373 U.S. 668 (1963), 480, McNeese v. Board of Education
|Docket Nº:||No. 480|
|Citation:||373 U.S. 668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622|
|Party Name:||McNeese v. Board of Education|
|Case Date:||June 03, 1963|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued April 23, 1963
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Petitioners, Negro students in an Illinois public school, brought suit in a Federal District Court under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983, to vindicate their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. They alleged that the enrollment at the school consisted of 251 Negroes and 254 whites and that, with a few exceptions, the Negro students attended classes in one part of the school, separate and apart from the whites, and were compelled to use entrances and exits separate from the whites. They prayed for equitable relief, including their registration in racially integrated schools. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that petitioners had not exhausted their administrative remedies under Illinois law, which forbids racial segregation in public schools and prescribes administrative procedures for enforcement of the prohibition. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The judgment is reversed. Pp. 669-676.
(a) Relief under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated though relief was not first sought under a state law which provided a remedy. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167. P. 671.
(b) The purposes of 42 U.S.C. §1983 were to override certain kinds of state laws, to provide a remedy where a state law is inadequate, to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, is not available in practice, and to provide a remedy in the federal courts supplementary to any remedy any State might provide; and those purposes would be defeated if it were held that assertion of a federal claim in a federal court must await an attempt to vindicate the same claim in a state court. Pp. 671-673.
(c) In this case, the right alleged is plainly federal in origin and nature; there is no underlying issue of state law controlling this litigation; nor is the federal right in any way entangled in a skein of state law that must be untangled before the federal case can proceed. P. 674.
(d) It is by no means clear that Illinois law provides petitioners with an administrative remedy sufficiently adequate to preclude prior resort to a federal court for protection of their federal rights. Pp. 674-676.
305 F.2d 783, reversed.
DOUGLAS, J., lead opinion
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit, which invokes the jurisdiction of the District Court under the Civil Rights Act, is brought to vindicate the rights of plaintiffs who are Negro students in the Illinois public school system. The complaint alleges that Chenot School, St. Clair County, was built and its attendance area boundaries drawn in 1957 so as to make it exclusively a Negro school. It alleges that, due to overcrowded conditions in an adjacent school, Centreville, which is in the same school district, all fifth and sixth grade classes in that school (containing 97% white students) were transferred to Chenot and kept segregated there. It alleges that enrollment at Chenot consists of 251 Negroes and 254 whites, all of the whites being in the group transferred from Centreville. It alleges that Negro students, with the exception of the eight transferred from Centreville, attend classes in one part of the school, separate and apart from the whites, and are compelled to use entrances and exits separate from the whites'. It alleges that Chenot school is a segregated
school in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, and it prays for equitable relief, including registration of plaintiffs in racially integrated schools pursuant to a plan approved by the District Court.
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that the plaintiffs had not exhausted the administrative remedies provided by Illinois law. The District Court granted the motion. 199 F.Supp. 403. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 305 F.2d 783. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted. 371 U.S. 933.
The administrative remedy, which the lower courts held plaintiffs must first exhaust, is contained in the Illinois School Code. Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, c. 122, § 22-19. By that Code, 50 residents of a school district or 10%, whichever is lesser, can file a complaint with the Superintendent of Public Instruction alleging that a pupil has been segregated in a school on account of race. The Superintendent, on notice to the school board, puts the complaint down for hearing within a prescribed time. After hearing, the Superintendent notifies the parties of his decision and, if he decides that the allegations in the complaint are "substantially correct," requests the Attorney General to bring suit to rectify the practice. Any final decision of the Superintendent may be reviewed by the courts. Moreover, under the School Code, a school district may not file a claim for state aid unless it files with the Superintendent a sworn statement that the school district has complied with the constitutional and statutory provisions outlawing segregation in the public schools. See Ill.Const., Art. VIII, § 1; School Code §§ 10-22:5, 22-11, 22-12.
Respondents, while saying that Illinois law does not require the Superintendent to refuse to certify claims for state aid if he finds the particular school board practices segregation, contends that the Superintendent would have
the power to withhold his certificate and, as a practical matter, would do so.
We have previously indicated that relief under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated because relief was not first sought under state law which provided a remedy. We stated in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183:
It is no answer that the State has a law which, if enforced, would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.
The cause of action alleged here1 is pleaded in terms of R.S. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
That is the statute that was involved in Monroe v. Pape, supra, and we reviewed its history at length in that case. 365 U.S. at 171 et seq. The purposes were several-fold
-- to override certain kinds of state laws, to provide a remedy where state law was inadequate, "to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice" (id., 174), and to provide a remedy in the federal courts supplementary to any remedy any State might have. Id., 180-183.
[83 S.Ct. 1436] We would defeat those purposes if we held that assertion of a federal claim in a federal court must await an attempt to vindicate the same claim in a state court. The First Congress created federal courts as the chief -- though not always the exclusive -- tribunals for enforcement of federal rights. The heads of jurisdiction of the District Court, at the start limited,2 are now numerous. In the beginning, the main concern was the security of commercial intercourse, which "parochial prejudice" might endanger.3
Maritime commerce was then the jugular vein of the Thirteen States. The need for a body of law applicable throughout the nation was recognized by every shade of opinion in the Constitutional Convention. From this recognition, it was an easy step to entrust the development of such law to a distinctive system of courts, administering the same doctrines, following the same procedure, and subject to the same nationalist influences.4
As the beneficiaries of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments became articulate and the nationalist needs multiplied, the heads of jurisdiction of the District Courts
increased, and that increase was a measure of the broadening federal domain in the area of individual rights.
Where strands of local law are woven into the case that is before the federal court, we have directed a District Court to refrain temporarily from exercising its jurisdiction until a suit could be brought in the state court. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496; Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478; Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167. Thus, we have stayed the hands of a Federal District Court when it sought to enjoin enforcement of a state administrative order enforcing state law, since any federal question could be reviewed when the cases came here through the hierarchy of state courts. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315. The variations on the theme have been numerous.5
[83 S.Ct. 1437] We have, however, in the present case no underlying issue of state law controlling this litigation. The right alleged is as plainly federal in origin and nature as those vindicated in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. Nor is the federal right in any way entangled in a skein of state law that must be untangled before the federal case can proceed. For petitioners assert that respondents have been and are depriving them of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. It is immaterial whether respondents' conduct is legal or illegal as a matter of state law. Monroe v. Pape, supra, at 171-187. Such claims are entitled to be adjudicated in the federal courts.6 Monroe v....
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