Delaney v. Bartlett

• Decision Date: 26 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. Civ.1:02 CV 00741.,Civ.1:02 CV 00741.
• Citation: 370 F.Supp.2d 373
• Parties: Paul DELANEY; Mary Elizabeth Boyd; and Cynthia Jane Wyatt, Plaintiffs, v. Gary O. BARTLETT, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary-Director of the North Carolina State Board of Elections; and North Carolina Board of Elections, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina

Page 373

370 F.Supp.2d 373

Paul DELANEY; Mary Elizabeth Boyd; and Cynthia Jane Wyatt, Plaintiffs, v. Gary O. BARTLETT, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary-Director of the North Carolina State Board of Elections; and North Carolina Board of Elections, Defendants.

No. Civ.1:02 CV 00741.

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina.

July 26, 2004.

Kris Vincent Williams, Sylva, NC, for Plaintiffs.

Susan Kelly Nichols, Alexander McClure Peters, Department of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BULLOCK, District Judge.

An unaffiliated candidate running for statewide office in North Carolina must comply with the eligibility requirements of North Carolina General Statute § 163-122(a)(1) to be placed on the general election ballot. Plaintiff Paul DeLaney and his supporters contend that this statute impermissibly infringes on the rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, DeLaney seeks a declaratory judgment invalidating Section 163-122(a)(1). For the following reasons, the court finds that North Carolina General Statute § 163-122(a)(1) imposes an unconstitutional burden on the rights of unaffiliated candidates and their supporters.

FACTS

In September 2001, DeLaney began a petition drive to have his name placed on the 2002 North Carolina General Elections Ballot. DeLaney sought to run as an unaffiliated candidate for the United States Senate. After obtaining fewer than one hundred of the 90,639 signatures required to secure a place on the ballot, DeLaney decided instead to qualify as a write-in candidate.

On September 6, 2002, approximately two months before the election and days before the absentee ballots were to be printed, DeLaney and two of his supporters filed this declaratory judgment action, claiming that North Carolina General Statute § 163-122(a)(1) unconstitutionally infringed on their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In their complaint, Plaintiffs asked the court to order DeLaney's name placed on the ballot as an unaffiliated candidate. The court denied Plaintiffs' request on October 18, 2002.

The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and on December 24, 2003, the court denied both parties' motions. See Delaney v. Bartlett, 2003 WL 23192145 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 24, 2003). The court ruled that Plaintiffs had standing to challenge the statute and that the nature of such a challenge precluded application of the mootness doctrine. See id. at *3-4. On March 31, 2004, the court held an evidentiary hearing at which North Carolina Board of Elections ("Board") Deputy Director Johnnie McLean ("McLean") testified.¹ The case is now ready for disposition.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

The Declaratory Judgment Act grants federal district courts discretion to entertain requests for declaratory judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The court has "great latitude in determining whether to assert jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions." Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ind-Com Elec. Co., 139 F.3d 419, 422 (4th Cir.1998). The court may hear a declaratory judgment action if the judgment "will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue [and] will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding." Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Winchester Homes, Inc., 15 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir.1994) (internal quotations omitted; citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995).²

II. Disparity Challenge

DeLaney challenges the constitutionality of North Carolina General Statute § 163-122(a)(1) on two grounds. First, DeLaney takes issue with North Carolina's differing requirements for unaffiliated candidates and new party candidates who seek ballot access.³ Specifically, DeLaney asserts that the disparity between the signature requirements for unaffiliated candidates and new party candidates places an unconstitutional burden on unaffiliated candidates. North Carolina General Statute § 163-122(a)(1) mandates that an unaffiliated candidate running for statewide office will be placed on the general election ballot only if the candidate

file[s] written petitions with the State Board of Elections supporting his candidacy for a specified office. These petitions must be filed with the State Board of Elections on or before 12:00 noon on the last Friday in June preceding the general election and must be signed by qualified voters of the State equal in number to two percent (2%) of the total number of registered voters in the State as reflected by the most recent statistical report issued by the State Board of Elections.

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 163-122(a)(1).⁴ The requisite number of signatures varies widely depending on the "most recent statistical report" used. To be placed on the 2002 general election ballot, a potential unaffiliated candidate needed to obtain signatures equal to two percent of registered voters, or 90,639 signatures. (Br. Supp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Decl. Gary O. Bartlett, at ¶ 5.)

In contrast, North Carolina General Statute § 163-96(a)(2) requires a candidate seeking to form a "political party"⁵ to obtain signatures of "registered and qualified voters in this State equal in number to two percent (2%) of the total number of voters who voted in the most recent general election for Governor." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 163-96(a)(2). The new party petitions must be signed by at least 200 voters from each of four North Carolina congressional districts and must be filed before noon on the first day of June preceding the general election.⁶ See id.

Once the party representative files the requisite petitions, the new party is entitled to place candidates on the general election ballot. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 163-98. If the party has multiple candidates vying for office, it must hold a convention to select its nominees. See id. ("For the first general election following the date on which it qualifies under G.S. 163-96, a new political party shall select its candidates by party convention."). However,

[i]f a nominee for a single office is to be selected and only one candidate of a political party files for that office ... then the appropriate board of elections shall, upon the expiration of the filing period for said office, declare such persons as the nominees or nominee of that party, and the names shall not be printed on the primary ballot, but shall be printed on the general election ballot as candidate for that political party for that office.

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 163-110. To be eligible for ballot access in 2002, a new party candidate needed to garner signatures equal to two percent of the total number of voters who voted for governor in 2000, or 58,841 signatures.⁷ (Br. Supp. Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. at 15.)

Thus, in 2002, a candidate seeking statewide office as the sole representative of a "political party" would be placed on the ballot after obtaining approximately 32,000 fewer signatures than if he ran without a party affiliation. Such a candidate would not be subject to a primary election or nominating convention and would incur only de minimis additional burdens.⁸ See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 163-110. Consequently, the statutory scheme discourages a candidate who wishes to be unaffiliated in favor of the formation of a political party, whatever its size or motivation.⁹ See McLean Testimony, Mar. 31, 2004 (acknowledging that DeLaney could form the "Paul DeLaney Party" to avoid the more demanding requirements of Section 163-122).

The Board dismisses potential problems with this disparity, reasoning that both types of signature requirements have been upheld. Considered in isolation, North Carolina's two percent signature requirement for unaffiliated candidates is not constitutionally infirm. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 438, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971) (upholding Georgia ballot access requirement that independent candidates obtain signatures of five percent of total registered voters). Likewise, North Carolina's ballot access requirements for new parties have withstood constitutional scrutiny. See McLaughlin v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d 1215, 1229 (4th Cir.1995) (rejecting challenge to various North Carolina elections laws regulating new parties). However, "a number of facially valid election laws may operate in tandem to produce impermissible barriers to constitutional rights." Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974). Therefore " a reviewing court must determine whether `the totality of the [state's] restrictive laws taken as a whole imposes a[n unconstitutional] burden on voting and associational rights.'" McLaughlin, 65 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968)) (alterations in McLaughlin). Given North Carolina's overall statutory scheme for ballot access, the focus of the court's inquiry is whether the State may permit unaffiliated candidates to conform to significantly greater requirements than new party candidates for a place on the general election ballot. See Am. Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 788, 94 S.Ct. 1296, 39 L.Ed.2d 744 (1974) (affirming that the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause require "essentially equal opportunity for ballot qualification").

To resolve this question, the court examines the regulations under the test established in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Under Anderson, the court must weigh the character and magnitude of the injury to First and Fourteenth Amendment rights against the State interests justifying the statute's restrictions, considering the extent to which the State's interests are necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564. If the statute's restrictions are "severe," t...