Fuller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

Decision Date07 January 1889
Citation37 F. 163
PartiesFULLER et al. v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Bill for a discovery and an accounting, brought by Harriet A Fuller and Austin B. Fuller against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company of the city of New York, and Joseph F Knapp. Many of the leading facts appear in Fuller v Knapp, 24 F. 100. See, also, 31 F. 696. The complainants seek to ascertain the amount due under certain stipulations of a policy of life insurance, which provide that the policy is issued upon the 'reserve dividend plan.' The defendants insist that the complainants confided to the board of directors of the insurance company an absolute discretion to apportion the reserve dividend, and that their determination as to the amount is conclusive. The complainants not only deny that this proposition contains a correct exposition of the law, but they contend, further, that it has no application to a cause like this where, by reason of the ambiguity of the contract, it is necessary to ascertain what is the meaning of its terms; that the court must at the outset determine the principles by which the defendants shall be governed and guided in making up the account. The bill has been attached at various times, and its sufficiency upheld by this court. The cause now comes on for final hearing.

Levi A. Fuller, for complainants.

William H. Arnoux, William B. Hornblower, and Haley Fiske, for defendants.

COXE J.

The first proposition argued by the defendants is that the court has no jurisdiction, for the reason that the amount involved does not exceed $500. Act March 3, 1875. The bill alleges that $1,231 is due the complainants from the reserve endowment fund. The defendants insist that this sum must be disregarded in fixing the jurisdictional amount, for the reason that they admit it to be due, and offer to pay it, in their answers, and therefore it is not in controversy. The soundness of this proposition may well be doubted. If it can be maintained, the defendant in a vast number of actions, both at law and in equity, both ex contractu and ex delicto, will have it in his power to oust the court of jurisdiction by admitting that the whole or a part of the plaintiff's demand is due. If, for instance, this suit were to recover the $1,231 alone, can it be said that the court has no jurisdiction to enter judgment because of the defendant's admission that the amount sued for is due? The amount actually due at the time the action is commenced is the amount in controversy. To recover that sum it is necessary for the plaintiff to bring the defendant into court; and, having been legally brought there, he cannot defeat the jurisdiction by an offer to pay. If the court has jurisdiction when the suit is commenced, it has it for all time. This rule is well-nigh universal, and it is not necessary to consider the exceptions to it here. The defendant cannot change the character of the suit in this regard.

It is true that under section 5 of the act of 1875 the cause should be dismissed if, at any time during its progress, the court discovers that it has no jurisdiction. The discovery, though not made until the end of a suit, relates back to the lack of jurisdiction at the beginning. If the court had no jurisdiction when the suit was begun, there must be a dismissal, even though the fact was not ascertained until the close of the litigation. Surely this section does not mean that a suit, properly brought, may be dismissed because the defendant by admissions or failure to deny reduces the amount in dispute to less than the statutory sum. If this be the true consideration, the stronger the plaintiff makes his case the greater danger he will incur of being turned out of court. If, for instance, on the trial, he proves his case so conclusively that the defendant can offer nothing in reply, and in open court concedes the justice of the plaintiff's demand, it will be the duty of the court at that very moment to dismiss the cause, for the reason that there is nothing in controversy between the parties. This was not the intention of the law-makers. There is, however, sufficient upon the other branch of the case to give the court jurisdiction. The complainants seek to recover under the reserve dividend clause of the policy. The defendants concede that there is due $387. The complainants insist that it is four times that amount. This controversy cannot be settled finally until a master has taken the account. Should it then be determined that there is more than $500 involved, the wisdom of retaining the cause will be apparent. On the other hand, should the master find that there is less involved, the defendants' point will be as available then as now. Clearly, at this stage of the litigation, the objection should be overruled. The defendants dispute the jurisdiction of the court upon other grounds, but it seems that they are all covered by former adjudications of this court, and should not be considered again. It would be an intolerable hardship to the complainants, after having informed them that their bill was properly brought, to turn them out of court at this late period, and after a tedious and expensive investigation, for want of equity.

The main question arises upon the interpretation to be placed upon the policy of insurance. On the 2d of March, 1874, the defendant the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company issued its policy of insurance for $10,000 upon the life of Austin B. Fuller, for the benefit of Harriet A. Fuller, for the term of 10 years. The policy contains this provision:

'At the request of the assured, this policy is insured upon the 'Reserve Dividend Plan,' and the said company agree that, should
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9 cases
  • New York Life Ins. Co. v. Boling
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • October 19, 1936
    ...165 Miss. 405; 13 C. J., pp. 532, 561, 770-771; 22 C. J., Evidence, p. 1203; 32 C. J. 1159; Couch on Insurance, p. 363; Fuller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 37 F. 163; Hattiesburg Plumbing Co. v. Carmichael, 31 So. 536, 80 66. This court held the Blaylock policy ambiguous. The present poli......
  • Pratt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • January 22, 1944
    ... ... 730, the court dealt with the same ... situation and held to the same general effect ... See, ... also, Supica v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 Kan ... 204, 19 P.2d 465, where the question decided was the ... authority of the agent to accept less than the amount of ... 547, 191 S.W. 279, L.R.A.1918F, 330, ... Ann.Cas. 1918E, 880; Noel v. Continental Casualty ... Co., 138 Kan. 136, 23 P.2d 610; Fuller v ... Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., C.C., 37 F. 163; and ... Southern Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Montague, ... 84 Ky. 653, 2 S.W. 443, 4 ... ...
  • Jellison v. Krell Piano Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky
    • November 24, 1917
    ...statute or of those decisions. In the Hayward Case the court based its decisions on those in the following cases, to wit: Fuller v. Insurance Co. (C.C.) 37 F. 163; Henderson v. Cabell (C.C.) 43 F. 257; Peeler Lathrop, 48 F. 780, 1 C.C.A. 93; Waite v. Insurance Co. (C.C.) 62 F. 769-- in addi......
  • Ijams v. Provident Savings Life Assurance Society of New York
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • December 24, 1904
    ...testimony of appellant's own witness, which is not contradicted, explains the meaning, and his testimony is the best evidence. Fuller v. Ins. Co., 37 F. 163. The oral promise merged in the written contract. In so far as either count of appellant's petition rests upon an alleged parol or pri......
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