375 Slane Chapel Rd., LLC v. Stone Cnty.
| Decision Date | 16 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 21-CV-05044-SRB |
| Parties | 375 SLANE CHAPEL ROAD, LLC, Plaintiff, v. STONE COUNTY, MISSOURI, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. #10.) For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART as discussed below.1
Plaintiff in this civil rights action is 375 Slane Chapel Road LLC ("Plaintiff"), a Missouri limited liability company owned and operated by Missouri residents Joseph and Yvonne Cordells ("the Cordells"). Plaintiff owns three parcels of real property located in Stone County, Missouri, which are designated as R-1 properties under Stone County's zoning regulations (the "Zoning Regulations"). Briefly, the relevant facts as taken from Plaintiff's complaint are set forth below.
Under Stone County's Zoning Regulations, owners of an R-1 property seeking to operate a short-term rental must apply for a conditional-use permit from the Stone County Planning and Zoning Commission ("the P&Z Commission"). On or around October 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed an application for a conditional-use permit to allow for short-term rentals on its properties (the "Application"). The P&Z Commission approved the Application during a hearing on November17, 2020. Shortly thereafter, a neighboring landowner appealed the P&Z Commission's decision to the Stone County Board of Adjustment (the "Board of Adjustment"). On April 13, 2021, the Board of Adjustment held a hearing on the matter, where multiple neighboring landowners to Plaintiff's properties voiced their opposition to the P&Z Commission's grant of a conditional-use permit. The Board of Adjustment ultimately reversed the P&Z Commission's decision and denied Plaintiff's application for a conditional-use permit.
On May 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint in federal court asserting three causes of action (Counts I, II, and III) arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against the following parties: Stone County, Missouri (the "County"); the Stone County Commission (the "County Commission"); the P&Z Commission; and the Stone County Planning and Zoning Board (the "P&Z Board") (collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiff seeks a judgment declaring certain identified provisions of Stone County's Zoning Regulations are "unconstitutional as applied to [Plaintiff] in violation of its Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process of law" and "facial[ly] unconstitutional[]" due to vagueness. (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 39, 47-48.) Plaintiff also asks for Defendants to be "preliminarily and permanently enjoined" from enforcing certain provisions of Stone County's Zoning Regulations against Plaintiff and other short-term rental applicants. (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 51-52.) Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6).2
Rule 12(b)(1) provides for the dismissal of a claim when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. When a defendant challenges a court's subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction exists. Jones v. Carondelet Health, No. 12-CV-00213, 2012WL 12898834, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 17, 2012) (citing Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir. 1990)). "In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a district court is required to distinguish between a facial attack and a factual attack." Roberts v. Dep't of Veterans Affs., No. 20-CV-00076, 2020 WL 7086103, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 2, 2020); see also Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n.6. In a facial challenge, the court reviews only the pleadings and "all factual allegations concerning jurisdiction are presumed to be true." Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993). The motion "is successful if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject-matter jurisdiction." Id. In a factual challenge to jurisdiction, a court may consider facts outside the pleadings and the non-moving party does not benefit from the presumption of truth. Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n.6; accord Mathews v. Fieldworks, LLC, No. 20-CV-06057, 2021 WL 1113205, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 23, 2021) (citation omitted) ( that "[i]n a factual attack the moving party submits evidentiary materials such as affidavits or depositions to attack the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint, and the court may consider that evidence when determining whether it has subject matter jurisdiction").
As a threshold issue, Defendants contend Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction. Defendants argue Plaintiff's complaint "fail[s] to allege a substantial federal question" under § 1983, and further contend Plaintiff's asserted claims are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine set forth in U.S. Supreme Court decision Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). (Doc. #11, p. 8.)3 Plaintiff argues that it adequately alleges claims invoking this Court's federal question jurisdiction, and further contends that abstention under Younger is inapplicable. Each argument is addressed in turn below.
To the extent Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to establish federal jurisdiction by failing to allege a substantial federal question under § 1983, the Court finds this argument presents a facial attack on Plaintiff's complaint under Rule 12(b)(1).4 The Court in turn limits its analysis for this specific argument to the pleadings and takes Plaintiff's factual allegations as true. See Titus, 4 F.3d at 593. Defendants argue Plaintiff merely presents a "run of the mill zoning dispute" and fails to allege a substantial federal question entitling it to jurisdiction. Specifically, Defendants argue there are no facts alleged that would support a substantive due process violation. Plaintiff responds that it does not assert a substantive due process claim, but instead asserts that the Stone County Zoning Regulations at issue are unconstitutionally vague on their face and as applied.
The Court determines that Plaintiff's allegations present a substantial federal question and adequately invoke this Court's jurisdiction. In the context of a Rule 12(b)(1) analysis, the Court considers whether the plaintiff's claim is subject to a determination of federal law over which the Court has jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) () (cleaned up). "Dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of the inadequacy of the federal claim is proper only when the claim is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy." Id. (cleaned up). Plaintiff alleges certain provisions of Stone County's Zoning Regulations are "unconstitutionallyvague," both on their face and as applied, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. #1, pp. 8-10.) Regardless of whether Plaintiff is likely to recover on those claims, its allegations are not legally foreclosed or wholly devoid of merit. See, e.g., ChemSol, LLC v. City of Sibley, 386 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1019 (N.D. Iowa 2019) (); Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1308 (8th Cir. 1997) (). In turn, Plaintiff's complaint implicates substantial federal questions enabling the Court to properly exercise its jurisdiction. Defendants' motion on this point is denied.
Defendants alternatively contend Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. District courts that have considered the issue in this context either construe the matter as a factual attack arising under Rule 12(b)(1) or, alternatively, a prudential ground for dismissal not bound by the assertions in a complaint. See, e.g., Backpage.com, LLC v. Hawley, No. 17-CV-1951, 2017 WL 5726868, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 28, 2017) (collecting cases) (declining to rely on Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6) in deciding the applicability of abstention under Younger); Chicago Ins. Co. v. Diocese of Kansas City-St. Joseph, No. 13-CV-00678, 2014 WL 556358, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 13, 2014) (). Whether analyzed as a factual attack under Rule 12(b)(1) or an independent prudential basis for dismissal, the Court finds that it is not limited to Plaintiff's complaint when determining whether the Younger abstention doctrine deprives it of jurisdiction in this case.
Defendants assert that on the same day Plaintiff initiated suit in federal court, Plaintiff also filed a petition in state court asserting claims arising from the same Board of Adjustmentdecision and Zoning Regulations that underlie the instant federal action. Given the pending state proceeding, Defendants argue this Court must postpone its exercise of jurisdiction in this case. Plaintiff disagrees, arguing its state proceeding "does not fit any category of cases warranting abstention" under the Younger doctrine. (Doc. #13, p. 13.)
Generally, federal district courts "have a virtually unflagging obligation to exercise their jurisdiction." Alleghany Corp. v. McCartney, 896 F.2d 1138, 1142 (8th Cir. 1990) (cleaned up) (quoting Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 206 (1988)). However, the Younger doctrine and its progeny provide that a federal court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a case if there is a parallel state proceeding which fits into one of three narrow categories: "(1) a criminal prosecution, (2) a civil enforcement proceeding that is akin to a...
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