Evans v. United States

Decision Date22 March 1967
Docket NumberNo. 18489,18490.,18489
Citation375 F.2d 355
PartiesWilliam James EVANS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. George William BRUTON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Irving L. Cooper, Clayton, Mo., for appellant William James Evans.

Daniel P. Reardon, Jr., St. Louis, Mo., for appellant George William Bruton.

William C. Martin, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for appellee. Richard D. FitzGibbon, Jr., U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., with him on the brief.

Before MATTHES, LAY and HEANEY, Circuit Judges.

MATTHES, Circuit Judge.

William James Evans and George William Bruton were jointly indicted, tried and convicted by a jury of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2114 (1948).1 Following the entry of judgment imposing the mandatory sentence of twenty-five years they duly perfected their appeals to this Court.

The focal and crucial point both in the district court and on appeal is the admissibility into evidence of two oral confessions made by the defendant Evans. Both confessions were made prior to Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (June 13, 1966). Trial, however, commenced on June 20, 1966; hence Miranda is applicable and controlling. Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (June 20, 1966).

We first give attention to the offense which was established by uncontradicted evidence.2

Paul J. Robinson operated a jewelry store and watch repair shop on South Kingshighway in St. Louis, Missouri. His place of business was also a contract station or branch for the United States Post Office Department, and postal services were offered to the general public. Miss Shirley Miller was, on the date in question, and had been for some time prior thereto, an employee in the store and contract station. At approximately 2:00 P.M. on Good Friday, April 16, 1965 two Negro men entered the establishment and while Miss Miller was waiting on them each drew a gun, pointed it towards Miss Miller, and ordered her to the rear of the premises. Robinson was working in the store behind a partition. He was nevertheless able to see and observe the men through a small window in the partition. Both Robinson and Miss Miller were commanded by their assailants, at gunpoint, to lie on the floor face down behind the partition. Their legs and arms were bound. Glass showcases were broken and a safe containing Government property was opened. Various articles of merchandise and more than thirty dollars in Government money were taken by the robbers. The victims later were able to free themselves and report the holdup to the police.

Robinson's place of business was located in an area occupied almost exclusively by white persons and was infrequently patronized by Negroes. Miss Miller testified that the individual identified as defendant Evans had been in the store about eight times during the period of a year and one-half prior to the offense. Robinson stated he had sold Evans stamps on the Monday prior to the holdup. In this setting both Robinson and Miss Miller had no difficulty whatever in promptly and positively identifying Evans on April 8, 1966, when they viewed him in a line-up at the St. Louis Police Headquarters. Only Miss Miller, however, identified Bruton in a later line-up conducted on April 25, 1966. Robinson, "who just saw him Bruton come in" and did not see him again while the robbery was in progress, was unable to positively identify Bruton.

At the threshold of the trial the court conducted a hearing out of the presence of the jury for the purpose of determining the voluntariness of certain incriminating statements elicited from Evans during a police interrogation. This procedure comports with the rule prescribed in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). Evans also objected to the admissibility of his incriminating statements during the course of the trial.

The preliminary hearing conducted by the court revealed that Evans was arrested on March 22, 1966 and detained for a period of nearly two weeks prior to the first interrogation by local officials. At police headquarters, on April 4, 1966, Detective Oscar Farmer, of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department interrogated Evans in general about various robberies in the city, but did not specifically question him as to his participation in the Robinson postal robbery. He testified that prior to the interrogation he advised Evans only of his right to have an attorney and was informed by Evans that an attorney already represented him.3

Farmer continued his interrogation of Evans on April 8, 1966 after Evans had been positively identified by Robinson and Miss Miller as one of the participants in the postal robbery. Concededly, no warning of any type was given to Evans on this date. Evans repeatedly denied involvement in the robbery during the first two interrogation sessions conducted on the 8th, the second of which transpired in the presence of Miss Miller and Robinson. Evans, however, finally admitted his participation during the third period of questioning later that day. Only subsequent to these admissions did Farmer discuss with Evans the possibilities of dropping current state charges involving a Western Union robbery in favor of Federal prosecution. The record is totally silent as to the manner of interrogation, and consequently, we do not infer that Evans' confession was a product of his own voluntary purge of conscience rather than the result of Farmer's psychological pressure during the repeated interrogations.

Following Evans' admissions on the 8th, Farmer contacted J. B. Thorn, a United States Postal Inspector, who subsequently conducted his own interrogation of Evans in the city jail on April 11, 1966 in the presence of Farmer. Farmer admittedly revealed to Thorn prior to this date the fact that Evans had confessed his role in the crime during the April 8th interrogation and that he had been positively identified by Robinson and Miss Miller. The inference is clear that Farmer desired Evans to reiterate his former admissions of guilt in the presence of Thorn and himself. Thorn's questioning focused specifically on the robbery of the postal station. His testimony, however, corroborated in substance by Farmer, indicated that he gave Evans the following preliminary warning:

"I told him that he was a suspect in this matter, that he was not required to give any statements, in fact, he was not required to talk to me, that any statements he gave could be used against him in a court of law, and that he further had the right to an attorney."

The discussion between Thorn and Evans then centered on whether Evans was presently represented by counsel. Evans then named his attorney, but in Thorn's opinion gave no indication that he wished to consult with him prior to being interrogated. Thorn's testimony, categorically denied by Evans during the preliminary hearing, indicated Evans' apparent willingness to submit to the interrogation process without the assistance of counsel:

"* * * Mr. Evans stated that Mr. Harris Evans\' attorney was coming to see him on that particular day. I asked him if he would rather that I wait until Mr. Harris came to the City Jail. He stated no, that we could talk and that he would give Mr. Harris the information."

The Thorn interrogation of April 11th similarly culminated in Evans' admission that he was implicated in the robbery of the postal contract station. Thorn and Farmer again discussed the possibilities of dropping state charges in favor of a Federal prosecution. Although the record appears somewhat ambiguous as to exactly what point in time this discussion took place, Thorn did testify that he believed it transpired subsequent to the time Evans implicated himself in the robbery.

A complaint was filed on April 11, 1966 with the United States Commissioner charging Evans with robbery of the postal contract station. A warrant of arrest was issued by the Commissioner on the same day, but was not executed until May 3rd, the day after the state charges against Evans were dropped and he was released from state custody. Pursuant to Rule 5(a), Fed.R.Crim.P., Evans was brought before the United States Commissioner on May 3, 1966, at which time it is agreed he was fully advised as to his rights. At Evans' request the case was continued until May 10, 1966. On May 11, 1966 the indictment under which Evans and Bruton were tried was returned and filed with the district court.

On May 4th, Thorn conducted a subsequent interrogation of Evans. This interview likewise proved fruitful in that Evans again described his participation in the robbery in some detail and implicated Bruton as his accomplice.

At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court was of the opinion that the failure of Detective Farmer to advise Evans of his rights on April 8th, prior to the confession obtained by Farmer, was totally irrelevant. The only reason expressed by the court for permitting the confession to be introduced was the following:

"I think Mr. Thorn advised him of his rights, and as to what he told Mr. Thorn at that time, I think it\'s admissible. Not getting back into what he may have told Farmer at some other time, because that doesn\'t have anything to do with it."

In addition the record fails to disclose any finding that Evans had knowingly and intelligently waived the right to have his attorney present during the interrogation by Thorn. An essential element of voluntariness is an effective waiver by the accused of his right to retained or appointed counsel. As Miranda teaches:

"If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Escobedo
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