State v. Taylor

• Citation: 373 P.3d 699,160 Idaho 381
• Decision Date: 10 June 2016
• Docket Number: Docket No. 42774
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-respondent, v. Lance Tyrell TAYLOR, Defendant-appellant.

160 Idaho 381
373 P.3d 699

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-respondent,
v.
Lance Tyrell TAYLOR, Defendant-appellant.

Docket No. 42774

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, April 2016 Term.

Filed: June 10, 2016

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, attorney for appellant. Brian R. Dickson argued.

373 P.3d 701

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

W. JONES, Justice

160 Idaho 383

I. NATURE OF THE CASE

Lance Taylor ("Taylor") appeals an order from the district court denying him credit for time served as a condition of probation; specifically, periods of incarceration during his drug court program. Taylor argues the district court's order was erroneous for two reasons.

First, Taylor argues that the amendments to Idaho Code sections 18–309 and 19–2603 (the "Credit Statutes"), effective July 2015, should be given retroactive effect such that he should receive credit for time served as a condition of his probation. Second, Taylor argues that even if the amended Credit Statutes are not given retroactive effect, he is entitled to credit for time served. He contends that the terms and conditions of his probation did not authorize discretionary jail time; therefore, the district court's conclusion that he was not entitled to credit for his incarceration during drug court because it was a condition of probation was erroneous.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 3, 2013, Taylor pleaded guilty to one count of grand theft. The district court sentenced Taylor to a term of ten years. From the date of his original arrest to the initial sentencing, Taylor was incarcerated 292 days, which was credited towards his sentence. However, the district court suspended the imposition of the sentence and placed Taylor on probation for ten years to commence March 26, 2013. The district court's Judgment of Conviction, Suspended Sentence, and Order of Probation provided, as a condition of probation, that Taylor must successfully enroll in and complete Ada County Drug Court.

Taylor participated in the drug court program from March 27, 2013 until April 15, 2014. He violated drug court rules numerous times, which resulted in his periodic incarceration. On October 2, 2013, the drug court issued a bench warrant for failure to comply with the drug court order. Taylor was arrested on that bench warrant on February 26, 2014. On March 24, 2014, while Taylor was in custody, the State moved for Taylor's discharge from the drug court program, alleging that Taylor violated the drug court agreement in a variety of ways. Taylor admitted to a number of the alleged violations, and the district court ordered Taylor's discharge from the drug court program. On April 15, 2014, Taylor was discharged from drug court. Upon his dismissal from drug court, Taylor remained incarcerated until his disposition hearing on June 12, 2014, when the district court revoked Taylor's probation and resentenced him for a total term of seven years. The district court credited Taylor with 292 days served in pre-judgment incarceration.¹ The district court noted that Taylor did "NOT receive credit for any discretionary jail time ordered by the probation officer or any jail time served as a condition of probation." (Emphasis in original).

On July 7, 2014, Taylor filed a pro se motion requesting credit for time served. In an affidavit, Taylor stated that he was incarcerated for five periods, three of which resulted from violating drug court rules. However, the district court held that Taylor was not entitled to file pro se motions while represented by counsel; therefore, the district court struck his motion. Following Taylor's pro se motion, his defense counsel filed a motion to amend judgment; however, the motion only requested credit for the following two periods of incarceration: (1) 227 days, dating from Taylor's original arrest to his release for drug court: August 13, 2012 to March 27, 2013; and (2) 107 days, dating from Taylor's arrest on a bench warrant to his probation violation disposition: February 26, 2014 to June 12, 2014. Accordingly, defense counsel requested the district court to amend Taylor's judgment to reflect 334 days of credit for time served.

373 P.3d 702

160 Idaho 384

On August 5, 2014, the district court issued an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Taylor's Rule 35 Motion. Specifically, the district court found that Taylor was "operating under the misunderstanding that he is entitled to credit for time served as a condition of probation while on probation. He is not." However, the district court amended its previous order regarding the amount of time Taylor served pending his probation violation. The amendment increased his time served during that period from 81 days to 107 days. Accordingly, Taylor was credited with a total of 318 days.

At a hearing on August 18, 2014, defense counsel requested the district court to reconsider its calculation of 318 days of credit for time served, arguing that the correct calculation was 334 days. The district court denied the motion for additional credit for time served, stating, "[t]here is nothing in the record to support the claim." On September 22, 2014, Taylor, through counsel, filed another motion to amend judgment. This motion attached documentation of incarceration dates, but the calculations of incarceration periods were otherwise identical to the previous request. Separately, Taylor filed his second pro se motion requesting credit for time served. His calculations were slightly different from his previous pro se motion, as he requested credit for a total of 381 days. There is nothing in the record indicating that the district court struck this pro se motion.

In its response motion, the State raised several questions regarding the drug court's authority and bases for periodically incarcerating Taylor. The State calculated Taylor's incarceration record as totaling 391 days.

The district court disagreed. It concluded that there were four periods during which Taylor was incarcerated, each with a different legal basis: (i) incarceration before sentencing; (ii) incarceration as a participant in drug court; (iii) incarceration following arrest on the bench warrant issued after he absconded from drug court, but before the motion for probation violation was filed; and (iv) incarceration following the motion for probation violation but before disposition. Regarding period (i), the district court ruled that Taylor was entitled to credit for this time because it was served prior to the imposition of sentence. Regarding period (ii), the district court ruled that Taylor, as a drug court participant, served this time as "sanctions imposed as part of the drug court regime to which [Taylor] consented at the time of accepting drug court as a condition of probation." Accordingly, the district court ruled that Taylor was not entitled to credit for this period of incarceration. Regarding period (iii), the district court agreed with the State's contention that Taylor's arrest on February 26, 2014, was difficult to characterize because a motion for probation violation had not been filed at that point. However, the district court concluded that the arrest was the "functional equivalent of a bench warrant issued under I.C. § 19–2602." Accordingly, Taylor's incarceration for period (iii) was not imposed as a sanction for violating drug court rules, but as a consequence of absconding; therefore, the district court credited Taylor with 107 days of incarceration following the February arrest. Lastly, the district court ruled that Taylor was entitled to 333 total days of credit for time served, including period (iv) which was "up to and including June 12, 2014, the date of disposition on probation violation."

Subsequent to the district court's order, Taylor sent a letter to the district court requesting credit for an additional 53 days, the period of July 21, 2013, to September 13, 2013, when he was incarcerated for violating drug court rules. Thus, Taylor requested a total of 386 days of credit for time served. The district court acknowledged the letter, but did not act on this request. On December 5, 2014, Taylor filed a notice of appeal.

III. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the 2015 amendments to the Credit Statutes are retroactive.

2. Whether the district court erred in interpreting the probation agreement and calculating the credit for time served to which Taylor is entitled.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is subject to free review by the appellate courts."

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