G.K.J., In Interest of

• Decision Date: 11 May 1988
• Docket Number: No. 76100,76100
• Citation: 370 S.E.2d 490,187 Ga.App. 443
• Parties: In the Interest of G.K.J.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 490

370 S.E.2d 490

187 Ga.App. 443

In the Interest of G.K.J.

No. 76100.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

May 11, 1988.

Rehearing Denied June 8, 1988.

Bradley J. Boyd, Atlanta, for appellant.

John B. Jay, Norcross, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Carol A. Cosgrove, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

CARLEY, Judge.

The appellant child in this appeal is represented by the attorney and guardian ad litem who was appointed to represent him pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-85(a). Appellant brings this appeal from a juvenile court order which terminated the parental rights of his father.

The petition for the termination of parental rights of appellant's father was filed by appellant's mother, who is his custodial parent. The petition had alleged that the parental rights of appellant's father should be terminated, in that he had "wantonly and willfully failed to comply with the order of a court of competent jurisdiction to support [appellant] for a consecutive term exceeding twelve (12) months...." Appellant's father made no personal appearance in these proceedings, but submitted a letter to the juvenile court, wherein he stated that he was aware of the proceedings and understood them, and that he did not choose to contest termination of his parental rights. Following a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order containing its findings of fact and its conclusion that there was "clear and convincing evidence" that, for more than a year, appellant's father had willfully and wantonly failed to provide the support that had been ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction. The juvenile court's order further found that a termination of the parental rights of appellant's father would be in the best interest of appellant. The juvenile court therefore ordered such a termination pursuant to the provisions of OCGA § 15-11-81. It is from that order that appellant brings this appeal.

1. Pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-85(a), the child himself is, in effect, made a party to an action to terminate his parent's or parents' parental rights. See In re L.L.B., 256 Ga. 768, 353 S.E.2d 507 (1987). Accordingly, appellant has standing, through his duly appointed attorney and guardian ad litem, to bring this appeal.

2. Appellant enumerates as error the findings of the juvenile court that his father's failure to comply with the support order was wilful and wanton and that the termination of his father's parental rights would be in his best interest. Appellant urges that these findings are not sufficiently supported by the evidence.

Our review of the entire record shows that there was sufficient clear and convincing evidence presented at the hearing to support the juvenile court's finding as to the willful and wanton failure of appellant's father to comply with the support order. See In re B.D.C., 256 Ga. 511, 513, 350 S.E.2d 444 (1986). See also In the Interest of J.L.Y., 184 Ga.App. 254(1), 361 S.E.2d 246 (1987).

Obviously, those same factors which show the existence of parental misconduct or inability can also support a finding that the termination of parental rights of the defaulting parent would be in the child's best interest. Thus, a finding as to whether the termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child represents, in essence, a finding as to whether the specifics of the parental default that have otherwise been found to exist are of such magnitude as to warrant the conclusion that the child himself would be better served by the grant of the petition to terminate. See generally Powell v. Dept. of Human Resources, 147 Ga.App. 251(1), 248 S.E.2d 533 (1978) (construing former OCGA § 15-11-51); In the Interest of C.M.S., 185 Ga.App. 549, 364 S.E.2d 908 (1988). In this regard, our review of the entire record shows that there was likewise sufficient clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that the termination of the parental rights of appellant's defaulting father would be in his best interest. See In re B.D.C., supra; In the Interest of J.L.Y., supra. Accordingly, it was not a manifest abuse of the juvenile court's discretion so to find. See In re H.B. & K.B., 174 Ga.App. 435, 330 S.E.2d 173 (1985).

3. Appellant also enumerates as error the failure of the juvenile court to have included in its order an explicit statement of the underlying findings of fact which supported its ultimate determination that the best interest of appellant would be served by the termination of his father's parental rights.

"A judgment having such a final, ultimate and significant result as that of severing the rights of a parent to a child must conclusively show compliance with the statutory criteria prescribed as a condition precedent for such termination. [Cits.]" McCary v. Dept. of Human Resources, 151 Ga.App. 181, 182(2), 259 S.E.2d 181 (1979). OCGA § 15-11-81(a) establishes the statutory criteria for the termination of the parental rights of appellant's father. That statute provides: "In considering the termination of parental rights, the court shall first determine whether there is present clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section. If there is clear and convincing evidence of such parental misconduct or inability, the court shall then consider whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child, after considering the physical, mental, emotional, and moral condition and needs of the child who is the subject of the proceeding, including the need for a secure and stable home." (Emphasis supplied.)

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