim. In November, 1973, QIEC filed a bill for judicial review (G.L. c. 30A, § 14), declaratory relief (G.L. c. 231A) and injunctive relief (G.L. c. 214, § 1, and c. 30A, § 14), to which the board filed an answer. On motion by the board, both cases were transferred to the county court where the cases were reserved and reported to the full court by a single justice of this court.

On December 24, 1973, a single justice of this court ordered the school committee 'forthwith' to submit to the board an implementation plan for and proposed modifications to the Task Force plan in accordance with the board's order. The school committee appealed from and sought a stay of that order. On January 6, 1974, a single justice of this court denied the application for a stay. On January 28, 1974, a single justice of this court granted a petition by the board seeking a definite date for compliance by the school committee. Upon the committee's refusal to take the steps necessary to implement the plan according to the implementation schedule, a preliminary injunction was issued requiring implementation of the plan according to schedule.

SCHOOL COMMITTEE'S OBJECTIONS.

The school committee raises a host of objections to the board's actions in this case. It first attacks the Task Force plan as failing to meet the requirements of the racial imbalance act, and then contends that its own short-term plan involving the balancing of the fifth and sixth grades was adequate. Next, the committee focuses on what it perceives to be procedural errors surrounding the hearing which was convened on August 1, 1973. We consider the school committee's objections seriatim.

1. The school committee argues that the Task Force plan adopted by the board does not comply with the safety and neighborhood requirements of G.L. c. 71, § 37D. The scope of our inquiry into an issue of this sort has been clearly defined in School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ.,--- Mass. ---, ---, b 292 N.E.2d 870 (1973): 'The proper function of the court is not to engage in complex fact determinations more appropriately committed to an agency, with staff and skilled experience to make them. Rather, the court must accept the factual determinations made by the agency if it finds they are supported by substantial evidence.' The question for decision, therefore, is not whether we believe the Task Force plan meets the safety and neighborhood requirements, but whether there was substantial evidence before the board to support its conclusion that the plan satisfies these two conditions. See SCHOOL COMM. OF BOSTON V. BOARD OF EDUC., --- MASS. ---, 302 N.E.2D 916 (1973)C.

The Task Force plan was designed by the superintendent of schools and the staff of the Springfield school department, with the assistance of the Task Force personnel. The record of the proceedings before the hearing examiner clearly indicates that thorough consideration was given to the question of pupil safety. The school department consulted with the police department, the bus company, the city planning department and the building department. The plan takes into account traffic flow, intersection locations, crime incidence in the city of Springfield, and travel time and distance involved in busing deemed essential. Trained bus monitors will be placed on buses likely to travel along hazardous routes. The children will be instructed as to bus conduct, and will be taught how to deal with possible emergencies. Guards will be stationed at appropriate intersections. Approximately two-thirds of Springfield's post-kindergarten students will not be bused, and the kindergarten group is totally exempt. Where busing is required, the plan primarily involves fifth and sixth graders, and the maximum distance to be traveled is five miles, a distance which requires no more than twenty minutes actual travel time.

Thus, it is clear that there was substantial evidence to support the board's determination that the proposed plan is a safe one. While it is possible to point out certain claimed deficiencies in the Task Force plan with regard to safety, '(p)ractical experience and mutual assistance and cooperation by the parties should yield continuous refinement to assure maximum safety precautions. . . . (S)uch a need for refinement would be present in any plan of this type and does not invalidate the Board's current efforts. The Committee has pointed out no specific features of the plan which pose such egregious safety hazards that we could say that it is arbitrary or capricious or not in accordance with law.' School Comm....

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    ...of the state statute go further than those of the Fourteenth Amendment, see School Committee of Springfield v. Board of Education, 1974 Mass.Adv.Sh. 657, 673, 311 N.E.2d 69 (May 1, 1974 — Springfield II), in the sense that the statute commands affirmative action to eliminate racial imbalanc......
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