Katz v. United States

Decision Date13 March 1967
Docket NumberNo. 20648.,20648.
PartiesCharles KATZ, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Burton Marks, Beverly Hills, Cal., for appellants.

Manuel L. Real, U. S. Atty., John K. Van De Kamp, Chief Asst. U. S. Atty., Robert L. Brosio, Asst. U. S. Atty., Asst. Chief, Crim. Div., Michael P. Balaban, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.

Before CHAMBERS and BARNES, Circuit Judges, and POWELL, District Judge.

Certiorari Granted March 13, 1967. See 87 S.Ct. 1021.

POWELL, District Judge:

The appellant was charged in each count of an eight count indictment with a violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1084.1 That statute proscribes the interstate transmission by wire communication of bets or wagers, or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers by a person engaged in the business of betting or wagering. Each count involved a violation on a different date or at different times on the same date. Appellant waived a jury. The district judge found appellant guilty on all counts.

The appellant moved to suppress evidence in the possession of the government and for the return of the evidence and the dismissal of the indictment. Following a hearing, the motions were denied. On the motion to suppress the evidence was substantially as follows:

In February of 1965 the appellant was seen placing calls from a bank of three public telephone booths during certain hours and on an almost daily basis. He was never observed in any other telephone booth.

In the period of February 19 to February 25, 1965, at set hours, Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation placed microphones on the tops of two of the public telephone booths normally used by the appellant. The other phone was placed out of order by the telephone company. The microphones were attached to the outside of the telephone booths with tape. There was no physical penetration inside of the booths. The microphones were activated only while appellant was approaching and actually in the booth. Wires led from microphones to a wire recorder on top of one of the booths. Thus the F.B.I. obtained a record of appellant's end of a series of telephone calls.

A study of the transcripts of the recordings made of the appellant's end of the conversations revealed that the conversations had to do with the placing of bets and the obtaining of gambling information by the appellant.

On February 23, 1965, F.B.I. Agent Allen Frei rented a room next to the appellant's apartment residence. He listened to conversations through the common wall without the aid of any electronic device. He overheard the appellant's end of a series of telephone conversations and took notes on them. These notes and the tapes made from the telephone booth recordings were the basis of a search warrant which was obtained to search appellant's apartment. The search warrant called for "* * * bookmaking records, wagering paraphernalia, including but not limited to, bet slips, betting markers, run-down sheets, schedule sheets indicating the lines, adding machines, money, telephones, telephone address listings * * *". (See N. 4). The articles seized are described in the return (C.T. 20-22). They are all related to the categories described in the warrant.

During the conversations overheard by Agent Frei, the appellant made numerous comments to the effect that "I have Northwestern minus 7", and "Oregon plus 3." Also, there was a statement by the appellant such as, "Don't worry about the line. I have phoned Boston three times about it today."

At the trial evidence was introduced to show that from February 19 to February 25, 1965, inclusive, the appellant placed calls from two telephone booths. located in the 8200 block of Sunset Boulevard in Los Angeles. The conversations were overheard and recorded every day except February 22. The transcripts of the recordings and the normal business records of the telephone company were used to determine that the calls went to Boston, Massachusetts, and Miami, Florida.

The testimony of Joseph Gunn of the Administrative Vice Division of the Los Angeles Police Department, who was the expert called by the government in the area of bookmaking, was that the transcripts of the conversations showed that bets were made and information assisting in the placing of bets was transmitted on the dates and at the times alleged in the indictment. Bets were recorded like "Give me Duquesne minus 7 for a nickel."2 Information relating to the line and the acquiring of credit was also transmitted.

In correlating the transcript of the telephone conversations and line sheets and markers found in appellant's residence during the search pursuant to the warrant, Officer Gunn concluded that appellant was placing wagers with a bookmaker for another person for a consideration.

On February 25, 1965, the appellant was arrested. He was advised by a Special Agent of the F.B.I., Emmett Doherty, that he had a right to remain silent, he had a right to consult counsel, and that any statements he made could be used against him in a court of law. The appellant was arrested on the street. He was later present in his apartment where another agent of the F.B.I. was involved in the search authorized by the search warrant. Appellant asked when he could have his records back. He stated that without them he was out of business and that he knew no other trade. During this exchange, in response to a question about interstate betting, the appellant said that he could not bet locally because the bookmakers would not pay off.

The next day, which was February 26, 1965, Agent Donovan of the F.B.I. met appellant in the lobby of his apartment building to return two personal items which had been taken at the time of the search. Donovan had been with Agent Doherty the day before when Doherty advised the appellant of his rights with respect to statements made to the Federal Agents. Appellant again asked why he could not have his records back. He stated without them he was out of business and that he had been a handicapper and a bettor most of his life. He suggested that if he got his records back he would continue to bet.3

From all of the evidence in the case the court found the volume of business being done by the appellant indicated that it was not a casual incidental occupation of the appellant. The court found that he was engaged in the business of betting or wagering at the time of the telephone conversations which were transmitted and recorded. (RT 316, 317).

I. Recording of Phone Booth Conversations.

The appellant argues that the evidence obtained at the time of the recording of the appellant's end of the conversations in the phone booth constituted an illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellant urges this on authority of Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961), which he says expresses the current attitude of the Supreme Court.

In the Silverman case the agents used a spike microphone which was driven into a party wall. It contacted a heating duct of the house occupied by the petitioners. This enabled the agents to hear conversations in the entire house, including conversations on the telephone. The case was reversed because of the invasion into a "constitutionally protected area." The court said, "the officers overheard the petitioners' conversations only by usurping part of the petitioners' house or office". (365 U.S. at 511, 81 S.Ct. at 682). It was held to be a violation of the petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights.

Appellant cites cases which we have considered. In People of the State of California v. Hurst, 325 F.2d 891 (9 Cir. 1963), there was an unlawful invasion of premises used as a residence. We do not consider Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963), as authority sustaining appellant's position as that case sustained the right to record a conversation between a government agent and the suspect. United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2 Cir. 1962), was reversed because a search of an apartment without a warrant produced evidence later used to search the same apartment after the defendant's right to possession had terminated. This last case would apply only if we found that the evidence obtained by the recording of the phone conversations here was in violation of appellant's Fourth Amendment rights. This we decline to do.

The public phone booth was used by appellant, who argues that when he occupied it for the purpose of engaging in a personal conversation and closed the door to the booth, he is in effect in his own residence. By invitation from the telephone company and the payment of the toll he says he is entitled to consider the booth protected from intrusion by the Fourth Amendment. In Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9 Cir. 1965), police officers observed events in a stall in a public toilet through a camouflaged hole in the ceiling. The court held that this was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of the defendants on two grounds, 1) the appellants impliedly consented to the search when they carried on their illegal acts in a public toilet, and 2) there was no unreasonable search within the meaning of the amendment. 352 F.2d at 253, 256.

In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928), evidence was introduced which was obtained by tapping the wires of the telephones used by petitioners. It was held that the use of the evidence did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of defendants.

In Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 62 S.Ct. 993, 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1942), federal agents were permitted to testify to conversations overheard by the use of a detectaphone applied to the walls of a room adjoining the office of the defendant. This is similar to the instant case. It was held not to be an...

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