Brenneman v. Medcentral Health System

Decision Date26 April 2004
Docket NumberNo. 02-3623.,02-3623.
Citation366 F.3d 412
PartiesLee BRENNEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MEDCENTRAL HEALTH SYSTEM, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Natalie F. Grubb (argued and briefed), Medina, OH, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael J. Frantz (briefed), Michael N. Chesney (argued and briefed), Frantz Ward, Cleveland, OH, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: KENNEDY, ROGERS, and COOK, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Lee Brenneman ("plaintiff") filed suit against his former employer MedCentral Health System ("defendant"), alleging disability discrimination in violation of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et. seq., and the Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02 as well as a violation of the federal Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.1 Plaintiff appeals the district court's award of summary judgment in favor of defendant on these claims. For the reasons explained below, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant.

I. Background

The record reveals the following facts. Plaintiff Brenneman worked in defendant MedCentral Health System's Pharmacy Department for approximately twenty-seven years. Although he began his employment in 1973 as a Pharmacy Helper, he received a promotion to Pharmacy Technician in 1975. Plaintiff remained in this position throughout the rest of his employment. Plaintiff was diagnosed with diabetes mellitus in 1968. Although he sometimes has episodes of hypoglycemia, in which he can experience seizures, shock, and/or lightheadedness and incoherence, plaintiff generally controls his condition with insulin. Plaintiff also controls his diabetes by regulating his diet, exercising, and monitoring his blood sugar level throughout the day using a glucometer. Since 1998, plaintiff, whose diabetes has worsened with age, has used an insulin pump to control this condition.

During the course of his employment, plaintiff had substantial attendance deficiencies. According to his employment records, plaintiff had 193 unapproved absences and 34 late arrivals or early departures during his employment. These attendance deficiencies chiefly related to medical problems other than plaintiff's diabetes, such as six work-related injuries and other general illnesses. Defendant granted plaintiff FMLA leave on five occasions, none of which was for diabetes. Per its attendance policy, defendant disciplined plaintiff numerous times for his attendance problems. For example, plaintiff received a number of verbal and written warnings and suspensions. Although each disciplinary form affords the employee an opportunity to respond to the disciplinary action, plaintiff never once protested the imposition of discipline or mentioned his diabetes.

On March 31, 2000, plaintiff informed defendant that he "wasn't doing well and ... wouldn't be in" that day. At that time, he did not mention that his absence was in any way related to his diabetic condition. On April 4, 2000, plaintiff met with his supervisors, Thomas Arkwright ("Arkwright"), the Director of Pharmacy Services, and Brian George ("George"), the Assistant Director of Pharmacy Services, regarding his attendance deficiencies. During this meeting, however, plaintiff never referenced his diabetes as the reason for his latest absence. Under defendant's attendance policy, this absence triggered another suspension of plaintiff. Moreover, pursuant to that policy, this suspension triggered plaintiff's termination because it was his third attendance-related suspension within five years. Thus, at the conclusion of the meeting, plaintiff was terminated.

On April 6, 2000, plaintiff requested and attended a final exit interview with Bruce Engle ("Engle"), defendant's Vice President of Human Resources. Plaintiff, for the first time, mentioned that his March 31st absence was due to his diabetes. Specifically, plaintiff presented a note from Dr. Cynthia Dorsey, his diabetes specialist, stating that the absence was due to an extended episode of diabetes-related hypoglycemia. Defendant, nevertheless, finalized plaintiff's termination.2

II. Analysis

We review the district court's order granting summary judgment de novo. Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 689 (6th Cir.1999). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A "material" fact is one "that might affect the outcome of the suit." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A "genuine" issue exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. We must accept the non-moving party's evidence, and draw all justifiable inferences in his favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "We may affirm a decision of the district court if correct for any reason, including one not considered below." See United States Postal Serv. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 330 F.3d 747, 750 (6th Cir.2003).

A. Disability Discrimination

The ADA proscribes discrimination "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112. Under the ADA, an employer's denial of employment opportunities to an employee with a disability may constitute such unlawful discrimination if the denial is based upon the employer's need "to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of the employee or applicant." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B) (1991). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: "(1) he is disabled; (2) he is otherwise qualified for the position with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision; (4) his employer knew or had reason to know of his disability; and (5) his position remained open." Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir.1999). Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action against plaintiff. Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 520-21 (6th Cir.1998). Once the employer discharges this burden of production, the employee must demonstrate that the proffered reason was, in fact, a pretext for unlawful disability discrimination. Id. at 521. The plaintiff always retains the ultimate burden of persuasion. Plant v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 936 (6th Cir.2000).

Because neither party has argued that an action for handicap discrimination under Ohio law entails a different legal analysis than that for disability discrimination under the ADA, and because Ohio case law tends to suggest that it entails the same legal analysis as that under the ADA, we will analyze plaintiff's state and federal discrimination claims under Ohio Revised Code § 4112 and the ADA, respectively, solely under the ADA. See Plant, 212 F.3d at 938-39 (noting that Ohio case law seems to support the proposition that the ADA analysis applies to a Ohio claim of disability discrimination, and assuming so for purposes of its analysis because the parties have not argued otherwise); Martin v. Barnesville Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 209 F.3d 931, 934 n. 2 (6th Cir.2000) (holding that "[b]oth federal and Ohio disability discrimination actions require the same analysis"); City of Columbus Civil Serv. Comm'n v. McGlone, 82 Ohio St.3d 569, 697 N.E.2d 204, 206-07 (1998) (holding that, to establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination under Ohio law, which is "similar" to the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: 1) he was handicapped; 2) the employer took an adverse action against him, at least in part, because of his handicap; and 3) the plaintiff, "though handicapped, can safely and substantially perform the essential functions of the job in question," and noting that Ohio courts may look to the ADA for guidance in the interpretation of Ohio law). But see Wooten v. City of Columbus, 91 Ohio App.3d 326, 632 N.E.2d 605, 611 (1993) (holding that Ohio disability discrimination law is "at least as broad, if not broader, in scope than" the ADA) (emphasis added).

The district court granted summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff's state and federal disability discrimination claims on the ground that plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of such discrimination; specifically, the district court held that plaintiff was unqualified due to his inability to satisfy defendant's basic attendance requirements.3 We agree with the district court that plaintiff, as a matter of law, has failed to establish that he was otherwise qualified for the position of Pharmacy Technician with or without reasonable accommodation. Plaintiff's disability discrimination claims hinge upon defendant's failure to grant plaintiff the reasonable accommodation of FMLA leave for his diabetes-related absences and defendant's ultimate termination of plaintiff under its attendance policy based upon its assessment of points for these diabetes-related absences.

However, even if defendant had granted plaintiff medical leave for those absences which plaintiff specifically alleges were diabetes-related — absences on February 16, 1996; February 9, 1999; and March 31, 2000 —,4 plaintiff, as a matter of law, would not have been...

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