Gilbert v. General Electric Company

Decision Date13 April 1974
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 142-72-R.
Citation375 F. Supp. 367
PartiesMartha V. GILBERT et al. v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

Seymour Dubow, Richmond, Va., Ruth Weyand, Associate Gen. Counsel, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO and CLC, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.

John S. Battle, Jr., Robert H. Patterson, Jr., McGuire, Woods & Battle, Richmond, Va., Stanley R. Straus, Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, Washington, D. C., for defendant.

Samuel W. Hixon, III, Williams, Mullen & Christian, Richmond, Va., for amicus curiae, The Chamber of Commerce of the U. S.

Burt A. Braverman, Washington, D. C., for U. S. C. C.

Linda Colvard Dorian, Washington, D. C., for EEOC.

MEMORANDUM

MERHIGE, District Judge.

Plaintiff female employees of defendant General Electric Company (G.E.), which is an employer within the meaning of the appropriate section of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), seek class relief from alleged sex employment discrimination practices by that company in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Plaintiff, International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, is the recognized bargaining representative of a national collective bargaining unit composed of employees of defendant at plants throughout the United States. Included in said unit at various plants are a number of the named plaintiffs. Plaintiff, Local 161, is an affiliate of the International, concerned primarily with defendant's Salem, Virginia plant. Other groups or units of employees at defendant's plants and locations have designated other labor organizations, not parties hereto, as their exclusive representatives.

G.E., however, pursued a policy of negotiating a uniform health insurance benefits contract which applies equally to all unionized and non-unionized employees. The bargaining is conducted on behalf of the participating unions by a steering committee which includes plaintiff union. Representations which are uncontradicted were made to the Court that all but 50 unionized employees are represented in the health plan negotiations by the plaintiff International (IUE) or some other member of the steering committee. The steering committee unanimously adopted a proposal under date of January 15, 1973, which promulgates the position espoused by the plaintiff union, hence the Court found it unnecessary to order joinder of the nonparty unions. See Memorandum of May 16, 1973.

Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). The employment practice complained of is G.E.'s denial of sickness and disability benefits to employees absent because of pregnancy.

The numerous pleadings, voluminous records and endless motions belie the underlying simplicity with which the issues herein may be stated. For these purposes it suffices to note that prior to hearing of this matter, the bulk of this litigation has been concerned with procedural questions of an often difficult nature, including venue, see D.C., 347 F. Supp. 1058 (Sept. 25, 1972); compliance with EEOC procedures, see memorandum of February 2, 1973; class determination and counter-claim, see D.C., 59 F. R.D. 267 (April 30, 1973); and compulsory joinder, see memorandum of May 16, 1973, supra.

Once having traversed the thicket of procedural complexities, the issues presented are not difficult. Briefly stated, G.E. provides weekly non-occupational sickness and accident benefit payments (hereinafter "S & A") to all its employees in an amount equal to 60 percent of an employee's straight time weekly wage up to a maximum benefit of $150 per week for each week the employee is absent from and unable to work on account of any disability resulting from a non-occupational accident or sickness for a period up to and including 26 weeks for any one continuous period of disability or successive periods of disability due to the same or related cause. Said coverage applies with one exception: sickness or other disabilities arising from pregnancy, miscarriage or childbirth are not included.1

Each of the original named plaintiffs was a G.E. employee who became pregnant during 1971. Each made claims for S & A benefits and was denied same. Several of the plaintiffs filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission and, upon waiting the requisite period, brought this suit with their local and national unions, which are co-plaintiffs. Pursuant to the Court's order of April 30, 1973, the original named personal plaintiffs were declared representatives of two classes:

I. With respect to declaratory relief concerning the issue of whether G.E.'s refusal to pay S & A benefits to pregnancy related cases is violative of law, said named plaintiffs represent a class of all females who are now or have been employed by G.E. on or after September 14, 1971, or who become so employed during the pendency of this action and also all female employees who became pregnant and were denied S & A benefits or will be denied S & A benefits therefor from September 14, 1971. This class numbers approximately 100,000 women at hundreds of G.E. plant locations nationally.

II. With respect to damages for those women actually denied benefits from September 14, 1971, the named plaintiffs represent all such women in this sub-class. The number of women in this class is uncertain at this stage, although during 1971 G.E. received over 5,500 claims for S & A benefits from women absent because of pregnancy. Interrogatory #36. Pursuant to the Court's order of May 14, 1973, members of both the class and sub-class were given notice of the pendency of this action. FRCP 23(c)(2). No request for exclusion as a class member was received by the Court.

The gravamen of plaintiffs' legal claim is that the challenged S & A policy is violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and EEOC guidelines issued thereunder by virtue of constituting illegal sex discrimination.2 In support of this claim, plaintiffs assert factually that there is no medical, economic or sociological basis for distinguishing pregnancy disabilities from other types of disabilities covered by G.E.'s S & A program. Defendants, in brief, argue that pregnancy may be distinguished on several accounts and that said distinctions justify G.E.'s S & A policy under Title VII.

I. Stipulated Facts

Counsel have entered into a lengthy stipulation of facts which, in pertinent part, reads as follows:

. . . . . .

1. The plaintiff International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (AFL-CIO) hereinafter called International Union, and the defendant General Electric Company, hereinafter called GE, on February 4, 1971, entered into a 1970 Settlement Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto marked as Exhibit A, which by its terms was effective until May 26, 1973.

2. Part Three of said 1970 Settlement Agreement is the 1970-1973 GE-IUE National Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto marked Exhibit B. The foregoing 1970 Settlement Agreement has been recognized by International Union and GE as applicable to all the plants and classifications listed on pages 1 to 5, inclusive of the 1970-1973 GE-IUE (AFL-CIO) National Agreement, and also to certain additional plants and classifications for which the International Union has been certified subsequent to February 4, 1970.

3. At all times since January 26, 1970, pursuant to the 1970 Settlement Agreement and particularly to the provisions of the 1970 GE-IUE Pension and Insurance Agreement, GE has provided and does now provide non-occupational sickness and accident benefit payments to all of its employees represented by the plaintiff International Union and its affiliated IUE locals in an amount equal to 60 percent of an employee's normal straight time weekly earnings up to a maximum benefit of $150 for each week he or she is totally disabled as a result of a non-occupational accident or sickness for a period up to and including 26 weeks for any one continuous period of disability or successive periods of disability due to the same or related cause, excepting therefrom absences due to pregnancy or resulting childbirth or to complications in connection therewith. The full terms and conditions governing the payment by defendant GE to such employees of weekly non-occupational sickness and accident benefits and medical expense benefits at all times since January 26, 1970, are set forth in the General Electric Insurance Plan with comprehensive Medical Expense Benefits, as amended January 26, 1970 (ERB-32D) a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C.

. . . . . .

5. At all times since January 1, 1970, pursuant to the 1970 Settlement Agreement, GE has maintained for hourly employees represented by the plaintiff International Union and its affiliated IUE locals the General Electric Long Term Disability Insurance Plan for Hourly Employees effective January 1, 1970 (ERB-135), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit E.

6. At all times since January 1, 1970, pursuant to the 1970 Settlement Agreement, GE has maintained for salaried employees represented by the plaintiff International Union and its affiliated IUE local unions the General Electric Long Term Disability Income Plan for Salaried Employees, as amended January 1, 1970, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit F.

7. At all times since January 26, 1970, pursuant to the 1970 Settlement Agreement, GE has maintained for the employees represented by the plaintiff International Union and its affiliated locals the General Electric Pension Plan, as amended January 1, 1970 (ERB-42E), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit G.

8. At all times since January 1, 1970, GE has maintained for pensioners who retired from employment in which they were represented by plaintiff International Union and its affiliated IUE locals, the medical...

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    ...Ray-O-Vac was consistent with Title VII as then understood at the time it was decided. Ray-O-Vac relied partly on Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 375 F.Supp. 367 (D.C.Va.1974), which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 519 F.2d 661, but was reversed in General Elec......
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    ...that the exclusion of such pregnancy-related disability benefits from General Electric's employee disability plan violated Title VII, 375 F.Supp. 367. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 4 Cir., 519 F.2d 661, and we granted certiorari, 423 U.S. 822, 96 S.Ct. 36, 46 L.Ed.2d 39. We now As part of ......
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