U.S. v. Ameline
| Decision Date | 21 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-30326.,02-30326. |
| Citation | 376 F.3d 967 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alfred Arnold AMELINE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Brian P. Fay, Angel Law Firm, Bozeman, Montana, for the appellant.
Lori Harper Suek, Assistant United States Attorney, Great Falls, Montana, for the appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding.
Before: WARDLAW, GOULD, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Alfred Ameline appeals his 150 month sentence that was imposed after he pled guilty to knowingly conspiring to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. In his initial appellate brief, Ameline challenged his sentence on two grounds. First, Ameline contended that because he objected to the amount of methamphetamine attributed to him in the Presentence Report ("PSR") the district court erred when it considered the PSR as "prima facie evidence of the facts" and required Ameline to disprove its contents relating to drug quantities. Second, Ameline contended that the district court's drug quantity finding was clearly erroneous because it was based on multiple layers of unreliable hearsay evidence.
In post-submission briefing, Ameline argued that the imposition of his sentence violates the Sixth Amendment as recently interpreted by the Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) because the facts underlying the calculation of his base offense level and his sentence enhancement were not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. If Ameline is correct that the Blakely rule applies to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, his other two claims become irrelevant, as they assume both the wrong decision-maker and the wrong standard of proof. We examine sua sponte whether the Blakely rule applies to sentences imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines. We hold that Blakely's definition of statutory maximum applies to the determination of the base offense presumptive ranges under § 2D1.1(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines, as well as the determination of the applicability of an upward enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1). As a result, we hold that Ameline's sentence, based on the district court's finding by a preponderance of the evidence of 1,603.60 grams of methamphetamine — despite Ameline's admission of only a detectable amount of methamphetamine — violates Ameline's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Because we may sua sponte review an issue based on a change in the law by the Supreme Court, we hold that we may properly review Ameline's Blakely claim and conclude, regardless of whether we apply the harmless or plain error standard, that the district court violated Ameline's right to have the facts underlying his sentence found beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, we hold that the Blakely rule's effect on the determination of a base offense level under § 2D1.1(c) and an upward enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) do not render the Sentencing Guidelines facially invalid. Accordingly, we vacate Ameline's sentence and remand for resentencing.
Ameline pled guilty to knowingly conspiring to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. His plea agreement did not contain an agreement as to a specific quantity of methamphetamine for purposes of sentencing, but rather left that determination to the district court at the time of sentencing. At Ameline's change of plea hearing, he disputed the government's offer of proof that he distributed one and a half kilograms of methamphetamine, but admitted that "some methamphetamine" was involved in his offense conduct. At the end of the hearing, Ameline's counsel reiterated this point:
The PSR prepared by the Probation Office attributed 1,079.3 grams of methamphetamine to Ameline for purposes of applying the drug equivalency table found in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), resulting in a recommended base offense level of 32. The PSR also recommended a two level enhancement pursuant to § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a weapon in connection with the offense on the basis of hearsay testimony by a confidential informant that Ameline sold the confidential informant methamphetamine in exchange for a rifle, and that he once witnessed Ameline threaten his son with a handgun.
After the probation officer disclosed the draft PSR to Ameline and the government, Ameline, as required by the court's April 30, 2002 Sentencing Order, presented the probation officer with a series of objections to the quantities of methamphetamine attributed to him in the report. Ameline also objected to the two paragraphs that formed the basis of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement — possession of a gun — as "false." In his letter objecting to the draft PSR, Ameline explained the basis for his objections and the evidence on which he would rely at the sentencing hearing. The probation officer dismissed Ameline's objections and reaffirmed his determination of the quantity of methamphetamine in the original PSR, as well as the upward enhancement. As the probation officer explained in an addendum to the PSR:
The information obtained for purposes of inclusion in the Offense Conduct section of the report is based solely on the official investigative reports provided by the Cascade County Sheriff's Office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Subsequent to receipt of the objections to the Presentence Investigation Report from the defendant's attorney, this officer again discussed investigative matters and reference to official reports with Detective Dan Kohm, Cascade County Sheriff's Office, and Special Agent Phil Niedringhaus, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to verify the validity contained in the investigative report. Both Detective Kohm and Agent Niedringhaus question the credibility of the individuals the defendant wishes to bring forward to provide testimony for the defendant in support of a lower drug amount. Both Kohm and Niedringhaus indicate that the CI is a reliable source of information.
As a result, this Officer stands by the original information provided in the Presentence Investigation Report and the total drug amount weight calculated as 1.08 kilograms of methamphetamine.
In Ameline's Sentencing Memorandum, dated September 3, 2002, he again objected to the amount of methamphetamine attributed to him in the PSR. Specifically, Ameline objected to the amount of methamphetamine the probation officer sought to attribute to him in paragraphs 13, 17, 24 and 28 of the PSR. Paragraph 13 of the PSR alleged that Ameline met with "Toro," aka Shawn Rodriguez, in Great Falls, Montana where Toro "fronted" Ameline a pound and a half of methamphetamine (680.4 grams). According to the PSR, the source of this information was not Toro, but rather a cooperator and co-defendant, Victor Saucedo, who claimed to have been told this by Toro. Paragraph 17 alleged that Jamie Swan gave Ameline ten ounces of methamphetamine (283.5 grams). Swan had supposedly received the methamphetamine he gave to Ameline from co-defendant Michael Lamere. Paragraph 24 attributed 113 grams of methamphetamine to Ameline based on three sales of methamphetamine to Ameline by a confidential informant. Paragraph 28 attributed two grams of methamphetamine to Ameline based on statements Reuben McDowell made to investigators that he had twice dealt one gram quantities of methamphetamine to Ameline.
At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, before any witnesses were called, the district judge informed the parties how he intended to proceed:
It is the position of this court in this matter, as it is in all such cases, that the facts as recited in the presentence report are prima facie evidence of the facts set out there; that if the defendant challenges the facts set forth in the presentence report, it is the burden of the defendant to show that the facts contained in the report are either untruthful, inaccurate, or otherwise unreliable.
The district judge then asked defense counsel to call his first witness. However, before counsel called any witnesses, the court again reiterated its position:
[I]t is my position that the statements in the presentence report, that is, statements of fact, are reliable on their face and prima facie evidence of the facts there stated. And I will be taking those into account to the extent relevant to the obligations that I have in fashioning sentence and fixing responsibility for drug quantities, if they are not overcome by other evidence presented at this hearing. Be guided accordingly. (emphasis added).
Consistent with his objections, Ameline presented testimony from Toro to dispute the amount of methamphetamine attributed to him in paragraph 17 of the PSR. Toro testified that he provided Ameline with three ounces of methamphetamine in October 1999, but that Saucedo was not present when the transaction took place. Toro further testified that he never told Saucedo that he had provided Ameline with one and a half pounds of methamphetamine. As to the amount of methamphetamine attributed to Ameline in paragraph 17 of the PSR by the statement of Jamie Swan, Ameline presented the testimony of Michael Lamere who testified that Swan was not in charge of selling the one pound quantity of methamphetamine that he supposedly distributed part of to Ameline. Lamere testified that Jamie Swan was mistaken in his belief that Ameline received 10 ounces of the one pound quantity of methamphetamine. As to paragraph 24 of...
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