Villot v. Varner

• Citation: 373 F.3d 327
• Decision Date: 30 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 01-1505.,01-1505.
• Parties: Moses VILLOT, Appellant v. Benjamin VARNER; The District Attorney of the County of Philadelphia; The Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

373 F.3d 327

Moses VILLOT, Appellant v. Benjamin VARNER; The District Attorney of the County of Philadelphia; The Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania.

No. 01-1505.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued on October 15, 2003.

June 30, 2004.

Stephen J. Binhak, (Argued), Huntingdon Valley, for Appellant.

Marilyn F. Murray (Argued), Assistant District Attorney, Robert M. Falin, Assistant District Attorney, Thomas W. Dolgenos, Chief, Federal Litigation, Ronald Eisenberg, Deputy District Attorney, Arnold H. Gordon, First Assistant District Attorney, Lynn Abraham, District Attorney, Office of District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Appellees.

Before SLOVITER, ROTH and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

ROTH, Circuit Judge.

Moses Villot pled guilty to a general murder charge in exchange for an agreement by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania not to seek the death penalty. At the sentencing hearing in the Court of Common Pleas, Villot was found to have committed first degree murder and he was sentenced to life in prison. The present appeal is from the denial of Villot's § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus, based on three claims that his plea counsel provided ineffective assistance. Villot had unsuccessfully urged one of these claims on direct appeal and all three of them in his state petition for collateral relief. The District Court held that the two claims not presented until Villot's state collateral proceeding were procedurally defaulted because Villot failed to satisfy 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 9543(a)(2)(iii), which requires petitioners seeking collateral relief from guilty pleas to plead and prove their innocence. The District Court also held that the claim Villot presented on direct appeal was procedurally defaulted because Villot had failed to seek review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and would now be time-barred from doing so.

A motions panel of this court granted a certificate of appealability asking counsel to specifically address whether the innocence provision in § 9543(a)(2)(iii) is an independent and adequate state procedural ground. We now hold that this provision is a substantive requirement rather than a procedural rule and cannot, therefore, give rise to a procedural default of Villot's federal claims. Under federal law, proof of innocence is not a prerequisite to relief from a guilty plea. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has, however, tacked on an innocence provision as a substantive element necessary to prove in order to obtain relief from a guilty plea. But a state cannot add a substantive element to the proof necessary to obtain federal relief. A habeas petitioner's inability to meet more restrictive state standards for relief cannot result in a forfeiture of his federal constitutional claims. Accordingly, we conclude that these two collateral relief claims were not procedurally defaulted.

We further hold that Villot's third ineffective assistance claim is not defaulted. Although Villot did not fully exhaust this claim on direct appeal, he did fully exhaust all three claims by petitioning the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for review of the Superior Court's denial of collateral relief. Thus, Villot has invoked "one complete round" of the normal state appellate review process with respect to each claim.¹ O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999). Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of District Court and remand this case for consideration of the merits of all of Villot's claims.

I. Facts and Procedural History

In October 1990, Moses Villot pled guilty in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas to the murder of his brother-in-law. Following a degree of guilt hearing, Villot was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment.² Shortly thereafter, Villot, represented by new counsel, filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea, principally arguing that his plea counsel provided ineffective assistance. Following evidentiary hearings in October 1991, the Court of Common Pleas denied Villot's motion. Villot appealed to the Superior Court, arguing, inter alia, that his plea counsel provided ineffective assistance at the degree of guilt hearing due to a conflict of interest. Villot claimed that two of his plea counsel's former clients were the murder victim and the only eye-witness called by the prosecution at the degree of guilt hearing. The Superior Court denied the appeal and Villot did not seek review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

In January 1997, Villot filed a pro se petition for collateral relief under Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 9541 et seq, claiming that his plea counsel's ineffective assistance "undermined the truth-determining process" per § 9543(a)(2)(ii) and "unlawfully induced" his guilty plea per § 9543(a)(2)(iii).³ Counsel was appointed to represent Villot, but filed a no-merit letter per Commonwealth v. Finley, 379 Pa.Super. 390, 550 A.2d 213 (1988). The Court of Common Pleas dismissed Villot's petition without opinion and allowed appointed counsel to withdraw.

The Superior Court granted Villot the right to appeal this decision nunc pro tunc. Villot raised three ineffective assistance claims on appeal. First, he claimed his plea counsel coerced him into pleading guilty. Second, he claimed that his plea counsel failed to adequately interview him prior to advising him to plead guilty. Finally, he reiterated the conflict of interest claim described above. In July 1999, the Superior Court affirmed the dismissal of his PCRA petition. The court noted that, pursuant to a 1995 amendment, the PCRA now requires a petitioner seeking relief from his guilty plea to show not only that the plea was "unlawfully induced" but also that he is innocent. 42 Pa. Const. Stat. § 9543(a)(2)(iii). The court held that Villot's claims were "not cognizable" under this section because Villot had failed to assert his innocence. The court further noted that Villot admitted facts consistent with his guilty plea in his brief supporting his PCRA appeal and held that "[o]bviously, Appellant is not innocent."⁴ In November 1999, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Villot's petition for allowance of appeal.

In October 2000, Villot filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging the same three ineffective assistance claims he had raised in his PCRA appeal. The Magistrate Judge held that Villot's first two claims were procedurally defaulted based on the Superior Court's holding that Villot's claims were "not cognizable." The Magistrate Judge held, however, that Villot's third claim was insulated from the Superior Court's holding because that claim was properly exhausted on direct appeal. The Magistrate Judge noted that Villot failed to petition the Pennsylvania Supreme Court following the Superior Court's denial of his direct appeal, but held that this was no longer a required step in the exhaustion process for habeas cases arising in Pennsylvania. The Magistrate Judge cited In re: Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post-Conviction Relief Cases, No. 218 Judicial Administration Docket No. 1 (Pa. May 9, 2000) (Order 218) of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which provides that "in all appeals from criminal convictions ... a litigant shall not be required to petition for rehearing or allowance of appeal following an adverse decision by the Superior Court in order to be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies respecting a claim of error." See Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d 218, 224-25 (3d Cir.2001) (citing Order 218). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge considered Villot's conflict of interest claim on the merits, and ultimately recommended that the claim be denied.

The District Judge adopted the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation with respect to the first two claims but held that the conflict of interest claim was also procedurally defaulted. The District Judge held that Order 218, issued in May 2000, does not apply retroactively and therefore did not apply to Villot's direct appeal, which was denied by the Superior Court in May 1993. See Wenger, 266 F.3d at 226 (holding that "Order 218 does not apply in cases in which the time to petition for review by the state supreme court expired prior to the date of the order"). The District Judge concluded, therefore, that Villot's conflict of interest claim was procedurally defaulted because the time to petition the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had long since expired. In February 2001, the District Court dismissed the petition without reaching the merits.

A motions panel of this court issued a certificate of appealability per 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) with respect to Villot's first two ineffective assistance claims but denied the certificate with respect to the conflict of interest claim, holding that this claim was clearly defaulted. The certificate specifically sought briefing on whether the Superior Court's holding that Villot did not satisfy § 9543(a)(2)(iii)'s innocence requirement constitutes "an `independent and adequate' state law ground [precluding] review of [Villot's] federal claims" under the procedural default rule. As explained below, our consideration of Villot's first two claims requires us also to reconsider the motions panel's earlier conclusion that his conflict of interest claim was defaulted.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court exercised jurisdiction over Villot's habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. We have jurisdiction to review the District Court's order denying Villot's petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court's legal conclusions in a habeas proceeding, Caswell v. Ryan, 953 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cir.1992), including its resolution of legal questions arising from application of the procedural default doctrine. Hull v. Kyler, 190 F.3d 88, 97 (3d Cir.1999).

III. D...