State v. Stump

• Decision Date: 28 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 91531–8.,91531–8.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Curtis Guy STUMP, Petitioner.

185 Wash.2d 454

374 P.3d 89

STATE of Washington, Respondent

v.Curtis Guy STUMP, Petitioner.

No. 91531–8.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued Jan. 28, 2016.

Decided April 28, 2016.

Jan Trasen, Attorney at Law, Marla Leslie Zink, David L. Donnan, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Gretchen Eileen Verhoef, Spokane County Prosecutors Office, Spokane, WA, for Respondent.

Nicholas Brian Allen, Attorney at Law, Rhona Taylor, Columbia Legal Services, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Columbia Legal Services.

Cindy Arends Elsberry, Washington Defender Association, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Washington Defender Association.

Prachi Dave, ACLU of Washington Foundation, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Aclu of Washington.

GORDON McCLOUD, J.

Curtis Guy Stump was convicted of possession of heroin following a bench trial. He filed a notice of appeal. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 27. The trial court then appointed a lawyer to represent Stump on the appeal at public expense.

¶ 2 That lawyer, however, did not file a brief in support of Stump's appeal. Instead, Mr. Stump's appointed lawyer moved to withdraw and filed an Anders¹ brief, arguing not that the appeal was meritorious but that it was wholly frivolous. The commissioner of the Court of Appeals, Division Three, granted defense counsel's motion to withdraw, agreed with defense counsel's assessment that the appeal was wholly frivolous, dismissed the appeal, and affirmed Stump's conviction.

¶ 3 The State then filed a cost bill, and the commissioner imposed appellate costs against Stump under RAP 14.2. RAP 14.2 states, in part, “A commissioner ... of the appellate court will award costs to the party that substantially prevails on review.” At least one other Division of the Court of Appeals has declined to order costs in this situation.² We granted review to resolve the issue of the propriety of imposing costs against an indigent criminal defendant whose appointed lawyer files an Anders brief and motion to withdraw.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Stump was convicted of possession of a controlled substance—heroin—following a bench trial. CP at 7–8. The trial court sentenced him to a residential chemical dependency treatment-based sentencing alternative. CP at 13–26.

¶ 5 Stump appealed. CP at 27. After reviewing the trial record, his appointed appellate counsel moved to withdraw and filed an Anders brief, arguing that the appeal contained no basis in law or in fact on which the court could grant relief. Suppl. Br. of Resp't Attach. C. The State's response asked the Court of Appeals for the same relief that defense counsel sought: grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the conviction. Id. at Attach. D. Stump filed no statement of additional grounds for review. Id. at Attach. G.

¶ 6 After reviewing the trial court record independently, a Court of Appeals' commissioner found no nonfrivolous issues, granted Stump's appellate counsel's motion to withdraw, dismissed the case, and affirmed Stump's conviction. Id. at Attach. E.

¶ 7 The State then filed a cost bill, requesting $3,024.50 in appellate costs pursuant to RAP 14.3 and RCW 10.73.160. Id. at Attach. F. Stump objected, arguing that the State was not the “substantially prevail[ing]” party and hence was not entitled to an award of costs on appeal under RAP 14.2. Id. at Attach. H–1. The commissioner disagreed with Stump; she ruled, “[T]he State of Washington did prevail in that the trial court's decision was affirmed.” Id. at Attach. H–2. A panel of Court of Appeals, Division Three, judges denied Stump's motion to modify the ruling imposing costs. Id. at Attach. J.

¶ 8 This court granted Stump's motion for discretionary review of the order imposing costs.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

¶ 9 To resolve this case, we must interpret the Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAPs). The interpretation of a court rule presents a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Engel, 166 Wash.2d 572, 576, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009) (we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo); Jafar v. Webb, 177 Wash.2d 520, 526, 303 P.3d 1042 (2013) (we interpret court rules in the same manner as statutes). However, this court is “uniquely positioned to declare the correct interpretation of any court-adopted rule.” Jafar, 177 Wash.2d at 527, 303 P.3d 1042.

II. RAP 14.2 Does Not Apply to Anders Briefs

¶ 10 Courts possess inherent authority to prescribe rules of procedure and practice for the judicial branch. State v. Gresham, 173 Wash.2d 405, 428, 269 P.3d 207 (2012) (“ ‘[T]he power to prescribe rules for procedure and practice’ is an inherent power of the judicial branch, State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498, 501, 527 P.2d 674 (1974), and flows from article IV, section 1 of the Washington Constitution, State v. Fields, 85 Wash.2d 126, 129, 530 P.2d 284 (1975).”).³

The Court of Appeals found that the applicable rule here is RAP 14.2. RAP 14 authorizes appellate judges, commissioners, and clerks to award appellate costs to the State, including the costs of appointed counsel,⁴ in certain circumstances. RAP 14.2 states, in relevant part, “A commissioner or clerk of the appellate court will award costs to the party that substantially prevails on review, unless the appellate court directs otherwise in its decision terminating review. If there is no substantially prevailing party on review, the commissioner or clerk will not award costs to any party....”

¶ 12 This rule gives appellate court judges the discretion to deny costs, even to a prevailing party. Id. But it also appears to take that discretion away from the appellate court commissioner and clerk. Instead, under RAP 14.2, an appellate court commissioner or clerk “will award costs to the party that substantially prevails on review, unless the appellate court directs otherwise in its decision terminating review.” (Emphasis added.) Here, the commissioner relied on that nondiscretionary directive to award costs and a panel of judges denied Stump's motion to reconsider that ruling.

¶ 13 The State defends that ruling; it argues that the appellate court commissioner was required to award costs against the indigent Mr. Stump, whose lawyer abandoned all arguments in favor of review and sought to withdraw. It focuses on RAP 14.2's “substantially prevail[ing]” party language and contends that since the State prevailed, costs must be imposed. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 10. Stump challenges that ruling; he argues that he was the one who prevailed because “[t]he Court of Appeals granted defense counsel's motion and granted the relief requested by petitioner (Mr. Stump), by permitting counsel to withdraw. Thus, if anyone prevailed, Mr. Stump was the prevailing party, because he received the relief he sought.” Mot. for Discr. Review at 6 (emphasis omitted). Alternatively, Stump claims, “Here, each party requested the same relief—to allow counsel for Mr. Stump to withdraw. As a consequence, both parties prevailed, since the relief requested by both parties was granted.” Id. (emphasis omitted).⁵

¶ 14 The State certainly got what it sought: an affirmance. The State's argument might therefore be the more persuasive one if we analyzed RAP 14.2 in isolation.

¶ 15 But we cannot analyze RAP 14.2 in isolation. When we interpret a court rule, like when we interpret a statute, we strive to determine and carry out the drafter's intent. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002) (citing State v. J.M., 144 Wash.2d 472, 480, 28 P.3d 720 (2001) ). We determine that intent by examining the rule's plain language not in isolation but in context, considering related provisions, and in light of the statutory or rule-making scheme as a whole. State v. Conover, 183 Wash.2d 706, 711, 355 P.3d 1093 (2015) (quoting Ass'n of Wash. Spirits & Wine Distribs. v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd.,

182 Wash.2d 342, 350, 340 P.3d 849 (2015) ).

¶ 16 The relevant context here is that the RAPs contain different provisions for burdening parties with costs in different situations, depending on the substantive effect of the appellate court's decision, and not just the labels. For example, one RAP contains a special provision concerning awards of costs to parties whose substantive interests differ from their formal designation. See, e.g., RAP 14.2 (“A party who is a nominal party only will not be awarded costs and will not be required to pay costs. A ‘nominal party’ is one who is named but has no real interest in the controversy.”). Another RAP limits awards of costs, in the appellate court's discretion, where a case is dismissed at the request of the appealing party. RAP 18.2 (“Costs will be awarded in a case dismissed on a motion for voluntary withdrawal of review only if the appellate court so directs....”). And of course, RAP 1.2(c) allows us to “waive or alter the provisions of any of these [RAPs] in order to serve the ends of justice.”⁶

¶ 17 Thus, RAP 14.2 is not the exclusive means for dealing with all situations resulting in an affirmance of a trial court decision. The RAPs are instead designed to allocate appellate costs in a fair and equitable manner depending on the realities of the case. This requires us to consider exactly what function an Anders brief serves.

¶ 18 A criminal defendant who cannot afford to retain counsel is entitled to a lawyer at public expense for the first appeal as a matter of right. But that lawyer need not raise frivolous claims on the appeal. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) ; State v. Hairston, 133 Wash.2d 534, 537 n. 2, 946 P.2d 397 (1997). In Anders, the United States Supreme Court addressed the potential tension between the indigent criminal defendant's constitutional right to appointed counsel on appeal and the lawyer's professional obligation to refrain from raising frivolous claims. 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396. The Anders majority established a “prophylactic framework,” Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539...