Malaterre v. Amerind Risk Management

• Decision Date: 20 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. A4-04-088.,A4-04-088.
• Citation: 373 F.Supp.2d 980
• Parties: Myrna MALATERRE, Carol Belgarde, and Lonnie Thompson, Plaintiffs, v. AMERIND RISK MANAGEMENT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of North Dakota

373 F.Supp.2d 980

Myrna MALATERRE, Carol Belgarde, and Lonnie Thompson, Plaintiffs, v. AMERIND RISK MANAGEMENT, Defendant.

No. A4-04-088.

United States District Court, D. North Dakota, Northwestern Division.

June 20, 2005.

Thomas A. Dickson, Dickson Law Office, Bismarck, ND, for Plaintiffs.

Ronald A. Hodge, Hodge Law Firm, P.C., Bismarck, ND, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

HOVLAND, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is American Risk Management's Motion to Dismiss filed on December 8, 2004. The Plaintiffs have filed a response opposing dismissal. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 19, 2002, Stacey Bruce, Ruth Poitra, and Lonnie Thompson were guests in a house being leased from the Turtle Mountain Housing Authority located on the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. On that date, the house was destroyed by a fire, killing Stacey Bruce and Ruth Poitra, and seriously injuring Lonnie Thompson. See Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 14-17.

On or about January 23, 2003, Myrna Malaterre, the mother of Stacey Bruce, Carol Belgarde, the mother of Ruth Poitra, and Lonnie Thompson filed a negligence action in Turtle Mountain Tribal Court against the Turtle Mountain Housing Authority.¹ The complaint was later amended to include Amerind Risk Management (Amerind), as a defendant. Amerind provides insurance coverage to the Turtle Mountain Housing Authority. The tribal court lawsuit is still pending and motions to dismiss have been filed by the defendants.

On July 1, 2004, the Plaintiffs filed an action against Amerind Risk Management in the federal District Court of North Dakota. The Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment regarding whether insurance coverage exists under the Amerind insurance policy. See Complaint, ¶ 23.

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION

Amerind's motion to dismiss is predicated upon Rule 12(b)² of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Amerind contends that dismissal is appropriate under the tribal exhaustion doctrine and on the basis of sovereign immunity.

A. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT

The Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2201. "Since its inception, the Declaratory Judgment Act has been understood to confer on federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants." Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995). To that end, the Act specifically provides that a court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, ..." 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added). The Act has been "repeatedly characterized" by the United States Supreme Court as "an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant." Wilton, 515 U.S. 277, 287, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 132 L.Ed.2d 214. (citations omitted). As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "[b]y the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress sought to place a remedial arrow in the district court's quiver; it created an opportunity, rather than a duty, to grant a new form of relief to qualifying litigants." Id. at 288, 115 S.Ct. 2137. Ultimately, "the propriety of declaratory relief in a particular case will depend upon a circumspect sense of its fitness informed by the teachings and experience concerning the functions and extent of federal judicial power." Id. at 287, 115 S.Ct. 2137. Any willingness on the Court's behalf to entertain such relief in this case would yield to the applicability of the tribal exhaustion doctrine. See Gaming World International, Ltd. v. White Earth Band of Chippewa, 317 F.3d 840, 849 (8th Cir.2003) ("The issue of tribal exhaustion is a threshold one because it determines the appropriate forum.").³

B. TRIBAL EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE

It is well-established that principles of comity require that tribal-court remedies must be exhausted before a federal district court should consider relief in a civil case regarding tribal-related activities on reservation land. Krempel v. Prairie Island Indian Community, 125 F.3d 621, 622 (8th Cir.1997) (citing Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 107 S.Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987); National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985); Bruce H. Lien Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 93 F.3d 1412 (8th Cir.1996)). Stated differently, "[t]he tribal exhaustion doctrine holds that when a colorable claim of tribal court jurisdiction has been asserted, a federal court may (and ordinarily should) give the tribal court precedence and afford it a full and fair opportunity to determine the extent of its own jurisdiction over a particular claim or set of claims." Ninigret Development Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Housing Authority, 207 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir.2000) (citations omitted). The purpose of the doctrine has been explained by the United States Supreme Court as follows:

[T]he existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions.

We believe that examination should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal Court itself. Our cases have often recognized that Congress is committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination. That policy favors a rule that will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal basis for the challenge. Moreover the orderly administration of justice in the federal court will be served by allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal Court before either the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed. The risks of the kind of "procedural nightmare" that has allegedly developed in this case will be minimized if the federal court stays its hand until after the Tribal Court has had a full opportunity to determine his own jurisdiction and to rectify any errors it may have made. Exhaustion of tribal court remedies, moreover, will also provide other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such matters in the event of further judicial review.

National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. 845, 855-56, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818. Exhaustion is "especially appropriate" when tribal members or tribal entities are involved in a dispute arising on the reservation, and questions of tribal law are raised. See Bruce H. Lien Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 93 F.3d 1412, 1420 (8th Cir.1996) ("In this case many of the parties are Tribal entities or members and the dispute arises from Tribal governmental activity involving a project located within the borders of the reservation. Under these facts, exhaustion of tribal remedies is especially appropriate."); Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 27 F.3d 1294, 1300 (8th Cir.1994); United States v. Turtle Mountain Housing Authority, 816 F.2d 1273, 1276 (8th Cir.1987) ("These facts tend to demonstrate that this is a purely internal tribal controversy, which the tribal court is uniquely situated to resolve."); Weeks v. Oglala Sioux Housing Authority, 797 F.2d 668, 673 (8th Cir.1986) ("The facts here show that this contract dispute arose on the reservation and raises questions of tribal law interpretation within the province of the tribal court.").

Exhaustion of tribal remedies means that tribal appellate courts must have the opportunity to review the determinations of the lower tribal courts. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 17, 107 S.Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10. In short, "[t]he tribal exhaustion doctrine is based on `a policy of supporting self-government and self-determination,'" and although the rule is prudential rather than jurisdictional, "[e]xhaustion is mandatory ... when a case fits within the policy."⁴ Gaming World International, Ltd. v. White Earth Band of Chippewa, 317 F.3d 840, 849 (8th Cir.2003) (citing LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 20 n. 14, 107 S.Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10; National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. 845, 856, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818; Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 27 F.3d 1294, 1300 (8th Cir.1994); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir.1991)).

Although the criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts is subject to substantial federal limitation, see Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978), their civil jurisdiction is not so restricted. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15, 107 S.Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987)(citing National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 854-55, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985). However, as a general rule, "absent express authorization by federal statute or treaty, tribal jurisdiction over the conduct of nonmembers exists only in limited circumstances." Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997) (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209; Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981)). As the United States Supreme Court explained, "`the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe' — those powers a tribe enjoys apart from express provision by treaty or statute — `do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.'" Id. at 445-46, 117 S.Ct. 1404 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 565, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493)). Notwithstanding,

Indian tribes [do] retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or...