Wright v. Houston Independent School District

Decision Date30 October 1972
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 70-H-1236.
Citation366 F. Supp. 1208
PartiesRita WRIGHT et al. v. HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

Leona Weber, pro se, James K. Kelly, Houston, Tex., for plaintiffs.

Herbert Coffman, Houston, Tex., for intervening plaintiff.

Bracewell & Patterson, William Key Wilde and Kelly Frels, Houston, Tex., Crawford Martin, Atty. Gen., James C. McCoy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER:

SEALS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs—students of the Houston Independent School District—here seek to enjoin the District and the State Board of Education from teaching the theory of evolution as part of the District's academic curriculum and from adopting textbooks which present that theory without critical analysis and to the exclusion of other theories regarding the origins of man. Plaintiffs base their claim for relief upon the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343. The case is presently before the Court on Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.1

Plaintiffs' principal contention is that the teaching of the theory of evolution in the Houston Independent School District inhibits Plaintiffs in the free exercise of their religion and constitutes an "establishment of religion," in contravention of the first amendment to the United States Constitution.2 The theory of evolution is, according to Plaintiffs, presented by Defendants without critical analysis and without reference to other theories which purport to explain the origin of the human species. The "other theory" whose case Plaintiffs here champion is the explanation derived from the Bible, the basis of which is that man was created by God. In Plaintiffs' view, the theory of evolution is so inimical to the Creation account that its presentation as part of the academic curriculum should be deemed a direct attack upon Plaintiffs' religious beliefs by an organ of government. The State, by implicitly rejecting a central tenet of Plaintiffs' religion, is holding that religion up to contempt, scorn, and ridicule, and is thus acting to discourage, if not to restrain, Plaintiffs in the free exercise of their religion.

Plaintiffs also argue a constitutional deprivation in terms of the Establishment clause of the first amendment. Plaintiffs maintain that, by restricting the study of human origins to an uncritical examination of the theory of evolution, Defendants are lending official support to a "religion of secularism."3 Under the guise of scientific theory, Plaintiffs submit that Defendants are engaged in the propagation of a doctrine that is fundamentally religious in nature, and thus, are "establishing" a particular religion in contravention of the first amendment.

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' teaching of the theory of evolution violates the doctrine of neutrality which the Supreme Court has held must be State policy in matters of religion.4 The principle of neutrality was most recently affirmed by the Court in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968). In that case, the Court struck down an Arkansas statute which prohibited any teacher in a state school from teaching the theory of evolution. The Court had

"* * * no doubt that Arkansas has sought to prevent its teachers from discussing the theory of evolution because it is contrary to the belief of some that the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of man." Epperson, supra, at 107, 89 S.Ct. at 272.

Such a statute, since it

"* * * was confined to an attempt to blot out a particular theory because of its supposed conflict with the Biblical account, literally read,"

could not pass the test of religious neutrality whose standard the Constitution requires all organs of government to uphold. Id., at 109, 89 S.Ct. at 273.

Plaintiffs have thus attempted to draw an analogy between the Arkansas prohibition and the teaching of the theory of evolution in the Houston Independent School District. From that position, Plaintiffs would suggest an appropriately analogous remedy: an injunction against the teaching of the theory of evolution. But Plaintiffs have wholly failed to establish the analogy.

In the first place, Arkansas chose to promote a particular view regarding human origins by means of legislative enactment. It was clear to the Supreme Court

"* * * that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and is the law's reason for existence." Id., at 108, 89 S.Ct. at 272.

Defendants, however, are not acting pursuant either to State law or school district regulation. Plaintiffs have not alleged that there exists even a school district policy regarding the theory of evolution. All that can be said is that certain textbooks selected by school officials present what Plaintiffs deem a biased view in support of the theory. This Court has been cited to no case in which so nebulous an intrusion upon the principle of religious neutrality has been condemned by the Supreme Court.

Neither have Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants attempt to discourage the free discussion of the subject of human origins. There has been no suggestion that Plaintiffs, or any other students, have been denied the opportunity to challenge their teachers' presentation of the Darwinian theory. Arkansas, on the other hand, prohibited any discussion of the subject of evolution.

In short, whereas Arkansas labelled as a criminal offense the mere reference to an entire body of scientific opinion, neither the State of Texas nor the Houston Independent School District has given legislative expression to any view of the subject of evolution. The State, at most, has a general policy of approving textbooks which present the theory of evolution in a favorable light. No position regarding human origins is even indirectly proscribed by State or District. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have failed even to assert the suppression of opposing ideas. Clearly, Defendants' "policy" (or lack thereof) regarding the theory of evolution is far removed from Arkansas' blanket censorship.

Plaintiffs' case depends in large measure upon their demonstrating a connection between "religion," as employed in the first amendment, and Defendants' approach to the subject of evolution.5 The Court is convinced that the connection is too tenuous a thread on which to base a first amendment complaint.

In Cornwell v. State Board of Education, 314 F.Supp. 340 (D.Md., 1969), aff'd, 428 F.2d 471 (C.A. 4, 1970), a group of Baltimore children and their parents sought to enjoin the enforcement of a bylaw, adopted by the State Board of Education, requiring "the local school system to provide a comprehensive program of family life and sex education in every elementary and secondary school for all students." Among other contentions, the Plaintiffs asserted that the sex education program constituted an establishment of religion and that its implementation denied to them the free exercise of their religious beliefs: Reminding Plaintiffs that the first amendment does not say that in all respects there must be a separation of church and state, the District Court applied the test devised by the Supreme Court in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963), for determining the validity of a legislative provision under the Establishment Clause of the first amendment:

"What are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution." Schempp, supra, at 222, 83 S.Ct. at 1571.

The Cornwell court was convinced that the

"* * * purpose and primary effect of the bylaw here is not to establish any particular religious dogma or precept, and that the bylaw does not directly or substantially involve the state in religious exercises or in the favoring of religion or any particular religion." Cornwell, supra, at 344.

In the case at bar, the offending material is peripheral to the matter of religion. Science and religion necessarily deal with many of the same questions, and they may frequently provide conflicting answers. But, as the Supreme Court wrote twenty years ago, it is not the business of government to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505, 72 S.Ct. 777, 96 L.Ed. 1098 (1952). Teachers of science in the public schools should not be expected to avoid the discussion of every scientific issue on which some religion claims expertise.

Avoidance of any reference to the subject of human origins is, indeed, a decidedly totalitarian approach to the problem presented here. Book-burning is always dangerous, but never more dangerous than when practiced on behalf of young and impressionable minds. How is the teacher to respond to the inquiry of a high school biology student regarding the theory of evolution? Is he to be told that the subject is taboo, that the teacher is not permitted to speak of it, that he mustn't ask such questions?

Plaintiffs, however, would propose another approach that, at first glance, seems reasonable and fair: "equal time" for all theories regarding human origins.6 If the beliefs of fundamentalism were the sole alternative to the Darwinian theory, such a remedy might at least be feasible. But virtually every religion known to man holds its own peculiar view of human origins. Within the scientific community itself, there is much debate over the details of the theory of evolution. This Court is hardly qualified to select from among the available theories those which merit attention in a public school biology class. Nor have Plaintiffs suggested to the Court what standards might be applied in making such a selection.

Plaintiffs' case must ultimately fail, then, because the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., s. 86-6144
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 5 Octubre 1987
    ...the school wins (See, e.g., Mozert; Grove v. Mead School Dist., 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir.1985); Wright v. Houston Ind. School District, 366 F.Supp. 1208 (S.D.Tex.1972)). Rather, unless the Supreme Court chooses to extend the principle of Thomas to schools, the democratic principle must prevai......
  • McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Ed.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas
    • 5 Enero 1982
    ...1973); aff'd. 504 F.2d 271 (D.C.Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927, 95 S.Ct. 1124, 43 L.Ed.2d 397 (1975); Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F.Supp. 1208 (S.D.Tex. 1978), aff'd. 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 417 U.S. 969, 94 S.Ct. 3173, 41 L.Ed.2d 1140 V. (D) The def......
  • Peloza v. Capistrano Unified School Dist.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Central District of California
    • 16 Enero 1992
    ...(D.D.C. May 18, 1973); aff'd D.C.Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927, 95 S.Ct. 1124, 43 L.Ed.2d 397 (1975); Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F.Supp. 1208 (S.D.Tex.1978), aff'd 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969, 94 S.Ct. 3173, 41 L.Ed.2d 1140 The Supreme Cou......
  • Crowley v. Smithsonian Institution
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • 30 Octubre 1980
    ...Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. at 103, 89 S.Ct. at 269; Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975); Wright v. Houston Independent School District, 366 F.Supp. 1208 (S.D.Tex.1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub. nom. Brown v. Houston Independent School District, 4......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT