Martinez v. United States
| Decision Date | 06 March 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 9109.,9109. |
| Citation | 373 F.2d 810 |
| Parties | Joe Aragon MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Gene E. Franchini, Albuquerque, N. M., for appellant.
John Quinn, U. S. Atty., and John A. Babington, Asst. U. S. Atty., for appellee.
Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and HILL and SETH, Circuit Judges.
This is a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence following a jury conviction on two counts of an indictment charging violations of 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a) and § 4742(a).
At the trial appellant, who was the defendant there, urged entrapment as a defense and here complains about the inadequacy of the trial court's instruction to the jury on entrapment.1
The defense of entrapment was unknown to the common law. Although it is now firmly entrenched in federal jurisprudence it is still not recognized in some state jurisdictions.2 It may be described as an affirmative or positive defense and is in the nature of a confession and avoidance. It cannot be applicable to the facts of a particular case unless the commission of the crime charged is admitted by the accused raising the defense.3 Its inception and history in the federal courts are recited in both the majority and concurring opinions in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848, and need not be repeated here.
The principle of law involved is not complicated and may be simply stated. Entrapment occurs when the criminal design or conduct originates in or is the product of the minds of the government officials and is implanted by them in the mind of an otherwise innocent person. In the words of the Court in Sherman v. United States, supra at 372, 78 S.Ct. at 821, "To determine whether entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal."
The fact that an accused asserts the affirmative defense of entrapment does not shift the burden of proof to him. When the defense is raised or asserted, the burden is upon the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that entrapment did not occur. If the facts and circumstances of the case show conclusively that entrapment occurred, the trial judge has a duty to find that entrapment, as a matter of law, exists in the case. If the evidence in the case on the issue is conflicting, the issue of entrapment should be submitted to the jury. Without reviewing in this opinion the evidence in this case we believe from a reading of the record the trial court properly submitted the issue of entrapment to the jury.
Appellant complains about the use of the term "unlawful entrapment" and the word "predisposition" in the entrapment instruction given in this case by the trial judge. We agree with appellant that the use of the word "unlawful" preceding the word entrapment in the instruction given was unnecessary and in our opinion improper. Regardless of any suggested forms of jury instructions, we find no substantial legal authority categorizing entrapment as "lawful" and "unlawful".4 The defense asserted is simply entrapment and that is the issue to be determined as a matter of law by the judge and as a matter of fact by the jury. The jury should be instructed as to the necessary elements of entrapment as they have been so clearly defined by the Supreme Court5 and by this Circuit6 without injecting into the case any extraneous matter. Appellant urges that the use of the word "unlawful" in this instruction imposed a burden of proof upon him. We do not agree because the court, in that same instruction, told the jury "The burden is on the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not entrapped." The court adequately advised the jury as to the elements of entrapment, although he referred to it as "unlawful entrapment" and also correctly advised the jury the circumstances under which "unlawful entrapment" could not exist. Although we do not approve of the use of the words "lawful" and "unlawful" in connection with the word entrapment, we believe that the instruction given, as a whole, fairly advised the jury on the issue and that appellant was not prejudiced by the use of the words "lawful" and "unlawful".7 Likewise we can find no merit in appellant's objection to the word "predisposition" in the instruction. It was properly used in connection with one of the elements of entrapment and did not inject any new issue into the case as argued.
We have carefully read and considered the entire record in the case and must conclude that the accused received a fair trial, free of any prejudice.
Affirmed.
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Robison v. United States
...entrapment" and "unlawful entrapment" in instructions to the jury has been criticized in the Second and Tenth Circuits Martinez v. United States, 373 F.2d 810, 812 (10th Cir. 1967); Garcia v. United States, 373 F.2d 806, 809 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Pugliese, supra, 346 F.2d at 86......
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U.S. v. Valencia
...admits to the commission of the crime charged." United States v. Gibson, 446 F.2d 719, 722 (10th Cir. 1971). See Martinez v. United States, 373 F.2d 810, 811-12 (10th Cir. 1967). But that court has slightly modified its rule by stating "that testimony from an accused is not prerequisite to ......