Gonzalez-De-Blasini v. Family Dept.

Decision Date02 August 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-2345.,03-2345.
PartiesMigdalia GONZÁLEZ-DE-BLASINI, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. FAMILY DEPARTMENT, as an agency of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; Yolanda Zayas, Secretary of the Family Department in her official capacity and personal capacity; Victor Maldonado, Human Resources Director, in his official and personal capacity, Defendants, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, Jay A. Garcia-Gregory, J.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Godwin Aldarondo-Girald, with whom Aldarondo-Girald Law Office was on brief, for appellant.

Camelia Fernández-Romeu, Assistant Solicitor General, with whom Roberto J. Sánchez-Ramos, Solicitor General, and Kenneth Pamias-Velázquez, Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief, for appellees.

Before BOUDIN, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and HOWARD, Circuit Judges.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Migdália González de Blasini ("González") appeals from an order of the district court granting co-defendants Yolanda Zayas's ("Zayas") and Victor Maldonado's ("Maldonado") motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

I. Factual Background

We review the entry of summary judgment on all claims de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, in this case González. Aponte Matos v. Toledo Davila, 135 F.3d 182, 185 (1st Cir.1998). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

González is a member of the New Progressive Party ("NPP"), which was the political party in power in Puerto Rico before the 2000 general elections. After the elections, a new administration under the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP") assumed control of the government. Both defendants are members of the PDP. At all relevant times, Zayas was the Secretary of the Family Department of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("Family Department"), and Maldonado was its Human Resources Director. Following the change in administration, the Family Department conducted an audit of its Human Resources Office covering personnel transactions from July 1, 1998, through December 31, 2000.

González began working for the Family Department in 1972. As of January 1993, she held a career position classified as Local Service Director I. On January 22, 1993, González was promoted to the trust position of Regional Director III. During her time in the trust position, the position of Local Service Director I was eliminated and replaced by the position of Director of Integral Services I. González occupied her trust position into 2000. On June 21, 2000, González requested reinstatement to a career position pursuant to the Puerto Rico Personnel Act (the "Personnel Act"), 3 P.R. Laws Ann. §§1301-1431.1

In a memorandum dated July 20, 2000, the Family Department's Human Resources Office stated that the position of Executive Director I was most similar to the position of Director of Integral Services I which was presently occupied. Notwithstanding the memorandum's finding, on September 1, 2000, the Executive Secretary of the Family Department reinstated González to a career position as Executive Director IV, which, as its designation suggests, provides greater compensation and involves more responsibility than Executive Director I.

According to the complaint, beginning in January 2001, González began receiving less work and responsibility. She also overheard co-workers make what she deemed to be derogatory comments about her. On February 2, 2001, González met with Zayas to discuss her situation at work. Zayas informed González that she had been improperly reinstated to the Executive Director IV position and that she would have to be placed in a different position. Zayas also allegedly told González that she needed González's position for "an employee of her trust." Zayas ordered González to vacate her office and exhaust any accumulated vacation leave. González went on vacation for ten days. When she returned, she was not immediately assigned a new office or duties. After several days, she met with Maldonado, the Human Resources Manager. Maldonado informed González that she would be transferred to the career position of Executive Director I because she had been improperly promoted to Executive Director IV. The demotion was made retroactive to September 1, 2000. On April 4 2001, González began working in the Executive Director I position. On April 21, 2001, González's request for early retirement was approved.

González filed the present complaint against the Family Department seeking monetary damages. She alleged violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1986 of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as Article II, §§ 1, 6, and 7 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. González alleged that she had a property right protected under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to her career position as Executive Director IV, and that defendants unconstitutionally discriminated against her on the basis of her political affiliation in violation of the First Amendment.2

On May 1, 2003, Zayas and Maldonado filed a motion for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion for summary judgment, mooted the remaining motions, and dismissed all claims against Zayas and Maldonado. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis
A. The Political Discrimination Claim

When alleging a claim of political discrimination, a plaintiff bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that she engaged in constitutionally protected conduct and that political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor behind the challenged employment action. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); Cosme-Rosado v. Serrano-Rodríguez, 360 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir.2004). The plaintiff must point "to evidence on the record which, if credited, would permit a rational fact finder to conclude that the challenged personnel action occurred and stemmed from a politically based discriminatory animus." LaRou v. Ridlon, 98 F.3d 659, 661 (1st Cir.1996) (quoting Rivera-Cotto v. Rivera, 38 F.3d 611, 614 (1st Cir.1994) (internal quotations omitted)).

The district court found that González failed to provide any evidence that establishes a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor behind the alleged adverse employment action. In the view of the district court, González did not even establish that her political affiliation was known to the defendants.

We agree with the district court that González has not met the burden of showing that her political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for the challenged employment action. González has adduced no evidence that the defendants knew she was a member of the NPP. She attempts to bolster her political discrimination cause of action by alleging that Zayas and Maldonado must have been aware of her political affiliation because she was a well-known supporter of the NPP in the community, had held a previous trust position under the NPP administration, and was allegedly demoted shortly after the PDP assumed power. González points to Zayas's statement that she wanted González's office and position to go to an employee of her trust as indication of a causal link between her political beliefs and the change in her employment conditions.

This evidence is insufficient to show that political affiliation was a substantial factor in the challenged employment action. Compare Cosme-Rosado, 360 F.3d at 48 (finding that the mayor's stated intention to "rid the town of NPP activists" was not enough to show that political affiliation was motive) with Padilla-García v. Rodríguez, 212 F.3d 69, 75-76 (1st Cir.2000) (where evidence showed that defendants knew of plaintiffs' party affiliation, plaintiff was conspicuous party member and witnesses testified as to defendant's desire to humiliate plaintiff there was genuine issue of material fact to warrant denial of summary judgment). While "we recognize that a prima facie case for political discrimination may be built on circumstantial evidence," González has not generated "the specific facts necessary to take the asserted claim out of the realm of speculative, general allegations." Kauffman v. P.R. Tel. Co., 841 F.2d 1169, 1173 (1st Cir.1988). We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's political discrimination claim.

B. The Due Process Claim

González's second claim is that she has a constitutionally protected property right to her position as Executive Director IV and that she was deprived of this right without due process of law. The district court held that González did not have a property interest in the Executive Director IV position because it was obtained in violation of Puerto Rico law. We agree.

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a public employee who possesses a property interest in continued employment cannot be discharged without due process of law. See Santana v. Calderon, 342 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir.2003); Figueroa-Serrano v. Ramos-Alverio, 221 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.2000). The Constitution does not create property interests; "they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); see also Santana, 342 F.3d at 23-24. "In order to establish a constitutionally protected property interest, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she has a legally recognized...

To continue reading

Request your trial
247 cases
  • Feliciano v. Puerto Rico State Ins. Fund
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • 13 octobre 2011
    ...the laws of Puerto Rico, career or tenured employees have property rights in their continued employment.” González–De–Blasini v. Family Dept., 377 F.3d 81, 86 (1st Cir.2004). In the instant case, Dávila clearly has a property interest in her employment. The position that brings about the in......
  • Colon-Perez v. Department of Health of Puerto Rico
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • 11 juin 2009
    ...544 F.3d 58, 67 (1st Cir.2008). A court may not consider documents before it provided in the Spanish language. Gonzalez-De-Blasini v. Family Dep't, 377 F.3d 81, 89 (1st Cir.2004). Pages 7 and 8 of plaintiff's sole exhibit, exhibit A, violate this rule because they are entirely in Spanish an......
  • Cruz-Baez v. Negron-Irizarry
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • 8 mars 2005
    ...protected conduct and this conduct was the motivating factor in the adverse action. Id. See also González-De-Blasini v. Family Department, 377 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir., 2004); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). Further, plaintiffs ......
  • Toro-Pacheco v. Pereira-Castillo
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • 7 octobre 2009
    ...that [he] will retain [his] position." Santana v. Calderón, 342 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir.2003), cited in González-de-Blasini v. Family Dep't, 377 F.3d 81, 86 (1st Cir.2004); Marrero-Gutiérrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d at Although it has not been made explicit, I infer that plaintiff was a career empl......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT