Fraternal Order of Police v. Williams

• Decision Date: 20 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-7076.,03-7076.
• Parties: FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS LABOR COMMITTEE, et al., Appellants, v. Anthony A. WILLIAMS, Mayor, District of Columbia, et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

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375 F.3d 1141 FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS LABOR COMMITTEE, et al., Appellants,
v.
Anthony A. WILLIAMS, Mayor, District of Columbia, et al., Appellees. No. 03-7076. United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. Argued April 16, 2004. Decided July 20, 2004.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 02cv00461).

Joshua D. McInerney argued the cause for the appellants. James F. Wallington was on brief.

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William J. Earl, Assistant Attorney General, District of Columbia argued the cause for the appellees. Robert J. Spagnoletti, Attorney General, District of Columba, and Edward E. Schwab, Assistant Attorney General, were on brief.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge:

The Fraternal Order of Police/Department of Corrections Labor Committee, its chairman and two member correctional officers (collectively the Union) appeal the district court's dismissal of their complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the District of Columbia (District) and two District officials, Mayor Anthony J. Williams (Mayor) and District of Columbia Director of Corrections Odie Washington (DOC Director). The Union claims that the two officials acted with deliberate indifference to the safety of District correctional officers when they laid off several hundred of them at the same time they added to the number of inmates housed at the District's Central Detention Facility (D.C. Jail or Jail). The Union contends that its claim arises under the "State endangerment concept" recognized by this court in Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 651 (D.C.Cir.2001). We disagree and affirm the district court's judgment albeit in a different procedural form.

I.

In 1997, the Congress passed the National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act, which called for, among other things, closure of the District's Lorton Correction Complex by December 31, 2001. Pub.L. No. 105-33, § 11201(b), 111 Stat. 251, 734; see D.C.Code Ann. § 24-101(b). Pursuant to that statute, District officials in late 2001 notified the Union that it intended to transfer a significant number of inmates from Lorton to the D.C. Jail. At roughly the same time, in December 2001 and February 2002, and in response to both fiscal year 2002 congressional appropriations for the DOC and the "surplus" of correctional officers following Lorton's closing, the Mayor approved a series of reductions-in-force (RIFs) decreasing the total number of correctional officers in the District's employ.

The Union opposed the RIFs and also claimed that the District, by transferring Lorton prisoners to the D.C. Jail, was violating a court-ordered ceiling on the number of inmates who could be housed at the Jail, see Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F.Supp. 111, 117 (D.D.C.1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C.Cir.1978) — an order that was lifted by the time of the district court's decision here, see Campbell v. McGruder, 86 Fed.Appx. 426, 2004 WL 180423 (D.C.Cir. Jan.23, 2004). — and adding to ongoing unhealthy and dangerous working conditions at the Jail. It filed an administrative complaint with the District's Public Employee Relations Board and in March 2002 filed suit in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It claimed that the Mayor and the DOC Director, by increasing the number of inmates at the Jail while decreasing the number of correctional officers there, affirmatively subjected correctional officers to an increased likelihood of inmate assaults in violation of their Fifth Amendment right to Due Process and their entitlement to a safe and sanitary work environment as recognized in D.C.Code Ann. § 32-1103(a).¹ The Union sought injunctive relief:

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namely an order prohibiting the RIFs and requiring the District to improve the showers and ventilation system at the Jail.

In connection with the Union's requests for a temporary restraining order (granted) and a preliminary injunction (denied), the parties submitted numerous affidavits, declarations and exhibits. The District then moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) on the ground that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Joint Appendix (JA) 142. The Union countered with additional evidence of the allegedly dangerous conditions at the Jail, relying on Butera and the right to be provided with a safe workplace and conditions of employment. The District responded that, even under Butera, the Union failed to assert an injury in fact or a constitutional claim because its member correctional officers had voluntarily exposed themselves to any alleged endangerment by accepting employment with the District.

In May 2003, the district court granted the District's motion. Fraternal Order of Police, Dep't of Corrections Labor Comm. v. Williams, 263 F.Supp.2d 45 (D.D.C. 2003).² Assuming that District officials could be held liable either for staffing policies in response to shortfalls in congressional appropriations or for the Congress's decision to close Lorton, the court found that "[n]othing presented by the [Union] is so egregious that, as a matter of law, it shocks the conscience." Id. at 47. The court further noted that the United States Supreme Court in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128-29, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1069, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992), expressly rejected the notion that the Due Process Clause protects a municipal employee's interest in a safe work environment and that this court in Washington v. District of Columbia, 802 F.2d 1478, 1482 (D.C.Cir.1986), rejected a prison guard's similar claim. See Fraternal Order of Police, 263 F.Supp.2d at 48. The court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the Union's remaining state law claims. Id. The Union appeals the dismissal.

II.

The District moved to dismiss the Union's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and the district court granted the motion. In so concluding, the court erred. The district court had jurisdiction to hear the Union's complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because, as the Supreme Court explained in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681, 66 S.Ct. 773, 775, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946), the complaint sought "recovery directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States." See 28 U.S.C. § 1343; Yates v. Dist. of Columbia, 324 F.3d 724, 725 (D.C.Cir.2003) (per curiam); Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C.Cir.1994). Having

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sought such recovery, the Union's complaint could be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) only if it was "wholly insubstantial and frivolous" or "so patently without merit as to justify ... the court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction." Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83, 66 S.Ct. at 775; see Best, 39 F.3d at 330. We do not believe the Union's claim can be so viewed. Instead, the complaint was subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Bell, 327 U.S. at 682, 66 S.Ct. at 775; Yates, 324 F.3d at 725. The substance of the District's motion was that the Union had failed to state a claim actionable under section 1983.³ Because both parties submitted materials outside the pleadings and the court relied on those materials in concluding that the Union had failed to state a claim, the motion to dismiss should have been converted to a summary judgment motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) ("If ... matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment."); Yates, 324 F.3d at 725 (parties' submissions and court's consideration of matters outside pleadings "had the effect of converting the Rule 12 motion ... into a motion for summary judgment"). We may, however, "characterize[ ]" the district court's dismissal as a grant of summary judgment under Rule 56(c) and affirm. Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 708 (D.C.Cir.1977) (treating district court's dismissal "for failure to state a claim over which it had jurisdiction" as "a summary judgment [when] both parties had presented affidavits and other materials `outside the pleading', these were expressly considered by the court, and it is clear from the [court's decision] that an intended, albeit unarticulated, ground for dismissal was Rule 12(b)(6)" (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b))); see Yates, 324 F.3d at 726 ("resulting order" from motion to dismiss "must be treated [on appeal] as a grant of summary judgment under Rule 56" because "parties submitted, and [court] considered, matters outside the pleadings"). We may do so, however, only if the "pleadings and record `show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and...