372 U.S. 353 (1963), 34, Douglas v. California

Docket Nº:No. 34
Citation:372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811
Party Name:Douglas v. California
Case Date:March 18, 1963
Court:United States Supreme Court
 
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Page 353

372 U.S. 353 (1963)

83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811

Douglas

v.

California

No. 34

United States Supreme Court

March 18, 1963

Argued April 17, 1962

Restored to the calendar for reargument June 25, 1962

Reargued January 16, 1962

CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

Syllabus

In a California State court, petitioners were tried jointly, convicted of 13 felonies, and sentenced to imprisonment. Exercising their only right to appeal as of right, they appealed to an intermediate Court of Appeals, and, being indigent, applied to it for appointment of counsel to assist them on appeal. In accordance with a state rule of criminal procedure, that court made an ex parte examination of the record, determined that appointment of counsel for petitioners would not be "of advantage to the defendant or helpful to the appellate court," and denied appointment of counsel. Their appeal was heard without assistance of counsel, and their convictions were affirmed. The State Supreme Court denied a discretionary review.

Held: Where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right were decided without benefit of counsel in a state criminal case, there has been a discrimination between the rich and the poor which violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 353-358.

187 Cal.App.2d 802, 10 Cal.Rptr. 188, judgment vacated and cause remanded.

DOUGLAS, J., lead opinion

[83 S.Ct. 815] MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners, Bennie Will Meyes and William Douglas, were jointly tried and convicted in a California court on an information charging them with 13 felonies. A single

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public defender was appointed to represent them. At the commencement of the trial, the defender moved for a continuance, stating that the case was very complicated, that he was not as prepared as he felt he should be because he was handling a different defense every day, and that there was a conflict of interest between the petitioners, requiring the appointment of separate counsel for each of them. This motion was denied. Thereafter, petitioners dismissed the defender, claiming he was unprepared, and again renewed motions for separate counsel and for a continuance. These motions also were denied, and petitioners were ultimately convicted by a jury of all 13 felonies, which included robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault with intent to commit murder. Both were given prison terms. Both appealed as of right to the California District Court of Appeal. That court affirmed their convictions. 187 Cal.App.2d 802, 10 Cal.Rptr. 188. Both Meyes and Douglas then petitioned for further discretionary review in the California Supreme Court, but their petitions were denied without a hearing.1 187 Cal.App.2d at 813, 10 Cal.Rptr. at 195. We granted certiorari. 368 U.S. 815.

Although several questions are presented in the petition for certiorari, we address ourselves to only one of them. The record shows that petitioners requested, and were denied, the assistance of counsel on appeal, even though it plainly appeared they were indigents. In denying petitioners' requests, the California District Court of Appeal stated that it had "gone through" the record

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and had come to the conclusion that "no good whatever could be served by appointment of counsel." 187 Cal.App.2d 802, 812, 10 Cal.Rptr. 188, 195. The District Court of Appeal was acting in accordance with a California rule of criminal procedure which provides that state appellate courts, upon the request of an indigent for counsel, may make

an independent investigation of the record and determine whether it would be of advantage to the defendant or helpful to the appellate court to have counsel appointed. . . . After such investigation, appellate courts should appoint counsel if in their opinion it would be helpful to the defendant or the court, and should deny the appointment of counsel only if in their judgment such appointment would be of no value to either the defendant or the court.

People v. Hyde, 51 Cal.2d 152, 154, 331 P.2d 42, 43.

We agree, however, with Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court, who said that the

[d]enial of counsel on appeal [to an indigent] would seem to be a discrimination at least as invidious as that condemned in Griffin v. Illinois. . . .

People v. Brown, 55 Cal.2d 64, 71, 9 Cal.Rptr. 816, 357 P.2d 1072, 1076 (concurring opinion). In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, we held that a State may not grant appellate review in such a way as to discriminate against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty. There, as in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, the right to a free transcript on appeal was in issue. Here, the issue is whether or not an indigent shall be denied the assistance of counsel on appeal. [83 S.Ct. 816] In either case, the evil is the same: discrimination against the indigent. For there can be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys "depends on the amount of money he has." Griffin v. Illinois, supra at p. 19.

In spite of California's forward treatment of indigents, under its present practice, the type of an appeal a person is afforded in the District Court of Appeal hinges

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upon whether or not he can pay for the assistance of counsel. If he can, the appellate court passes on the merits of his case only after having the full benefit of written briefs and oral argument by counsel. If he cannot, the appellate court is forced to prejudge the merits before it can even determine whether counsel should be provided. At this stage in the proceedings, only the barren record speaks for the indigent, and, unless the printed pages show that an injustice has been committed, he is forced to go without a champion on appeal. Any real chance he may have had of showing that his appeal has hidden merit is deprived him when the court decides on an ex parte examination of the record that the assistance of counsel is not required.

We are not here concerned with problems that might arise from the denial of counsel for the preparation of a petition for discretionary or mandatory review beyond the stage in the appellate process at which the claims have once been presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an appellate court. We are dealing only with the first appeal, granted as a matter of right to rich and poor alike (Cal.Penal Code §§ 1235, 1237), from a criminal conviction. We need not now decide whether California would have to provide counsel for an indigent seeking a discretionary hearing from the California Supreme Court after the District Court of Appeal had sustained his conviction (see Cal.Const., Art. VI, § 4c; Cal.Rules on Appeal, Rules 28, 29), or whether counsel must be appointed for an indigent seeking review of an appellate affirmance of his conviction in this Court by appeal as of right or by petition for a writ of certiorari which lies within the Court's discretion. But it is appropriate to observe that a State can, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for differences so long as the result does not amount to a denial of due process or an "invidious discrimination." Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348

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U.S. 483, 489; Griffin v. Illinois, supra, p. 18. Absolute equality is not required; lines can be and are drawn, and we often sustain them. See Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141; Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464...

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