Atkins v. Atkins

Decision Date18 August 1977
Citation376 A.2d 856
PartiesCecilia A. ATKINS v. Edward L. ATKINS and Ralph W. Atkins.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Daviau & Daviau by Robert J. Daviau, Waterville, for plaintiff.

Marden, Dubord, Bernier & Chandler by Albert L. Bernier, Waterville, for defendants.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY and GODFREY, JJ.

DELAHANTY, Justice.

Plaintiff Cecilia Atkins appeals from an order of summary judgment in favor of her ex-husband, defendant Edward Atkins (Edward), and her son, defendant Ralph Atkins (Ralph). We sustain the appeal.

Plaintiff obtained a divorce from her husband on August 27, 1969. The next day, August 28, 1969, she filed a complaint against Edward and Ralph, alleging that they had conspired to place a certain parcel of real estate, and the Crescent Hotel situated thereon, beyond her reach. The property had been purchased in 1966, at a time when plaintiff and Edward were estranged and separated. Although title was placed in Ralph's name, it was Edward who supplied the $10,000 for the down payment. Plaintiff claims that the true and equitable owner of the property is Edward, and that she is therefore entitled to a portion of that property by virtue of the divorce. 1 She asks that Ralph be charged as a trustee of the property for her benefit or, in the alternative, that a money judgment be rendered against Edward. On December 17, 1969 the property was taken by Urban Renewal and the $74,000 compensation was made payable to Ralph.

Plaintiff filed a pre-trial memorandum on April 22, 1970. The case then lingered on the calendar for several years. Pre-trial conference was finally held on January 13, 1976. The presiding Justice subsequently issued a pre-trial order specifying the factual issues involved, but defendants filed a formal objection to the manner in which he had postured the issues.

Later, on June 23, 1976, defendants moved for summary judgment. Following a hearing, their motion was granted by a decision dated July 31, 1976. The issue which we address concerns the propriety of this granting of the motion from both procedural and substantive points of view.

Plaintiff first argues that summary judgment was procedurally inappropriate since defendants' motion was filed six years after the commencement of the action. M.R.Civ.P. 56 provides that a motion for summary judgment may be filed "at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action . . . but within such time as not to delay the trial". Plaintiff does not contend that the motion, or the hearing on it, in any way delayed trial. On these facts, a six-year delay would not preclude summary judgment.

Plaintiff next argues that summary judgment was procedurally improper since its granting perforce overrules the previous pre-trial order which had specified that genuine factual issues were involved. She contends that summary judgment is never appropriate in such a case. We disagree.

The purpose of a pre-trial order is to make specific the legal theories on which each party is proceeding and to crystallize and formulate the issues to be litigated at the trial. Beckwith v. Rossi, 157 Me. 532, 175 A.2d 732 (1961). If the order did not control the ensuing proceedings, it would be rendered meaningless. However, this does not mean that there must be unswerving and rigid adherence to every provision; the pre-trial order was not intended to become "hoops of steel to bind the parties to frozen issues". Case v. Abrams, 352 F.2d 193, 195 (10th Cir. 1965). Indeed, M.R.Civ.P. 16(c) provides that the order "controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice " (emphasis added), thus sanctioning a certain degree of flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances.

Not only may the pre-trial order be modified, but its posturing of the factual issues may, in certain situations, be disregarded even to the extent of permitting a later granting of summary judgment, a procedure utilized exclusively when no genuine fact issues whatsoever exist. 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice § 56.02 (2d ed. 1974). 2 We concur with the opinion of the Second Circuit in Irving Trust Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 1955) that

(u)pon a proper showing that there is no genuine issue to be tried, a judge may grant a motion for summary judgment wholly irrespective of the terms of a pretrial order specifying a number of issues which remained after the discussion at the Pretrial Conference had eliminated others.

Plaintiff's contention that the pre-trial order must, in every instance, control is therefore unfounded. Certainly there are cases in which it would be manifestly unjust to allow it to do so. The case before us, however, is not one of them. We have reviewed the pre-trial order 3 and, for the reasons delineated below, we agree with its posturing of the factual issues.

In granting defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Justice below stated:

The Plaintiff asserts that when, prior to her divorce from him, the Defendant, Edward L. Atkins furnished $10,000 for the down payment for the purchase of certain real estate purchased in the name of their son, the Defendant, Ralph W. Atkins, it was a fraud upon the Plaintiff. The sum advanced for that down payment was repaid to the Defendant, Edward L. Atkins, when the real estate was taken from the son by eminent domain in 1969. At no time did the Defendant, Edward L. Atkins, ever have title to this real estate. A husband may dispose of his personal estate absolutely without the concurrence of his wife, exonerated from all claim by her. Wright v. Holmes, 100 Me. 508, 514, 62 A. 507 (1905). See also Kirkpatrick v. Clark, 132 Ill. 342, 24 N.E. 71, 72 (1890). (emphasis added).

We are troubled by the presiding Justice's decision and his reliance on Wright since, in reciting the holding of that case, he omitted an important exception contained therein. The complete sentence states that...

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9 cases
  • Wescott v. Allstate Ins.
    • United States
    • Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)
    • 18 Enero 1979
    ...although Rule 56(c) expressly authorizes summary judgment, when appropriate, to be rendered against the moving party. Atkins v. Atkins, Me., 376 A.2d 856 (1977); Akerley v. Lammi, Me., 217 A.2d 396 (1966). A party's invocation of the summary judgment procedure is not a submission of issues ......
  • Dalton v. Comm'r
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • 20 Junio 2012
    ...232–33, 45 S.Ct. 64, 69 L.Ed. 259 (1924). In connection with real property, Maine recognizes the nominee doctrine. See Atkins v. Atkins, 376 A.2d 856, 859 (Me.1977). This doctrine allows for the possibility that the true owner of a parcel of land may be someone other than the record owner. ......
  • Cyr v. Cote
    • United States
    • Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)
    • 26 Enero 1979
    ...A.2d 783 (1962), specifies the legal theories upon which the parties are proceeding, and formulates the issues to be tried. Atkins v. Atkins, Me., 376 A.2d 856 (1977). Accordingly, we hold that where the issues raised by the pleadings have been modified by a pre-trial order, the order and n......
  • United States v. Kimball
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Court (Maine)
    • 24 Junio 2016
    ...land may be someone other than the record owner." Id. The First Circuit referred to a single Maine Law Court decision, Atkins v. Atkins, 376 A.2d 856 (Me. 1977), as invoking a three-factor test, and said that "Maine case law does not fully delineate the contours of the nominee doctrine." 68......
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