Doherty v. Gilmore
Decision Date | 15 December 1896 |
Citation | 37 S.W. 1127,136 Mo. 414 |
Parties | Doherty et al. v. Gilmore et al., Appellants |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from DeKalb Circuit Court. -- Hon. W. S. Herndon, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
Harwood & Hubbell for appellants.
(1) The court committed reversible errors in giving to the jury instructions numbered 1, 5, 6, and 8 on the part of the plaintiffs, because there was no evidence of Joseph D Gilmore having exercised undue influence over the mind of the testator. McFadin v. Catron, 120 Mo. 252; Maddox v. Maddox, 114 Mo. 35; Norton v. Paxton, 110 Mo. 456; Thompson v. Ish, 99 Mo. 160; Jackson v Hardin, 83 Mo. 175; Brinkman v. Rueggesick, 71 Mo. 553; Spoonmore v. Cables, 66 Mo. 579; Alexander v. Harrison, 38 Mo. 258. (2) For the same reason the trial court erred in refusing the first instruction prayed by defendants. Mays v. Mays, 114 Mo. 536. (3) The court committed reversible error in giving instruction numbered 3 on the part of the plaintiffs, because it told the jury, in effect, that in order to constitute a valid will the testator must have been able to make a reasonable disposition of his property. Couch v Gentry, 113 Mo. 248; Benoist v. Murrin, 58 Mo. 307.
Casteel & Haynes for respondents.
(1) There was ample evidence to submit the case to the jury on the question of undue influence. McClintock v. Curd, 32 Mo. 411; Harvey v. Sullens, 46 Mo. 147; Myers v. Hauger, 98 Mo. 433; Thompson v. Ish, 99 Mo. 160; McFadin v. Catron, 120 Mo. 252; 1 Jarman on Wills, 132; 1 Redf. on Wills, 516; 1 Redf. on Wills, 537. (2) If there was any evidence tending to prove undue influence, or from which the jury might reasonably infer the same, the case was properly submitted to the jury. Wilson v. Board, 63 Mo. 137; Cook v. Railroad, 63 Mo. 397; Buesching v. Gaslight, 73 Mo. 219; Kelly v. Railroad, 70 Mo. 604; Groll v. Tower, 85 Mo. 249; Noeninger v. Vogt, 88 Mo. 589; Gardner v. Crenshaw, 122 Mo. 79. (3) The instructions as a series should be taken together, and if as a whole they are correct and consistent, their meaning is to be collected from the whole context, and not from detached instructions or phrases in them, and if, when so treated, their meaning is obvious, the legal principles enunciated correct and applicable to the case, they are safe guides for a jury, even though subject to verbal criticism. State v. Matthews, 98 Mo. 125; Reilly v. Railroad, 94 Mo. 600; Harrington v. Sedalia, 98 Mo. 583; Karl v. Railroad, 55 Mo. 476; Mayor v. Burns, 114 Mo. 426.
Division One: Robinson, J. Macfarlane, J., concurs; Brace, C. J., and Barclay, J., dissent. In Banc: Gantt, Sherwood, Macfarlane, and Burgess, JJ., concurring with Robinson, J. Brace, C. J., and Barclay, J., dissenting.
In Banc.
This is a suit to set aside the will of William T. Doherty, founded upon a petition in two counts; the first alleging want of testamentary capacity, the second alleging undue influence exercised over the mind of the testator by one Joseph D. Gilmore, a grandnephew, who, together with a brother and sister, was the recipient of the greater portion of the testator's estate.
The case was tried by a jury who under instructions from the court found in favor of plaintiff, which results in the setting aside of the will.
Several errors are assigned by appellants as grounds for reversing the judgment rendered therein, but in the disposition which we will make of this appeal only one will be noticed.
At the close of the testimony, defendants asked the court to instruct the jury "that there was no evidence of undue influence as in law would invalidate the writing propounded as the last will of the testator Doherty as alleged in the second count of plaintiffs' petition."
Defendants' instruction was refused and the following instructions on that issue, in behalf of plaintiffs, over the objections of defendants, as if to emphasize the error complained of, were then given by the trial court:
I have examined the facts of the case with care, and have been unable to find a word or syllable of legal evidence upon which a verdict of undue influence could be predicated, and think that reversible error was committed by the trial court,...
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