Crafton v. Luttrell

Decision Date25 June 1974
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 6615 and 6795.
Citation378 F. Supp. 521
PartiesCarl Clifford CRAFTON v. Mark H. LUTTRELL, Commissioner of Correction, State of Tennessee, et al. Calvin MURRY, Individually and on behalf of all other State Penitentiary inmates similarly situated v. Winfield DUNN, Governor, State of Tennessee, and Mark H. Luttrell, Commissioner of Correction, State of Tennessee.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Stephen C. Small, Nashville, Tenn., for plaintiffs.

W. Henry Haile, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Tenn., Nashville, Tenn., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

MORTON, District Judge.

This is a class action by all inmates of the Tennessee Department of Correction seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S.C. § 1983. Principal defendants are the Governor and the Commissioner of Correction of the State of Tennessee, and the Warden of the Tennessee State Penitentiary, Nashville, Tennessee. Jurisdiction of the court is acquired pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) and 2201.

Plaintiffs allege the absence of procedural due process in the administration of prison disciplinary measures, and more specifically, that confinement in administrative segregation, forfeiture of good and honor time, and revocation of parole and work release status have and are being accomplished without affording inmates their right to due process of law.

I.

There have been in recent years an increasing number of civil rights suits filed by state and federal prison inmates against those charged with their custody. A percentage of these cases filed in this court are thinly-veiled attempts to circumvent the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in what are plainly habeas corpus situations. Another segment of these complaints filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allege, as is true in the instant case, the denial of procedural due process in disciplinary hearings in which the sanction imposed is the loss of good and honor time credits and/or removal from good and honor time accrual status. Whether these too are cases properly cognizable only as petitions for habeas corpus is a question considered subsequently in this opinion. A further element of this litigation concerns the constitutionality of conditions of confinement. Finally, and frequently an adjunct of the condition of confinement cases, are those which allege lack of procedural due process in the imposition of segregated or solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure, regardless of whether the conditions of that confinement are assailed as being unconstitutional in and of themselves.

Traditionally, there has existed a general reluctance among federal courts to interfere with the internal operation of state prisons, including the nature of disciplinary measures employed by prison administrators. More recently, however, the trend has been away from this "hands off" doctrine, and the courts, while remaining reticent to assume any type of general supervisory control, have at least begun to review the constitutionality of the administration of prison discipline. This has been especially true since the Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), held that termination of a welfare recipient's benefits without prior notice and hearing was constitutionally impermissible as a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The sweep of this decision has been broad indeed, and not the least affected area has been that of procedural due process behind prison walls. Numerous district courts have considered this problem in light of Goldberg, and although there may have been no consensus reached as to what procedural safeguards must precede the imposition of prison discipline, there certainly remains no serious doubt that due process applies and that suits alleging its denial are valid sources of judicial inquiry under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

II.

This case first arose with the June 16, 1972, filing of the pro se "Petition for Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Judgment" of Carl Clifford Crafton, an inmate at the Tennessee State Penitentiary, Nashville, Tennessee. Crafton's claim was under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and alleged the complete absence of any semblance of due process in the disciplinary hearing which resulted in his loss of one year's good and honor time and his commitment to administrative segregation.

This disciplinary action was taken in January, 1972, as a result of Crafton's having forced a prison nurse to inject him with a narcotic while he held another prison employee hostage. Following the incident, Crafton claims that he was locked in isolation for 30 hours before meeting a disciplinary board, and that at his hearing, prior to which he was given no notice of the precise charges, he was not allowed to make a statement in his own behalf, was not allowed to present witnesses of his own, and was not permitted to confront or cross-examine the witnesses against him nor the guards charging the rule violation. The disciplinary board voted to take twelve months accrued good and honor time from Crafton, and committed him to administrative segregation where he remained for approximately eight months. Crafton further alleges that he was never charged with the violation of another prison rule during this eight-month period, although such a length of confinement was expressly prohibited by disciplinary regulations.

On the basis of the allegations, a law firm was appointed to represent Crafton, and the cause was set for hearing. Prior to the hearing the parties, on September 6, 1972, entered into a consent order (Appendix A) in which it was agreed that the disciplinary board procedures, Section 4.600 et seq. of the Manual of Adult Service Policies and Procedures for the Department of Correction (hereinafter the "Manual"), failed to meet certain requirements of due process of law. The consent order provided that any prisoner accused of a rules violation would have certain rights, which in summary were:

(1) written notice of the rule violated and the manner of its violation no less than six hours prior to meeting a disciplinary committee;
(2) the right of confrontation and cross-examination of an accusing witness or guard;
(3) the right to call one inmate witness on behalf of the accused, with additional inmate witnesses callable within the discretion of the disciplinary board;
(4) the right to an inmate counsel-substitute to assist the accused in investigating the facts and to appear with him at the hearing;
(5) the opportunity for the accused to present a defense and to offer any facts and circumstances which might warrant mitigation of any punishment to be imposed; and
(6) the right not to be retained in isolation for investigation or suspicion of rules violation longer than eighteen hours without the written charge being countersigned by the warden or deputy warden that probable cause exists to suspect the charged inmate with the alleged infraction.

It was further provided in the order that defendants would be permanently enjoined from placing any prisoner in administrative or punitive segregation in excess of sixty days for the violation of any prison rule.

Following the entry of the September 6, 1972, consent order in the Crafton case, this court received an unusually large number of pro se complaints from other prisoners within the Tennessee correctional system, primarily from the Tennessee State Penitentiary in Nashville, Tennessee. For the most part, these complaints came from inmates who claimed loss of good and honor time and/or commitment to administrative segregation under alleged circumstances similar to those which gave rise to the Crafton order. The complaints depicted situations occurring both before and after September 6, 1972, in which it was alleged by some prisoners that in disciplinary proceedings they had not been afforded the rights required by the September 6 order, by others that these rights were not constitutionally adequate, and by numerous others that they were being unlawfully held in administrative segregation longer than the sixty-day maximum set by the September 6 order. The relief sought was an injunction restoring lost good and honor time and/or release from administrative segregation.

On November 9, 1972, the defendants filed a motion to modify the September 6 decree so as to delete the following:

"Defendants are hereby permanently enjoined from placing any prisoner in administrative or punitive segregation in excess of sixty days for the violation of any prison rule."

Then, on November 29, 1972, Calvin Murry, also an inmate at Tennessee State Penitentiary, filed a civil rights class action alleging, as did Crafton, denial of due process in the forfeiture of good and honor time, and in addition that confinement in administrative or punitive segregation, revocation of work release status, and rescission of parole recommendations had occurred without a hearing that comported with due process. As in the suit by Crafton, the complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief.

Murry had been sentenced to 5 to 10 years for robbery in 1970, and by December, 1971, had been placed on educational release. During the early period of his confinement, Murry had been involved in several incidents which resulted in disciplinary action against him, but due to his improved discipline and good performance while on educational release, was recommended for parole by the Board of Probation and Paroles on January 27, 1972, and was scheduled for parole on October 4, 1972. Then, on February 15, 1972, Murry was placed on the work release program and employed by a firm which would be his employer while on parole.

On March 24, 1972, Murry was charged with forging a check, and was summarily removed from work release and placed in segregation. On the basis of this charge and the recommendation of the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • Avant v. Clifford
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • June 23, 1975
    ...Modified 510 F.2d 534, 535--36 (1st Cir. 1974), Cert. granted --- U.S. ---, 95 S.Ct. 2414, 44 L.Ed.2d 678 (1975); Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F.Supp. 521, 539 (M.D.Tenn.1973) (Amended June 25, 1974); Fowler v. Vincent, 366 F.Supp. 1224, 1227--28 (S.D.N.Y.1973); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F.Supp.......
  • Vaughn v. Trotter
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
    • October 16, 1980
    ...days and was then placed on administrative lockup for an additional ten days. As required by this court's order in Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F.Supp. 521 (M.D. Tenn.1974), Vaughn's confinement was reviewed by an administrative panel. That panel could find no justification for the plaintiff's ......
  • Conway v. Cumming
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • July 9, 1993
    ...furlough release; there is little doubt that termination of furlough status qualifies as a "grievous loss." See Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F.Supp. 521, 534-35 (M.D.Tenn.1974) (because of the magnitude of the loss, and because the inmate's interest in avoiding the loss outweighed any interest ......
  • Woodard v. Farris, 2:20-cv-00007
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
    • March 25, 2020
    ...discipline." Brooks v. Westbrooks, No. 3:17-cv-00686, 2017 WL 3868275, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 5, 2017) (quoting Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F. Supp. 521, 526 (M.D. Tenn. 1973) (citations omitted)). For all of these reasons, the complaint fails to state due process claims under Section 1983 up......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT