Auburn Mach. Works Co., Inc. v. Jones

Decision Date18 January 1979
Docket NumberNo. 53526,53526
Citation366 So.2d 1167
CourtFlorida Supreme Court
PartiesAUBURN MACHINE WORKS CO., INC., etc., Petitioner, v. Clyde Pete JONES and Irma Jean Jones, his wife, Respondents.

Jacqueline R. Griffin, of Wells, Gattis & Hallowes, Orlando, for petitioner.

Robert Orseck, Walter H. Beckham, Jr., Robert L. Parks and Joel D. Eaton, of Podhurst, Orseck & Parks, Miami, for respondents.

ALDERMAN, Justice.

We have for review the decision in Jones v. Auburn Machine Works Co., 353 So.2d 917 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), in which the Second District refused to apply the "patent danger" or "open and obvious hazard" doctrine so as to preclude liability on the part of a manufacturer. This decision conflicts with Farmhand, Inc. v. Brandies, 327 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), in which the First District applied the doctrine and held that it created an exception to a manufacturer's liability. To resolve this conflict, we must either accept or reject the patent danger doctrine. We reject the doctrine and hold that the obviousness of the hazard is not an exception to liability on the part of the manufacturer but rather is a defense by which the manufacturer may show that the plaintiff did not exercise a reasonable degree of care as required by the circumstances. We also conclude that the principles of comparative negligence apply where this defense is raised.

The facts can be stated briefly. Clyde Jones, sixteen years of age, worked with a crew laying underground telephone cable. He had been instructed by his supervisor on the day of the accident to climb into the trench behind the trench digging machine in order to place the cable flat at the bottom of the trench. While guiding the cable into the trench directly behind the trencher, he lost his balance when the side of the trench caved in, and his foot became entangled in the exposed chain of the machine. He sustained injuries which required the amputation of his left leg below the knee. The trencher possessed no shield or guard and was obviously dangerous.

Jones and his wife sued C. C. Construction, his employer, and Auburn Machine Works Company, the manufacturer of the trench digging device. The employer was granted summary judgment based on its workmen's compensation immunity. In their amended complaint against Auburn, the Joneses alleged negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability arising out of the alleged defective manufacture and design of the trencher. They alleged that Auburn failed to provide reasonable safety features, shields, and guards on moving, exposed, and dangerous portions of the machine; that Auburn failed to design and manufacture the trencher so that the driver or operator could adequately view the operation of the machine's dangerous moving parts; and that Auburn failed to furnish adequate operation instructions. The amended complaint further alleged that Auburn impliedly warranted to ultimate users of the trencher that it was fit for its intended purpose and was safely designed; that the trencher, however, was not of merchantable quality because of its lack of safety devices; and that Auburn was strictly liable in tort. Proximate cause was alleged on all counts.

Auburn filed a motion for summary judgment. In opposition to this motion, the Joneses filed an affidavit of an expert witness testifying that the trencher's design constituted a departure from the reasonably safe and sound engineering practice at the time of its manufacture. The witness stated that the placement of the trencher upon the tractor by Auburn constituted a departure from reasonably safe and sound engineering practice at the time of its manufacture in that Auburn failed to equip the tractor with a rearview mirror which would allow the operator to see the trencher in operation; that Auburn failed to have a library containing safety and design standards at the time this machine was manufactured; that the machine was manufactured without any thought to prevailing safety requirements for the trencher; that the trenching boom was not guarded or shielded, leaving an exposed chain; that a guard or shield probably would have prevented the accident; and that such guard or shield was available at the time this trencher was manufactured or prior to the time of the accident. The trial court entered summary judgment for Auburn, and the Joneses appealed.

Holding that Auburn as movant failed to meet its burden of showing conclusively that no genuine issues of material fact existed, the Second District reversed the trial court's order granting summary judgment; and, referring to its earlier decision in Watson v. Lucerne Machinery & Equipment, Inc., 347 So.2d 459 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), it refused to adopt the obvious and patent danger rule espoused by the First District in Farmhand, Inc. v. Brandies, supra.

Auburn, relying primarily upon Farmhand and Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950), argues that we should apply the patent danger doctrine and contends that this doctrine is based upon sound principles. In response, the Joneses argue that we should reject this doctrine and hold that the obviousness of the hazard is merely an element to be considered in the determination of contributory fault.

The most cogent statement of the patent danger doctrine is found in Campo v. Scofield, supra. In that case, the New York Court of Appeals stated:

(T)he manufacturer of a machine or any other article, dangerous because of the way in which it functions, and patently so, owes to those who use it a duty merely to make it free from latent defects and concealed dangers. . . .

If a manufacturer does everything necessary to make the machine function properly for the purpose for which it is designed, if the machine is without any latent defect, and if its functioning creates no danger or peril that is not known to the user, then the manufacturer has satisfied the law's demands.

301 N.Y. at 471-2, 95 N.E.2d at 803-04.

The First District in Farmhand applied the patent danger doctrine as enunciated in Campo v. Scofield to the facts of the case before it because it believed the doctrine to be the controlling law in Florida at the time it rendered its decision, holding that the doctrine barred the plaintiff's negligence and breach of warranty claims. The First District recognized, however, that its decision in Farmhand passed upon a question of great public interest. Because of this concern, the First District in Farmhand certified for our consideration the question of whether the manufacturer of a machine in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user should be held liable to the user notwithstanding that the condition was obviously dangerous. No petition for writ of certiorari was filed, however, and the certified question was therefore never answered by this Court.

Farmhand was decided shortly before the New York Court of Appeals, in Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 348 N.E.2d 571 (1976), overruled Campo v. Scofield, supra. The New York court, concluding that the patent danger doctrine produced harsh results and suffered from rigidity, held that rather than preventing a plaintiff from establishing his case, the obviousness of the danger should be available to the defendant on the issue of whether plaintiff exercised that degree of reasonable care required under the circumstances. The New York court said:

Apace with advanced technology, a relaxation of the Campo stringency is advisable. A casting of increased responsibility upon the manufacturer, who stands in a superior position to recognize and cure defects, for improper conduct in the placement of finished products into the channels of commerce furthers the public interest. To this end, we hold that a manufacturer is obligated to exercise that degree of care in his plan or design so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to anyone who is likely to be exposed to the danger when the product is used in the manner for which the product was intended . . . .

What constitutes "reasonable care" will, of course, vary with the surrounding circumstances and will involve "a balancing of the likelihood of harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens, against the burden of the precaution which would be effective to avoid the harm" (2 Harper & James, Torts, § 28.4; see Pike v. Hough Co., 2 Cal.3d 465, 85 Cal.Rptr. 629, 467 P.2d 229, Supra ). Under this approach, "the plaintiff endeavors to show the jury such facts as that competitors used the safety device which was missing here, or that a 'cotter pin costing a penny' could have prevented the accident. The defendant points to such matters as cost, function, and competition as narrowing the design choices. He stresses 'trade-offs'. If the product would be unworkable when the alleged missing feature was added, or would be so expensive as to be priced out of the market, that would be relevant defensive matter" . . . .

We next examine the duty owing from a plaintiff or, in other words, the conduct on a plaintiff's part which will bar recovery from a manufacturer. As now enunciated, the patent-danger doctrine should not, in and of itself, prevent a plaintiff from establishing his case. That does not mean, however, that the obviousness of the danger as a factor in the ultimate injury is thereby eliminated, for it must be remembered that in actions for negligent design, the ordinary rules of negligence apply . . . . Rather, the openness and obviousness of the danger should be available to the defendant on the issue of whether plaintiff exercised that degree of reasonable care as was required under the circumstances.

39 N.Y.2d at 385-7, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121-22, 348 N.E.2d at 577-8.

The modern trend in the nation is to abandon the strict patent danger doctrine as an exception to liability and to find that the obviousness of the defect is only a factor to be considered as a mitigating defense in determining whether a defect is unreasonably dangerous and whether...

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