Cummings v. Godin
| Decision Date | 30 August 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-318-A,75-318-A |
| Citation | 119 R.I. 325,377 A.2d 1071 |
| Parties | John A. CUMMINGS, Mayor of the City of Woonsocket, v. Wilfred L. GODIN. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This is an appeal in a declaratory judgment action. The Mayor of Woonsocket sought a judgment in Superior Court declaring that the provisions of the Woonsocket Home Rule Charter prohibiting city employees from holding elective offices are constitutional 1 and that the defendant, a public school teacher in the city of Woonsocket, is a city employee to whom these provisions are applicable. The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts:
The trial justice held that public school teachers are city employees and that the charter provisions prohibiting city employees from holding elective offices was constitutional. The defendant, on appeal, contends that the trial justice erred for several reasons: (1) that a public school teacher is not a city employee and thus is not covered by the charter provisions: (2) that even if public school teachers are city employees, the charter cannot prohibit them from holding elective office since local regulation of education is not authorized unless the General Assembly has expressly delegated that power: (3) that the charter provisions are invalid because they regulate state elections and set qualifications for holding office: (4) that since the Legislature, the sole judge of the qualifications of its members, has not disqualified defendant, it is clear they did not intend to delegate authority to the City of Woonsocket to prohibit teachers from holding elective office: (5) that the charter provisions are unconstitutionally overbroad and violate the First Amendment because they prohibit city employees from holding any elective office.
The defendant initially contends that public school teachers are not city employees and, as a result, are not covered by the provisions of ch. XVI, art. 9 of the charter. In support of this argument, defendant cites City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624 (1958), where this court stated that under the Rhode Island Constitution education was a state function, and, as such, was carried out by the cities and towns, through their school committees, as agencies of the state government. Therefore, we concluded, teachers are agents of the state government and may be enjoined from striking. The defendant thus argues that since school teachers are agents of the state, they cannot be municipal employees. We agree with the trial justice's conclusion that the defendant misconstrues our language in City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, supra, and misinterprets the General Assembly's intent in creating local school committees. In City of Providence v. Local 799, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 111 R.I. 586, 589, 305 A.2d 93, 95 (1973), this court stated that a body having no statewide authority and performing no statewide function is not a state agency. Thus, school committees are agencies of the state, but are not "state agencies," since they act only on matters of local concern. Moreover, this court explicitly stated in City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, supra, that the cities and towns, through their school committees, perform a state function based upon a delegation of power from the General Assembly. Thus, the school committees, although exercising a portion of the state's power over education, are, nonetheless, municipal bodies, and their employees, including public school teachers, are municipal employees.
Furthermore, as noted by the trial justice in his decision, the General Assembly in G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 16-6-2 defined a teacher as "every person employed by any city or town as a teacher * * * in any public school in the state who is required by law to hold a certificate of qualification * * *." (Emphasis added.) It is evident from a careful reading of this statute and the previously discussed case law that school committees are not state agencies; they are municipal bodies acting as agents for the state in that they exercise state power that has been delegated to them by the state.
Moreover, the General Assembly's specific validation and ratification of each provision contained in the Woonsocket Home Rule Charter further supports our conclusion that defendant is a city employee. Public Laws 1953, ch. 3235 and P.L. 1969 ch. 234, § 3. In ch. XIV of the charter the Woonsocket School Committee is designated as the Woonsocket Department of Education, a department of the city of Woonsocket. Since each provision was expressly validated by the General Assembly, such designation constitutes an act of the General Assembly and manifests a clear intent that the school committee is a municipal body and all of its employees, city employees.
Finally, as the trial justice noted in his opinion, defendant is employed by a department of the city which is supported by the taxpayers of that city, and he receives his paycheck from the city.
Therefore, we conclude that the General Assembly intended that the Woonsocket School Committee be a municipal body and that school teachers employed by the school committee be considered city employees. As a result, defendant, as an employee of the city, is subject to the provisions of ch. XVI, art. 9 of the charter prohibiting him from holding his position as a teacher and the office of state senator at the same time.
The defendant next argues that the Woonsocket Home Rule Charter provisions at issue in the instant case constitute local regulation of education, and that since the Legislature has not expressly delegated to the city the power to regulate school teachers in this manner, these provisions are invalid. However, since the General Assembly ratified each and every provision of this charter, P.L. 1953, ch. 3235 and P.L. 1969, ch. 234, § 3, defendant's argument must fail.
The defendant's third contention is that the charter provisions forcing him to choose between his employment as a teacher and his office as state senator are invalid because the city is, in effect, regulating state elections and setting qualifications for holding state office, an area exclusively reserved for regulation by the state. This contention is without merit. The charter provisions do not attempt to limit the right to vote or to establish qualifications for office. The city employee is free to run for office; the provisions simply require that, if elected, the employee must choose between that office and his city employment. Moreover, if the employee fails to make such a choice, the charter does not disqualify him from holding elective office, but requires that he forfeit his city employment.
The defendant next contends that since the senate did not disqualify him, it is evident that it did not delegate the power of regulation to the city. However, as we previously noted, the charter provisions do not attempt to disqualify defendant from membership in the state senate. They simply provide that he must choose between the two positions, and that if he fails to do so, he must forfeit employment with the city. Consequently, this argument is without merit.
Finally, defendant contends that these charter provisions violate first amendment rights. Specifically, defendant argues that these provisions are overly broad because they purport to regulate protected as well...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gelch v. State Bd. of Elections, s. 84-320-M
...office is one of the rights included within the scope of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, Cummings v. Godin, 119 R.I. 325, 335, 377 A.2d 1071, 1076 (1977), the disqualification of a convicted felon by a state is specifically allowed under section 2 of the Fourteenth Am......
-
Bauers v. Cornett
...on other grounds, 493 F.2d 826 (2nd Cir.1974)); Martin v. State Bd. of Elections, 119 R.I. 556, 381 A.2d 234 (1977); Cummings v. Godin, 119 R.I. 325, 377 A.2d 1071 (1977); Phillips v. Flint, 57 Mich.App. 394, 225 N.W.2d 780 (1975); Stefano v. Wilson, 96 N.J.Super. 592, 233 A.2d 682 (1967); ......
-
City of Cent. Falls, Rhode island v. Cent. Falls Teachers' Union, Rhode Island Council 94, Afscme, Afl-Cio Local 1627 (In re City of Cent. Falls, Rhode island)
...the school committees of the several cities and towns.117On the basis of this delegation, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held, in Cummings v. Godin and repeatedly thereafter, that school committees are “agencies of the state” in that they carry out by delegation the educational mission ......
-
National Educ. Ass'n of RI v. Garrahy, Civ. A. No. 82-0399P
...bodies acting as agents for the state in that they exercise state power that has been delegated to them by the state. Cummings v. Godin, 377 A.2d 1071, 1073 (R.I.1977); accord Brown v. Elston, 445 A.2d 279, 285 To note that the school committee is a separate entity for purposes of federal (......