Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court

Decision Date08 March 1974
Docket NumberCiv. No. 2208.
Citation372 F. Supp. 1175
PartiesJames L. HUFFMAN, Plaintiff, v. MONTANA SUPREME COURT and James Harrison, Individually and as Chief Justice of the Montana Supreme Court, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Montana

James H. Goetz, Bozeman, Mont., for plaintiff.

Robert L. Woodahl, Atty. Gen., J. C. Weingartner, Charles Ed Laws, Deputy Attys. Gen., Helena, Mont., for defendants.

Before KILKENNY, Circuit Judge, EAST, Senior District Judge, and BATTIN, District Judge.

OPINION AND ORDER

BATTIN, District Judge:

This case presents a novel question to the federal courts as to the constraints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the criteria a State may adopt for admission to the bar. The plaintiff, James L. Huffman, is a graduate of the University of Chicago Law School and a resident of the State of Montana. On July 14, 1972, he filed a petition for admission on motion to the Montana bar with the defendant, Montana Supreme Court. The defendant, on July 21, 1972, denied plaintiff's petition. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action in which he seeks to restrain the defendant Montana Supreme Court from implementing that portion of Section 93-2002,1 Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, which excepts the graduates of the University of Montana Law School from the requirement that applicants to the Montana bar undergo an examination as to their qualifications prior to their admission to the Montana bar. The plaintiff further seeks a Mandatory Injunction ordering the defendant to admit plaintiff to the Montana bar. In short, the plaintiff urges this court to declare Montana's statutorily enacted "diploma privilege" to be violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

When statutes are challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, the court developed various doctrines to evaluate the statutes' constitutionality. Under one doctrine, the constitutional safeguard of the Equal Protection Clause is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objective. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1960). The court has enumerated several rules for the implementation of this traditional doctrine:

"1. The equal-protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary." Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1910).

The courts have also applied an equal protection doctrine of relatively recent vintage: the rule that statutory classifications which either are based upon certain "suspect" criteria or affect "fundamental rights" will be held to deny equal protection unless justified by a "compelling" governmental interest. Those "suspect" criteria include wealth, race, nationality and alienage. Those "fundamental rights" include the right to freedom of speech, the right to vote, and the right of interstate travel. Obviously this doctrine requiring a showing of a substantial and compelling reason is more rigorous than the traditional doctrine which allows classifications unless they are without any reasonable basis.

First, then, this court must determine which standard of review is appropriate. Is the criterion of the classification —i. e., graduation from one law school versus graduation from other law schools—"suspect"? This court concludes not. Certainly a real and substantial distinction exists between one's wealth, race, nationality or alienage (over which one may exercise little, if any, control) and one's choice of institutions at which to study law.2

The court also concludes that no "fundamental right" is affected by the classification. The authority to practice law is not a fundamental right such as the right to the freedom of speech, the right to vote or the right of interstate travel.

As the Supreme Court observed in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of State of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957):

"We need not enter into a discussion whether the practice of law is a `right' or `privilege.' Regardless of how the State's grant of permission to engage in this occupation is characterized, it is sufficient to say that a person cannot be prevented from practicing except for valid reasons." Schware, supra at page 239, footnote 5, 77 S.Ct. at page 757.

A more recent treatment of this question by the Supreme Court was made in a judgment authorized by Justice Black with three Justices concurring and one Justice concurring in the result. Justice Black wrote: "The practice of law is not a matter of grace, but of right for one who is qualified by his learning and his moral character." Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 8, 91 S.Ct. 702, 707, 27 L.Ed.2d 639 (1970). Whether this recent pronouncement establishes the practice of law as a "right", or not, it is not a fundamental right. Moreover, this is not a case where one who has established his learning qualifications and moral character has been deprived of any right.

Brother East, however, would require the state to show a compelling governmental interest after concluding that the classification created by the diploma privilege affects the fundamental right of interstate travel. With great respect to Brother East, this court rejects his conclusion.3 We find that the compelling state interest doctrine is not applicable to the case at bar. The proper judicial inquiry is whether any rational justification can be stated for the existence of the diploma privilege.4

"State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, supra, 366 U.S. at 425-426, 81 S.Ct. at 1104.

The object of the classification under scrutiny in the instant case, Sec. 93-2002, R.C.M.1947, is to ensure that the courts and people of Montana are represented by attorneys who are of sound ethical character and of competent legal skills.

There exists a series of cases (relied upon by the plaintiff) in which residence requirements to practice law were found to be violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Potts v. Supreme Court of Hawaii, 332 F.Supp. 1392 (D.Hawaii, 1971); Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F.Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C.1970); and Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F.Supp. 391 (N.D.Miss.1971). The courts held that residence requirements have no reasonable relationship with an applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. But, again, the question before this panel is whether the diploma privilege, as expressed in Section 93-2002, R.C.M.1947, bears a reasonable relationship with an applicant's fitness and capacity to practice law.5

The defendants here, proceeding upon the authority of Section 93-2002, R.C. M.1947, require that all applicants to the bar in Montana demonstrate the scholastic and mental ability to practice law, as well as the ethical necessities, before they are admitted. This demonstration of scholastic and mental ability is accomplished through two modes in Montana—(1) graduates of the University of Montana Law School must complete the required course of instruction with its emphasis on Montana law, and (2) graduates of other law schools must demonstrate their proficiency by taking the Montana bar examination. This classification is reasonably related to the object of ensuring a competent and ethical bar.

The record before the court includes the following from the statement of uncontested facts:

"That the University of Montana School of Law was inspected in 1957, 1964, and 1968 by the Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association; that these reports are incorporated by reference as a part of these agreed statements of fact."6

In one of these reports—that of 1968— the following statement is included:

"The program of studies is designed to prepare a graduate to practice successfully in any jurisdiction in the U. S. Naturally, the large majority of graduates practice in Montana. Thus Montana statutes and cases are considered in supplementary materials prepared by the instructor in most courses." (1968 Report at page 4.)

And from another report:

"The diploma privilege exists in Montana and the school explores thoroughly the moral qualifications of all applicants. No law school in America does a better job on this score and the school is entitled to commendation." (1957 Report at page 2.)

In short, graduates of the University of Montana Law School enroll in courses which emphasize Montana statutes and case law. These graduates must establish their moral qualifications prior to admission to the school. Furthermore, as the same American Bar Association report indicates:

"Each year thereafter after admission and also prior to graduation he each University of Montana School of Law student must execute an affidavit that `since the dates of the last previous certificate and affidavit executed by me, nothing has occurred which I would be required to
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22 cases
  • Simmang v. Texas Bd. of Law Examiners
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
    • September 15, 2004
    ...1036, 1038 (D.N.J.1975), aff'd, 546 F.2d 418 (3rd Cir.1976) (there is no fundamental right to practice law); Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court, 372 F.Supp. 1175, 1177 (D.Mont.1974), aff'd, 419 U.S. 955, 95 S.Ct. 216, 42 L.Ed.2d 172 (1974) ("The authority to practice law is not a fundamental ......
  • Nordgren v. Hafter
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    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi
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    ...for exempting University of Mississippi law graduates from taking the bar examination. Id. at 688. See also Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court, 372 F.Supp. 1175 (D.Mont.1974). In sum, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not mandate that the Board of Bar Admissions ado......
  • Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • September 8, 1982
    ...A state may allow state graduates to waive examination without denying equal protection to other applicants. Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court, 372 F.Supp. 1175 (D.C.Mont.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 955, 95 S.Ct. 216, 42 L.Ed.2d 172 (1974). A board of bar examiners may validly meet to review borderli......
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    ...right to travel and must withstand only rational relation examination.14 Further support for our view is provided by Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court, 372 F.Supp. 1175 (D.Mont.1974, 3-judge court), aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 955, 95 S.Ct. 216, 42 L.Ed.2d 172 (1974). In Huffman, plaintiffs challen......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Protecting the Guild or Protecting the Public? Bar Exams and the Diploma Privilege
    • United States
    • Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics No. 35-2, April 2022
    • April 1, 2022
    ...686 (N.D. Miss. 1974) (holding that Mississippi’s diploma privilege does not burden the right to travel); Huffman v. Mont. Sup. Ct., 372 F. Supp. 1175, 1177 (D. Mont. 1974) aff’d mem. , 419 U.S. 955 (1974) (holding that Montana’s diploma privilege did not infringe upon any fundamental right......

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