Templet v. Hydrochem Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-30250.,03-30250. |
| Citation | 367 F.3d 473 |
| Parties | Lucien TEMPLET, Jr.; et al., Plaintiffs, Melba Irvin, Individually and on Behalf of Her Minor Child, Adam Irvin; Jimmy Irvin, Individually and on Behalf of His Minor Child, Adam Irvin, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HYDROCHEM INC.; et al., Defendants, Hydrochem Inc.; Hydrochem Industrial Services Inc.; Georgia Gulf Corporation; Master Maintenance Corporation; Master Management Corporation; Payne & Keller Company Inc.; Louisiana Intrastate Gas Co. LLC; LA Intrastate Gas Corp.; Amoco Pipeline Co.; Amoco Energy Trading Corporation; XL Insurance Co., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Daria Burgess Diaz, Robert Souren Abdalian (argued), Diaz & Abdalian, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Luis A. Leitzelar (argued), Emile C. Rolfs, III, Michael Paul Fruge, Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, Baton Rouge, LA, for Hydrochem Inc., Hydrochem Industrial Services Inc., Georgia Gulf Corp., Master Maintenance Corp., Master Management Corp. and Payne & Keller Co. Inc. Reginald R. Smith, King & Spalding, Houston, TX, for Georgia Gulf Corp. and Payne & Keller Co. Inc.
Michael Stephen Sepcich, Lemle & Kelleher, New Orleans, LA, for Louisiana Intrastate Gas Co. and LA Intrastate Gas Corp.
Ronald A. Johnson, Michael W. Mallory, Johnson, Johnson, Barrios & Yacoubian, New Orleans, LA, for Amoco Pipeline Co. and Amoco Energy Trading Corp.
Thomas Edgard Schwab, Barkley & Thompson, New Orleans, LA, for XL Ins. Co.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana.
Before DeMOSS, DENNIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Melba Irvin, et al. (the "Irvins"), appeal the granting of summary judgment by the district court for Defendants-Appellees, and the subsequent denial of the Irvins' Rule 59(e) motion to alter, amend, and reconsider in a toxic tort action arising from a chemical release from Defendants' facility.
This case arises out of claims brought in state court relating to the release of a mustard gas agent at the Georgia Gulf Corporation facility in Plaquemine, Louisiana, that occurred on or about September 25, 1996. On November 8, 1996, suit was filed in state district court, asserting claims against multiple defendants, including Georgia Gulf Corporation, X.L. Insurance Company, Primex, Ltd., HydroChem Industrial Services, Inc., Payne & Keller Company, Inc., Master Maintenance & Construction, Inc., Amoco Energy Trading Corporation, Louisiana Intrastate Gas Company, L.L.C., and LIG Liquids Company, L.L.C. (collectively, the "Defendants").
On March 5, 1999, X.L. Insurance Company and Primex, Ltd. removed the case to federal court, asserting jurisdiction under the Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. X.L. Insurance Company and Primex, Ltd. are foreign insurance companies who were named as defendants in this action pursuant to the Louisiana Direct Action Statute, La. Rev. Stat. § 22:655. The Irvins filed a motion to remand on April 5, 1999, that was denied by the district court on June 9, 1999.
The Irvins, who were added as additional plaintiffs to the original state court proceeding in March and September 1997, maintain that they sustained injuries as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the Defendants. Since joining as plaintiffs, the Irvins have been represented by four separate sets of attorneys. On January 7, 2002, the Irvins' second set of counsel, Albert Bensabat and Daniel Edwards, filed a motion to establish discovery cutoff and trial dates and/or a status conference. On March 1, 2002, the magistrate held a status conference where she set discovery deadlines, ordering the Irvins to: 1) provide the Defendants with all medical reports by March 15, 2002; 2) list all treating physicians and identify all experts by July 1, 2002; and 3) submit all expert reports by August 1, 2002. On March 14, 2002, one day before the Irvins were ordered to provide the Defendants all medical reports, Bensabat and Edwards filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the Irvins. The following day the magistrate granted the motion to withdraw. Thereafter, the Irvins failed to identify any experts or produce any medical or expert reports in compliance with the court's deadlines.
On August 22, 2002, George Tucker enrolled as counsel for the Irvins. The district court held a status conference on August 27, 2002, that was attended by Mr. Tucker, appearing on behalf of the Irvins. The district court judge entered an order the following day referring the matter to the magistrate for entry of scheduling orders and trial preparation "anticipating a trial date in March or April 2003." On August 30, 2002, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and/or dismissal, asserting that the Irvins had failed to satisfy the elements of their claim. Specifically, the Defendants maintained that the Irvins could not, through the requisite expert evidence, establish negligence on the part of the Defendants, nor could they establish causation and damages. In the alternative, the Defendants sought the dismissal of the Irvins' claims for their failure to adhere to the court-ordered deadlines. The Irvins did not file any opposition to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
On October 30, 2002, the district court issued its ruling granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The district court stated:
In this case, plaintiffs have alleged that they suffered harm by exposure to the mustard gas release but have failed to produce any evidence whatsoever of such injury. In a toxic tort case such as this ... medical evidence is essential to establish harm to plaintiffs. Without having produced any medical evidence, plaintiffs cannot establish that they suffered damages, an essential element of their case.
Subsequently, on November 5, 2002, George Tucker, the Irvins' counsel, filed a motion to withdraw from the case. The district court granted the withdrawal on November 20, 2002, and entered judgment dismissing the Irvins' case the following day.
On December 6, 2002, the Irvins obtained new counsel, who immediately filed a Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion to alter, amend, and reconsider the judgment. Specifically, the Irvins requested that the district court reconsider and vacate the November 21, 2002, judgment to prevent manifest injustice. On February 4, 2003, the district court denied the Rule 59(e) motion, stating that the motion for summary judgment was filed while the Irvins were represented by counsel, who neither requested a continuance nor sought a rescheduling of deadlines. The Irvins filed a timely notice of appeal on March 3, 2003.
This suit was originally filed in Louisiana state district court on November 8, 1996. On March 5, 1999, two of the multiple defendants, X.L. Insurance Company and Primex, Ltd., removed the case to federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), asserting jurisdiction under the Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. The Irvins subsequently filed a motion to remand, which was denied by the district court. The Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted, and the district court entered judgment on November 21, 2002. The Irvins filed a timely Rule 59(e) motion, which was denied by the district court on February 4, 2003. The Irvins then filed their notice of appeal on March 3, 2003.1 This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The applicable standard of review of the denial of the Irvins' motion to alter, amend, and reconsider is dependent on whether the district court considered the materials attached to the Irvins' motion, which were not previously provided to the court.2 Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Bright, 34 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir.1994). If the materials were considered by the district court, and the district court still grants summary judgment, the appropriate appellate standard of review is de novo. Id. However, if the district court refuses to consider the materials, the reviewing court applies the abuse of discretion standard. Id. Under this standard of review, the district court's decision and decision-making process need only be reasonable. Id.
Based on a review of the district court's ruling on the motion for reconsideration, it is unclear whether the additional materials submitted by the Irvins were considered by the district court. The district court does not expressly or impliedly refer to the additional materials in its ruling. Therefore, in the absence of any specific reference to these materials, we review the district court's denial of the Irvins' Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of discretion, i.e., as if the district court did not consider the additional materials.
This Court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Tango Transp. v. Healthcare Fin. Servs. LLC, 322 F.3d 888, 890 (5th Cir.2003). Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-movant. Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir.1997). The non-movant must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial to avoid summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is...
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