State ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse Comm'n v. Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 April 1888
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE EX REL. RAILROAD & WAREHOUSE COMMISSION v CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

38 Minn. 281

37 N.W. 782

STATE EX REL. RAILROAD & WAREHOUSE COMMISSIONvCHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 20, 1888.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Under section 8, c. 10, Gen. Laws 1887, the determination of the railroad and warehouse commission as to what are equal and reasonable fares and rates for the transportation of persons and property by a railway company is conclusive, and in proceedings by mandamus to compel compliance with the tariff of rates recommended and published by them, no issue can be raised or inquiry had on that question.

The authority thus given to the commission to determine, in the exercise of their discretion and judgment, what are equal and reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative power.

Section 8, referred to, vests the supreme court (concurrently with a district court) with original jurisdiction of all proceedings by mandamus therein provided for to compel compliance with the provisions of the act.

Application by the railroad and warehouse commission of the state for a writ of mandamus to compel the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company to comply with the recommendation made to it by the commission to change its tariff of rates on milk from the cities of Owatonna and Faribault to the cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis, all within the state of Minnesota.

M. E. Clapp, Atty. Gen., A. D. Keyes, and J. M. Burlingame, for relator.

John W. Cary, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

The questions here presented are-First, the construction, and, second, the constitutionality, of chapter 10, (particularly subdivisions e, f, and g of section 8,) Gen. Laws 1887, entitled “An act to regulate common carriers, and creating the railroad and warehouse commission of the state of Minnesota, and defining the duties of such commission in relation to common carriers.” The provisions of the act are made applicable to all common carriers of persons or property by railroad, or partly by railroad and partly by water, when both are used under a common control or management. It creates and establishes a commission to be known as the “Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of Minnesota,” and to consist of three commissioners appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate. It provides that all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers and property shall be equal and reasonable. It also requires all carriers to furnish ample, equal, and reasonable facilities for trade and travel; prohibits unequal and unreasonable preferences to any particular person or locality, or to any particular description of traffic; and forbids pools, rebates, or limitations of the common-law liability of carriers of property, etc. Section 8 (a) requires every common carrier to print and keep posted at every depot or station, schedules showing its freight rates and passenger fares. (b) Forbids any change in these schedules without 10 days' notice. (c) Makes it unlawful to charge any greater or less rates than those specified in such schedules. (d) Requires the carrier to file with the railway and warehouse commission copies of these schedules, and to promptly notify such commission of all changes therein. (e) That in case the commission shall at any time find that any part of the tariffs of rates, fares, charges, or classifications, so filed and published as hereinbefore provided, are in any respect unequal or unreasonable, it shall have the power, and is hereby authorized and directed, to compel any common carrier to change the same, and adopt such rate, fare, charge, or classification as said commission shall declare to be reasonable and equal; to which end the commission shall, in writing, inform such common carrier in what respect such tariff of rates, fares, charges, or classifications are unequal and unreasonable, and shall recommend what tariffs shall be substituted therefor. (f) In case such common carrier shall neglect or refuse, for 10 days after such notice, to substitute such tariff of rates, fares, charges, or classifications, or to adopt the same as recommended by the commission, it shall be the duty of said commission to immediately publish such tariff of rates, fares, charges, and classifications as they had declared to be equal and reasonable, and cause the same to be posted at all the regular stations on the line of such common carrier in this state; and thereafter it shall be unlawful for such common carrier to charge or maintain a higher or lower rate, fare, charge, or classification than that so fixed and published by said commission. (g) If any common carrier, subject to the provisions of this act, shall neglect or refuse to publish or file its schedules of classifications, rates, fares, or charges, or any part thereof, as provided in this section, or if any common carrier shall refuse or neglect to carry out such recommendation made and published by said commission, such common carrier shall be subject to a writ of mandamus, to be issued by any judge of the supreme court, or of any of the district courts, of this state, upon application of the commission, to compel compliance with the requirements of this section, and with the recommendation of the commission; and failure to comply with the requirements of said writ of mandamus shall be punishable as and for contempt. And the said commission, as complainants, may also apply to any such judge for a writ of injunction against such common carrier from receiving or transporting property or passengers within this state until such common carrier shall have complied with the requirements of this section, and the recommendation of said commission; and for any willful violation or failure to comply with such requirements, or such recommendation of said commission, the court may award such costs, including counsel fees, by way of penalty, on the return of said writs, and after due deliberation thereon, as may be just.

1. In construing this act, the first question that presents itself is as to our own jurisdiction. As the law stood at the time of the passage of the act, the district court had exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases of mandamus, except when the writ is to be directed to a district court, or a judge thereof in his official capacity, in which case the supreme court had exclusive original jurisdiction; and all issues of fact in any mandamus proceeding were triable in the district court by a jury, as in an ordinary civil action. Gen. St. 1878, c. 80, § 12, Gen. Laws 1881, c. 40; State v. Burr, 28 Minn. 40,8 N. W. Rep. 899;State v. Whitcomb, 28 Minn. 50,8 N. W. Rep. 902. Does subdivision g of section 8, above cited, vest the supreme court with original jurisdiction of the proceedings in mandamus, therein provided for, to compel compliance with the requirements of the act? It must be admitted that the languageof the act is vague, and its meaning obscure. The framer of the bill evidently was not sufficiently familiar with the practice in mandamus to express himself in apt terms. If the language was to be construed with technical strictness, it might be difficult to give to it any effect whatever. But legislative enactments are not to be defeated on account of mistakes, omissions, or inaccuracies of language, any more than other writings, provided the intention of the legislature can be ascertained from the whole act. In construing a statute, we must assume, if its language will admit, that the legislature intended to act within its constitutional power. We must also, if possible, so construe the language as to make it effectual. To construe this act as meaning that the judge shall, as a mere ministerial officer, issue the writ, without any hearing or judicial determination by the court, as a sort of execution to enforce the orders of the commission, would be to hold the act unconstitutional. For, in such a case, the functions required of the judge would be only executive or ministerial; not judicial, or pertaining to the exercise by his court of its judicial powers. Of course, it is not in the power of the legislature to impose any such duties upon him. This construction must therefore be rejected. If it means that a judge of the supreme court is not only to allow the alternative writ, but to hear and determine whether a peremptory writ shall issue, (in which case he would act as a court,) it would be also unconstitutional. The supreme court consists of five judges, and can exercise its judicial functions only when a quorum is present. Again, if the act means that the judges of the supreme court shall issue the writ, and make it returnable in the district court, which alone should have jurisdiction to hear and determine the proceedings, it would be obnoxious to the objection that it would vest in him powers, and impose on him duties, belonging to the judges of the district court. Moreover, such a practice, even if allowable, would be at once both useless and without precedent. The only remaining interpretation that can be suggested, and the only one that will make the language of the act effectual, is that a judge of the supreme court or of the district court may issue (or cause to be issued) the writ, returnable into his own court, to bring the matter before it for hearing and determination; in short, that the intention of the act was to give the district and supreme court concurrent original jurisdiction of all proceedings in mandamus provided for in subdivision g of section 8 of the act to compel compliance with its provisions. This construction is supported and strengthened by the last clause of the section, which provides that “for any willful violation or failure to comply with such requirements or such recommendations of said commission, the court may award such costs, including counsel fees, by way of penalty, on the return of said writs, and after due deliberation thereon, as may be just.” This last is, in our opinion, the only...