375 Slane Chapel Rd., LLC v. Stone Cnty.

• Decision Date: 22 November 2022
• Docket Number: 21-3367
• Citation: 53 F.4th 1122
• Parties: 375 SLANE CHAPEL ROAD, LLC, Plaintiff - Appellant v. STONE COUNTY, MISSOURI, et al., Defendants - Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

53 F.4th 1122

375 SLANE CHAPEL ROAD, LLC, Plaintiff - Appellant

v.STONE COUNTY, MISSOURI, et al., Defendants - Appellees

No. 21-3367

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: June 15, 2022

Filed: November 22, 2022

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant and appeared on the appellant brief was Derek A. Ankrom, of Springfield, MO.The following attorney appeared on the appellant brief; Jason C. Smith, of Springfield, MO.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellees and appeared on the appellee brief was Travis A. Elliott, of Springfield, MO.The following attorney appeared on the appellee brief; Paige J. Parrack, of Springfield, MO.

Before LOKEN and KELLY, Circuit Judges, and MENENDEZ, District Judge.^*

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Joseph and Yvonne Cordell own 375 Slane Chapel Road, LLC("375"), a limited liability company that owns and operates a substantial vacation home adjacent to Table Rock Lake in Stone County, Missouri.When the Cordells' personal use of the home declined, 375 applied in October 2020 for a conditional use permit ("CUP") to rent out the property to short-term renters on platforms such as Airbnb.A CUP is required by Art. 4, § 25 of the Stone County Zoning Regulations(the "Short-Term Rental Regulation").After a November 17 hearing at which 375 presented testimony and exhibits in favor of the application and Marlin Constance, a nearby property owner, spoke in opposition, the Stone County Planning & Zoning Commission approved the application by a 7-6 vote.Constance appealed the Commission's decision to the Stone County Board of Adjustment.SeeStone Cty. ZoningReg., Art. 27, §§ 1(F), 3.After a hearing on April 13, 2021 at which those supporting and opposing 375's application appeared, the Board of Adjustment voted 3-0 to reverse the Planning & Zoning Commission's decision and deny 375 a CUP.

On May 12, 375 filed separate actions in state and federal court to overturn the Board of Adjustment's decision.In the Western District of Missouri, 375 filed this federal action, alleging that the Short-Term Rental Regulation is unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied to 375 because, by using the word "may," the regulation gives the Board of Adjustment unbridled discretion.One hour later, 375 filed a certiorari action in the Circuit Court of Stone County against the Board of Adjustment under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 64.870, alleging that the Board's decision was not supported by competent and substantial evidence, and that the Board unlawfully applied the Short-Term Rental Regulation in a disparate and discriminatory manner in violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Missouri Constitutions.U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1;Mo. Const. art. 1, § 2.

Defendants promptly moved to dismiss this lawsuit, arguing, as relevant here, that 375's federal claims are "barred by the Younger abstention doctrine."Invoking Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669(1971), the district court granted the motion, abstained from adjudicating the federal complaint in deference to "the parallel state court proceeding," dismissed 375's complaint without prejudice, and subsequently denied 375's Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. 375 appeals these rulings.Concluding that the district court misinterpreted the "exceptional circumstances" warranting Younger abstention as defined in Sprint Communications v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78, 82, 134 S.Ct. 584, 187 L.Ed.2d 505(2013), we reverse.

I.The Abstention Landscape

In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that, absent "extraordinary circumstances,""the possible unconstitutionality of a [state]statute‘on its face’ does not in itself justify an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it."401 U.S. at 54, 91 S.Ct. 746.Though Younger reversed a federal court injunction of a state criminal prosecution, the Court later "clarified and expanded" the scope of the Younger abstention doctrine to include limited types of civil cases.SeeMinn. Living Assistance, Inc. v. Peterson, 899 F.3d 548, 551(8th Cir.2018), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1195, 203 L.Ed.2d 203(2019)(citing cases); 17B Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure§ 4254 (3d ed. 2022 Supp.).In Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116(1982), where an attorney challenged the constitutionality of ongoing state attorney disciplinary proceedings, the Court explained that "[t]he policies underlying Younger are fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved," such as the state bar disciplinary proceedings at issue.Id. at 432-34, 102 S.Ct. 2515.Applying Middlesex, federal courts in subsequent cases considered what are called the three " Middlesex factors" in deciding whether to abstain: whether there is an "(1) ongoing state judicial proceeding, which (2) implicates important state interests, and (3) provides an adequate opportunity to raise federal challenges."Sprint, 571 U.S. at 81, 134 S.Ct. 584(cleaned up).

In New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans("NOPSI"), the Court altered this analysis when it emphasized that "only exceptional circumstances justify a federal court's refusal to decide a case in deference to the States."491 U.S. 350, 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298(1989).The Court explained that the requisite "exceptional circumstances" are limited to three types of state civil and criminal proceedings: (1)"pending state criminal prosecutions,"(2) certain "civil enforcement proceedings" warranting abstention, and (3)"civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions."Id.In NOPSI, the Court reversed the lower courts' decision to abstain in a federal case seeking judicial review of a city council's rate-making decision because review of that decision was also pending in state court:

[I]t has never been suggested that Younger requires abstention in deference to a state judicial proceeding reviewing legislative or executive action.Such a broad abstention requirement would make a mockery of the rule that only exceptional circumstances justify a federal court's refusal to decide a case in deference to the States. ...[W]e have never extended [Younger] to proceedings that are not ‘judicial in nature.’... The Council's proceedings in the present case were not judicial in nature.

* * * * *

There is no contention here that the Louisiana courts' review [of the Council's decision] involves anything other than a judicial act ....As a challenge to completed legislative action, NOPSI's suit ... is, insofar as our policies of federal comity are concerned, no different in substance from a facial challenge to an allegedly unconstitutional statute or zoning ordinance -- which we would assuredly not require to be brought in state courts.

Id. at 368, 370, 372, 109 S.Ct. 2506(cleaned up).In reversing, the Court applied its long-standing principle that "federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred," a principle that "do[es] not call into question, the federal courts' discretion in determining whether to grant certain types of relief."Id. at 358-59, 109 S.Ct. 2506(citations omitted).

Over two decades later, reviewing administrative action being challenged in federal and state court, the Supreme Court again reversed a circuit court abstention order, this time by our court, in Sprint Communications v. Jacobs.In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the unanimous Court, citing NOPSI, emphasized that "federal courts are obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction.Abstention is not in order simply because a pending state-court proceeding involves the same subject matter."571 U.S. at 72, 134 S.Ct. 584.Rather, Younger extends only to the three "exceptional circumstances"the Court identified in NOPSI – state criminal prosecutions, civil enforcement proceedings, and "civil proceedings involving certain orders ... uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions."Id. at 78, 134 S.Ct. 584, citingNOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506, and two prior casesNOPSI cited to define the third limited class of cases.Noting that our court had relied on the Middlesex factors to support abstention, the Court explained that the Middlesex factors are "additional factors appropriately considered ... before invoking Younger,"id. at 81, 134 S.Ct. 584, to be considered after the NOPSI category has been satisfied:

Divorced from their quasi-criminal context, the three Middlesex conditions would extend Younger to virtually all parallel state and federal proceedings, at least where a party could identify a plausibly important state interest.That result is irreconcilable with our dominant instruction that, even in the presence of parallel state proceedings, abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the "exception, not the rule."In short, to guide other federal courts, we today clarify and affirm that Younger extends to the three "exceptional circumstances" identified in NOPSI, but no further.

Id. at 81-82, 134 S.Ct. 584(citations omitted).Applying this directive, we held in Minnesota Living Assistance, 899 F.3d at 552, that determining whether Younger abstention is appropriate requires a three-part inquiry:

First, does the underlying state proceeding fall within one of the three "exceptional circumstances" where Younger abstention is appropriate?Second, if the underlying proceeding fits within a Younger category, does the state proceeding satisfy what are known as the "Middlesex" factors?And third, even if the underlying state proceeding satisfies the first two inquiries, is abstention nevertheless inappropriate

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