Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia

• Citation: 55 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1065,283 Ed. Law Rep. 582,372 S.W.3d 629,115 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 610
• Decision Date: 29 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–0802.,10–0802.
• Parties: MISSION CONSOLIDATED INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. Gloria GARCIA, Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas

372 S.W.3d 629

115 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 610

283 Ed. Law Rep. 582

55 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1065

MISSION CONSOLIDATED INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner,

v.Gloria GARCIA, Respondent.

No. 10–0802.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Jan. 10, 2012.

Decided June 29, 2012.

David P. Hansen, Eric Enoch Munoz, Schwartz Eichelbaum Wardell Mehl and Hansen, PC, Austin, TX, for Mission Consolidated Independent School District.

Savannah Robinson, Law Office of Savannah Robinson, Danbury, TX, for Gloria Garcia.

Katherine Butler, Houston, TX, Daniel B. Kohrman, AARP Foundation Litigation, Washington, DC, John P. Mobbs, El Paso, TX, for Amicus Curiae AARP.

John P. Mobbs, El Paso, TX, for Amicus Curiae Gumercindo Castanon.

Justice WILLETT delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice HECHT, Justice WAINWRIGHT, Justice GREEN, Justice JOHNSON, and Justice GUZMAN joined.

This case raises a fundamental question of discrimination law: Can a plaintiff establish a prima facie case of age discrimination when undisputed evidence shows she was replaced by someone older? While the answer may seem obvious, courts in this state and the federal judiciary alike are anything but uniform in their response. The specific issue today is whether, under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), such a claimant is ever entitled to a presumption of age discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.¹ We answer no.

To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the TCHRA, we hold that a plaintiff in a true replacement case must show that he or she was (1) a member of the protected class, (2) qualified for his or her employment position, (3) terminated by the employer, and (4) replaced by someone younger. Because it is undisputed that the plaintiff here was replaced by an older worker, she has failed to allege a prima facie case, and the trial court should have granted the defendant's plea to the jurisdiction. We reverse the court of appeals' judgment in part and render judgment dismissing this suit.

I. Background

Gloria Garcia worked for the Mission Consolidated Independent School District for 27 years. The District fired her in 2003, and Garcia filed suit, alleging she was terminated in retaliation for her participation in certain protected activities and that she was also discriminated against based on her race, national origin, age, and gender. Garcia is a female of Mexican–American descent, and she was 48 years old when she was fired.

The District filed a plea to the jurisdiction,² arguing that Garcia's pleadings failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The District attached evidence that Garcia was replaced by another Mexican–American woman who was three years older than Garcia. Garcia did not dispute this evidence and declined to request or submit any evidence of her own. The trial court denied the District's plea.

On interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. On the race, national origin, and gender discrimination claims, the court held that the plea should have been granted because Garcia failed to show that she was replaced by a person outside those protected classes.³ But on the age-discrimination claim, the court held that replacement by an older worker was not fatal to Garcia's claim. Applying the inferential “pretext” method of proof first articulated in McDonnell Douglas, the court held that an age-discrimination plaintiff can meet her prima facie burden by alleging she was replaced by someone younger or by “otherwise show[ing] that she was discharged because of age.” ⁴ Because the District's evidence did not conclusively negate the “otherwise show” element, the court of appeals held that the plea was properly denied on Garcia's age-discrimination claim.

II. Discussion

In this Court, the District argues that a plaintiff relying on the prima facie case to prove age discrimination must demonstrate that her replacement was younger; otherwise, she is not entitled to a presumption of discrimination and must submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent to defeat a plea to the jurisdiction. Because there is no dispute that Garcia's replacement was older and because she submitted no other evidence to create a fact issue on discriminatory intent, the District argues that the trial court should have dismissed her age-discrimination claim. We agree.

Under the TCHRA, “an employer commits an unlawful employment practice if because of race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age the employer ... discharges an individual or discriminates in any other manner against an individual in connection with compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” ⁵ Section 21.051 is effectively identical to Title VII, its federal equivalent, except that Title VII does not protect against age and disability discrimination.⁶ (Those forms of discrimination are addressed in separate statutes.⁷) Because one of the purposes of the TCHRA is to “provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” ⁸ we have consistently held that those analogous federal statutes and the cases interpreting them guide our reading of the TCHRA.⁹

As a result, Texas courts follow the settled approach of the U.S. Supreme Court in recognizing two alternative methods of proof in discriminatory treatment cases.¹⁰ The first method, rather straightforward, involves proving discriminatory intent via direct evidence of what the defendant did and said.¹¹ However, the High Court recognized that motives are often more covert than overt, making direct evidence of forbidden animus hard to come by.¹² So to make matters easier for discrimination plaintiffs, the Court created the burden-shifting mechanism of McDonnell Douglas.¹³ Under this framework, the plaintiff is entitled to a presumption of discrimination if she meets the “minimal” initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. ¹⁴ Although the precise elements of this showing will vary depending on the circumstances, the plaintiff's burden at this stage of the case “is not onerous.” ¹⁵ The McDonnell Douglas presumption is “merely an evidence-producing mechanism that can aid the plaintiff in his ultimate task of proving illegal discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.” ¹⁶ The prima facie case “raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.” ¹⁷ Ultimately, if the defendant fails to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the employment decision, that presumption will be sufficient to support a finding of liability.¹⁸

The issue before us is whether the District's plea to the jurisdiction should have been granted here, where its evidence allegedly negated an element of Garcia's prima facie case and Garcia offered no evidence whatsoever to support her age-discrimination claim. To answer this question, we explore the elements of the prima facie case and whether these elements are “jurisdictional facts” properly addressed in a plea to the jurisdiction.

A. Prima Facie Case as a Jurisdictional Issue?

We first address a threshold issue not raised by the parties or the courts below: Did the District properly challenge Garcia's prima facie case by way of a plea to the jurisdiction? In other words, does a plaintiff's failure to allege a prima facie case of age discrimination rob the trial court of jurisdiction over that claim or merely implicate the merits thereof? If the latter, the trial court should deny the plea to the jurisdiction and consider this challenge at the summary judgment phase or at trial. The District obviously believes this issue implicates jurisdiction, both lower courts treated it as such, and Garcia makes no argument to the contrary. But because this question deals with jurisdiction, we can (and must) consider it ourselves.¹⁹

1. Plea to the Jurisdiction Practice in Texas

The answer will depend on whether an analysis of Garcia's prima facie case calls for “a significant inquiry into the substance of the claims” ²⁰ or instead constitutes a challenge to the “existence of jurisdictional facts” permitted by our plea to the jurisdiction practice. ²¹ A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea, the purpose of which is generally to defeat an action “without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit.” ²² Typically, the plea challenges whether the plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the case.²³ However, a plea to the jurisdiction can also properly challenge the existence of those very jurisdictional facts. In those cases, the court can consider evidence as necessary to resolve any dispute over those facts, even if that evidence “implicates both the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court and the merits of the case.” ²⁴

In those situations, a trial court's review of a plea to the jurisdiction mirrors that of a traditional summary judgment motion. ²⁵ Initially, the defendant carries the burden to meet the summary judgment proof standard for its assertion that the trial court lacks jurisdiction.²⁶ If it does, the plaintiff is then required to show that a disputed material fact exists regarding the jurisdictional issue. ²⁷ If a fact issue exists, the trial court should deny the plea. ²⁸ But if the relevant evidence is undisputed or the plaintiff fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea as a matter of law.²⁹

In the District's plea to the jurisdiction here, it argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the age-discrimination claim because Garcia “[could not] prove her prima facie case of discrimination as a matter of law.” This argument necessarily implies that the elements of the prima facie case are themselves jurisdictional facts, and that a trial court has no...