State v. Lamb
| Decision Date | 09 March 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 136PA87,136PA87 |
| Citation | 365 S.E.2d 600,321 N.C. 633 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Ruby Lawless LAMB. |
Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen. by Laura E. Crumpler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State-appellant.
Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender by Daniel R. Pollitt, Asst. Appellate Defender, Raleigh, for defendant-appellee.
Defendant was convicted of the second-degree murder of her husband. Defendant reasserts before this Court four of the five arguments she made to the Court of Appeals, specifically that the trial court committed prejudicial error (1) in admonishing a witness, out of the presence of the jury but in the presence of other witnesses, that she could be subject to perjury and contempt of court because of her testimony; (2) in denying defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that her statutory right to a speedy trial was violated; (3) in denying her motion in limine to exclude any evidence implicating her in other killings; and (4) in failing to give her requested jury instructions and in giving improper and prejudicial instructions. Believing that the trial court committed prejudicial error in denying defendant's motion in limine, the Court of Appeals awarded defendant a new trial. We affirm.
On the morning of 3 October 1983, David Lee Lamb's body was discovered lying in bed in his trailer in Clayton, North Carolina. Death had resulted from a single bullet wound in the chest. Lamb had a gun in his left hand and a gun-cleaning rod in his right. A beer can was propped against his body. There were several other beer cans in the kitchen and the television was on. There was a spent shell casing on the bathroom floor, another on the bedroom floor and a bullet hole in the bedroom ceiling. According to expert testimony, the gun was fired several feet from the victim so that the gunshot wound could not have been self-inflicted.
David Lee Lamb was married to defendant, Ruby Lawless Lamb, who was living in Cowpens, South Carolina with her three grandchildren at the time of the murder. Although the investigation revealed that defendant had been to visit her husband the weekend of the murder, her alibi was that she had returned to Cowpens prior to the shooting. Defendant's family members corroborated her story and denied any knowledge of the circumstances surrounding David Lamb's death. On 7 April 1984, defendant was indicted for the first-degree murder of her husband. However, due apparently to the lack of evidence against defendant, the district attorney on 14 August 1984 "enter[ed] a dismissal ... [w]ith [l]eave [p]ending the completion of the investigation." In July 1985, three of defendant's relatives came forward with statements implicating her in her husband's murder. Her sister, nephew, and niece stated that defendant had told them that she had shot David Lamb and had set it up to look like an accident. Defendant was reindicted on 22 July 1985. On 14 October 1985 defendant's grandson, who lived with defendant, gave a statement to the authorities to the effect that he had been with defendant in Clayton the weekend of the murder and had witnessed defendant shooting her husband. At trial, defendant adhered to her alibi defense.
During pretrial discovery, defendant discovered that during investigation of the case, several of her relatives had told officers that she had made statements to them that she had participated in other killings. Defendant had never been indicted for these killings. Defendant filed a pretrial motion in limine to have any evidence relating to the alleged killings excluded. The trial court deferred ruling on the motion. Near the close of defendant's evidence, but before she had rested or taken the stand herself, defendant renewed her motion in limine and the trial court denied it. Defendant then declined to take the stand. She was convicted of the second-degree murder of David Lamb and sentenced to fifteen years in prison.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with defendant that the denial of the motion in limine was prejudicial error, reasoning that the challenged evidence was inadmissible under any rule of evidence and that the trial court's failure to exclude it effectively precluded defendant from taking the stand. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the State's position that the issue was not capable of review since defendant had failed to take the stand and therefore had failed to present the alleged error within a reviewable context. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984). The Court of Appeals concluded that Luce was not binding upon North Carolina courts and that it was distinguishable from defendant's case. We granted the State's petition for discretionary review.
Defendant first contends that the trial court and the district attorney "improperly stifled the free presentation of testimony by warning and threatening witness ... [defendant's sister] Crooks in the presence of [two other] witnesses ..., that she could be subject to perjury and contempt of court because of her testimony." We find no merit in this contention.
The State called defendant's sister, who testified about conversations she had had with defendant after David Lamb's death. The district attorney asked the witness to state whether defendant had ever elaborated on how the deceased had died. The witness responded:
A. Your Honor, could I please not testify? I don't know anything.
The trial court instructed the witness to answer. Defense counsel asked to be heard and the jury was excused. Following arguments by counsel, the court permitted the district attorney to pursue his questions outside the jury's presence. The answers indicated that the witness was a reluctant witness. When questioned about a prior statement she had given to investigators, she responded:
A. Maybe I lied, maybe I was the one that lied.
Q. I didn't ask you that. I asked you didn't Ruby Lawless Lamb tell you that she shot David Lee Lamb and that Wesley Warlick [defendant's grandson] was present at the time in his trailer in Clayton?
A. I lied.
Q. Did you tell, did you make that statement to Detective Eatman?
A. If I made it, I lied.
Q. Well, a moment ago you said she may have been drinking. Were you lieing [sic] then?
A. Yes.
....
Q. So you have lied since you have been on the witness stand?
A. I lied on it all the way.
....
Q. You do not deny making a statement to Detective Eatman that Ruby Lawless Lamb told you that she shot David Lee Lamb at his trailer and Wesley Warlick was present and she set it up to look like an accident--you admit telling Detective Eatman that, do you not?
A. I said it, but I lied.
Q. Well, why would you lie to Detective Eatman?
A. I'm just a liar.
....
Q. I want you to think about this real carefully--you were sworn before you took the witness stand?
A. That's right.
Q. And you are telling this Court you have lied while you have been on the witness stand--you understand the meaning of talking [sic] an oath, do you not?
A. Yes.
Q. And I am going to ask you again whether or not Ruby Lamb told you how she killed David Lee Lamb and if she didn't set it up to look like an accident?
A. No.
Q. Was that a lie?
A. That was a lie.
....
Q. And since you have gotten on the stand you have changed your mind about testifying against your sister, haven't you?
A. I didn't want to testify to begin with.
Q. And you don't want to testify now?
A. That's right.
Q. But don't you think--strike that. Didn't you also tell me during the noon recess, just a moment before you got on the stand, that Wesley Warlick wasn't going to have to carry all the blame and all the responsibility, didn't you tell me that seated in this courtroom just--
A. I did not mention Wesley's name, you did.
Q. Well, didn't you say that he won't [sic] going to have to carry it all?
A. I told you it wasn't right for Wesley to have to be in the situation he's in, yes.
Q. Well, you also told me you didn't want to testify against your sister, but if you had to take the stand, you wanted to get up here and get it over with, did you not?
A. I said I wanted to get it over with.
Q. And now you don't want to tell the truth about it and you don't want to testify against her, is that true?
A. Would you testify against your sister?
COURT: Ma'am, that is not the question. The question is--you were subpoenaed to be here. You have taken an oath to tell the truth. You are under a duty to answer the lawyer's questions and I must respectfully inform you that if you refuse to answer the lawyer's question, I have no alternative except to hold you in contempt of court, and I must further inform you that if you intentionally lie on this stand, you are subjecting yourself to perjury. Do you understand that?
A. I understand.
....
Q. I would like to ask you, Mrs. Crooks, if you understood the warning concerning contempt?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. Well, now I would like to ask you at this time if you are willing to proceed to answer my questions under oath and tell the truth?
A. Yes, sir.
Defendant contends that the trial court's warnings were improperly accusatory and threatening and reveal that the court had determined that the witness had lied during her testimony on direct examination. In support of this contention, defendant relies on State v. Rhodes, 290 N.C. 16, 224 S.E.2d 631 (1976), and State v. Locklear, 309 N.C. 428, 306 S.E.2d 774 (1983). Defendant's reliance on these cases avails her naught. In Rhodes, the trial judge actually accused the witness of not telling the truth and in Locklear, the trial judge repeatedly admonished the witness for her failure to respond to questions and also accused her of not being truthful. Here, in contrast, the judge...
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