United States v. Welden

Decision Date20 April 1964
Docket NumberNo. 235,235
Citation12 L.Ed.2d 152,377 U.S. 95,84 S.Ct. 1082
PartiesUNITED STATES, Appellant, v. William C. WELDEN
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Irwin A. Seibel, Washington, D.C., for appellant.

George H. Lewald, Boston, Mass., for appellee.

Mr. Justice GOLDBERG delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal presents the question of whether a person who has testified under subpoena before a congressional committee investigating the operation of the Antitrust Acts has testified in a 'proceeding, suit, or prosecution under said Acts' thereby acquiring immunity from prose- cution under the Act of February 25, 1903, 32 Stat. 854, 904.1

The facts are undisputed. On September 6, 1962, appellee, along with other individuals and corporations, was indicted on charges of conspiring to fix milk prices and to defraud the United States, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Conspiracy Act, 62 Stat. 701, 18 U.S.C. § 371. Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground, inter alia, that the prosecution was barred under the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, because he had previously testified before a subcommittee of the House Select Committee on Small Business concerning matters covered by the indictment. The Government opposed the motion to dismiss contending that the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, extends only to judicial proceedings and not to hearings before congressional committees.2 The District Court for the District of Massachusetts, rejecting the Government's contention, dismissed the indictment against appellee. The Government appealed the dismissal directly to this Court pursuant to the Criminal Appeals Act, 62 Stat. 844, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3731. Probable jurisdiction was noted. 375 U.S. 809, 84 S.Ct. 63, 11 L.Ed.2d 46.

We hold, for the reasons stated below, that the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, applies only to persons testifying in judicial proceedings, not to persons testifying before committees or subcommittees of Congress.

The immunity provision in question was enacted as part of an appropriations act which declared:

'That for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act entitled 'An Act to regulate commerce,' approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, and all Acts amendatory thereof or supplemental thereto, and of the Act entitled 'An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies,' approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety, and all Acts amendatory thereof or supplemental thereto, and sections seventy-three, seventy-four, seventy-five, and seventy-six of the Act entitled 'An Act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and other purposes,' approved August twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, the sum of five hundred thousand dollars, to be immediately available, is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not heretofore appropriated, to be expended under the direction of the Attorney-General in the employment of special counsel and agents of the Department of Justice to conduct proceedings, suits, and prosecutions under said Acts in the courts of the United States: Provided, That no person shall be prosecuted or be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, in any proceeding, suit, or prosecution under said Acts * * *' 32 Stat. 903—904. (Emphasis added.)

By any common-sense reading of this statute, the words ' ny proceeding, suit, or prosecution under said Acts' in the proviso plainly refer to the phrase 'proceedings, suits, and prosecutions under said Acts in the courts of the United States,' in the previous clause. The words 'under said Acts' confirmed that the immunity provision is limited to judicial proceedings, which are brought 'under' specific existing acts, such as the Sherman Act or the Commerce Act. Congressional investigations, although they may relate to specific existing acts, are not generally so restricted in purpose or scope as to be spoken of as being brought 'under' these Acts.3

In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652 decided only three years after the passage of the Act of February 25, 1903, this Court construed that Act in accordance with the plain meaning of its words as follows:

'While there may be some doubt whether the examination of witnesses before a grand jury is a suit or prosecution, we have no doubt that it is a 'proceeding' within the meaning of this proviso. The word should receive as wide a construction as is necessary to protect the witness in his disclosures, whenever such disclosures are made in pursuance of a judicial inquiry, whether such inquiry be instituted by a grand jury, or upon the trial of an indictment found by them.' Id., 201 U.S. at 66, 26 S.Ct. at 375, 50 L.Ed. 652. (Emphasis added.)

We conclude, therefore, that as enacted the Act of February 25, 1903, applies only to judicial proceedings.4 Appellee does not really dispute this. His basic contention, which is not accepted by any member of the Court,5 is that the 1906 immunity statute 6 amended the Act of February 25, 1903, to extend immunity to persons who testified in nonjudicial as well as judicial proceedings. He does not contend that the 1906 statute, by its terms, so amended the 1903 Act. He offers the following interpretation of the events leading up to the enactment of the 1906 statute in support of the contention that the 1903 Act was amended by implication to extend to nonjudicial proceedings. In the case of United States v. Armour & Co., 142 F. 808, decided three years after the enactment of the 1903 Act, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that certain defendants had been immunized from prosecution under the Antitrust Laws by giving unsubpoenaed and unsworn testimony in a nonjudicial investigation con- ducted by the Commissioner of Corporations,7 an official of the Department of Commerce and Labor.8 Congressional reaction to this decision was immediate and adverse, and within four months Congress enacted the 1906 immunity statute.9 This statute specifically limited immunity under existing immunity statutes to persons testifying under oath and in obedience to subpoena.10 Appellee contends that the purpose of Congress in enacting the 1906 statute was to remedy the objectionable features of the Armour decision, and that since the statute did not 'remedy' the court's holding that immunity could be obtained by testifying in a nonjudicial proceeding, it follows that Congress did not regard that holding as objectionable. He asks us to conclude, therefore, that 'proceeding' as used in the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, must now be read to include nonjudicial as well as judicial proceedings.

This argument erroneously assumes that the Armour decision rested on a construction of 'proceeding, suit, or prosecution' in the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903. A reading of that decision reveals, however, that it rested primarily on the Commerce and Labor Act, which contained a specific grant of immunity to persons who testified in investigations, admittedly nonjudicial, conducted by the Commissioner of Corporations.11 In deciding the Armour case, the court felt it 'necessary to look into the purp ses of Congress in passing the commerce and labor act in order that the court may determine what construction will best carry out the legislative intent.' 142 F. at 819. After a detailed analysis of that statute and its history, the court concluded that the Commerce and Labor Act was dispositive of the case and that defendants were entitled to immunity thereunder. Following this conclusion, the judge added a brief paragraph in which he said, without analyzing (or even quoting) the language or history of the Act of February 25, 1903, that he was 'of opinion' that the defendants would also be entitled to immunity under that Act as well. Id., 142 F. at 826.12 In the very next para- graph, however, the judge again described the opinion as resting on 'the construction here given to the commerce and labor law * * *.' Ibid.

The controversial feature of the Armour decision, and the only one which Congress was interested in remedying, was the holding that unsubpoenaed and unsworn testimony came within 'the purposes of Congress in passing the commerce and labor act * * *.' 142 F. at 819. Congress wanted to be certain that persons anticipating indictment could not immunize themselves from prosecution by volunteering to give unsworn testimony.13 There was nothing controversial about the court's holding that immunity could result from testimony given in an investigation conducted by the Commissioner of Corporations, since the Commerce and Labor Act specifically granted immunity for testimony given in such an investigation.

It is not at all significant, therefore, that Congress, while 'remedying' the Armour holding that immunity could be obtained from testimony which was unsworn and voluntary, did not 'remedy' the holding that immunity could result from testimony given in nonjudicial investigations conducted by the Commissioner of Corporations.

Congress, in enacting the 1906 statute, did not manifest any intent to enlarge the reach of the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, to include nonjudicial proceedings. The purpose of the 1906 statute was not to define the type of proceeding in thich immunity, under existing statutes, could be obtained. Its sole purpose was to define the type of testimony for which immunity, under existing statutes, could be obtained. This is all Congress was asked to do by President Theodore Roosevelt in his message recommending the legislation which became the 1906 statute. In his message the President said:

'It has hitherto...

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