Berry v. Baca
| Citation | 379 F.3d 764 |
| Decision Date | 13 August 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-56004.,No. 03-56000.,No. 03-56096.,03-56000.,03-56004.,03-56096. |
| Parties | Rodney BERRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Leroy BACA, Defendant-Appellee. R.D. Mortimer, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Leroy Baca, Defendant-Appellee. Anthony K. Hart, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Leroy Baca, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Stephen Yagman, Marion R. Yagman, Yagman & Yagman & Reichmann, Venice Beach, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Michael D. Allen, Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence, Glendale, CA, for the defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. Nos. CV-01-02069-DDP, CV-00-13002-DDP, CV-01-01866-DDP.
Before D.W. NELSON, JOHN R. GIBSON,* and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Anthony Hart, Rodney Berry, and Roger Mortimer each sue Los Angeles County Sheriff Leroy Baca, in his official capacity, for pursuing a policy of deliberate indifference to their constitutional rights that resulted in unlawful periods of over-detention in the Los Angeles County jail. In each case, the plaintiff was detained for a period ranging from twenty-six to twenty-nine hours after the court had authorized his release from jail. Their cases were consolidated before the district court.
On May 29, 2003, the district court granted Baca's motion for summary judgment. The court based its holding on the recently decided Ninth Circuit case, Brass v. County of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 925, 157 L.Ed.2d 744 (2003), which the district court held controlled because it found Brass and these consolidated cases "rest upon nearly identical grounds."
Because we conclude that Brass is distinguishable, and that the plaintiffs in this case have raised a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the existence of a county policy of deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
Anthony Hart was arrested on August 14, 2000, for felony charges of grand theft. On August 17, 2000, the Superior Court ordered his release from jail. At the same time, the court also ordered him to appear at 9:30 a.m. that day in a different department on the same charge. Hart was released from custody on August 18 at 2:02 p.m. This was twenty-nine hours and thirty-two minutes after the court authorized his release.
The paperwork from the Superior Court authorizing Hart's release did not arrive at the Inmate Reception Center ("IRC") of the Los Angeles County jail until the end of the day on August 17, and because the release form had an order to appear in a different department, personnel at IRC waited until the following morning to confirm with the court that Hart was to be released. Once the release was confirmed, it was entered into the Automated Justice Information System ("AJIS"), the computer system for booking, tracking, and release of inmates. It took five hours and twenty-five minutes from the time his release was entered into the AJIS until Hart's release.
Rodney Berry was arrested on a drug charge on October 5, 1999. After a jury trial resulted in a deadlocked jury and several further amended charges and pleas, the Superior Court ordered the charges dropped and authorized Berry's release on February 1, 2001, at 11:30 a.m. On February 2, 2001, at 2:02 p.m., Berry was released from jail. This was twenty-six hours and thirty-two minutes after the Superior Court's order for his release, and sixteen and a half hours after his release order was entered into the AJIS.
Roger Mortimer was arrested for charges of rape with a foreign object on April 1, 2000. On August 14, 2000, the jury announced a verdict of not guilty. That same morning, at 11:45 a.m., the Superior Court authorized Mortimer's release. Mortimer was released on August 15, 2000, at 4:57 p.m. This was twenty-nine hours and twelve minutes after the order for his release and seventeen hours after his release order was entered into the AJIS.
After their releases, Hart, Berry, and Mortimer each filed suit in the Central District of California, on February 27, 2001, March 1, 2001, and December 12, 2000, respectively. Each plaintiff alleged that his constitutional rights were violated by the hours spent in detention after his court-authorized release from jail. The three cases were consolidated before District Court Judge Dean Pregerson. On September 16, 2002, Defendant/Appellee Sheriff Leroy Baca filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted on May 29, 2003. Each plaintiff timely appealed.
The plaintiffs sued Los Angeles County Sheriff LeRoy Baca, in his official capacity, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violating their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. County officials can be held liable under § 1983 if they act as "lawmakers or ... those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Baca does not dispute that he acted on behalf of the official policy of Los Angeles County (hereinafter "the County").
In order to hold Baca liable under § 1983, plaintiffs must demonstrate that "`action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.'" Brass, 328 F.3d at 1198 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018). We have stated that "a local governmental body may be liable if it has a policy of inaction and such inaction amounts to a failure to protect constitutional rights." Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir.1992) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989)). However, the policy of inaction must be more than mere negligence, see Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333-36, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); it must be a conscious or deliberate choice among various alternatives. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th Cir.2001).
In order to impose liability based on a policy of deliberate inaction, the "plaintiff must establish: (1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy `amounts to deliberate indifference' to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy [was] the `moving force behind the constitutional violation.'" Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1474 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389-91, 109 S.Ct. 1197).
The district court did not discuss this four-step showing, because it did not address the plaintiffs' claims that the County's policies amount to a policy of deliberate indifference to their constitutional rights. Instead, the district court found that it "is bound by the holding in Brass and finds that the County's challenged policies did not result in a violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights."
While Brass is closely related to the cases at hand, it does not directly control this case. In Brass, the plaintiff — also a detainee in a Los Angeles County jail — was held for thirty-nine hours after the court ordered his release. 328 F.3d at 1194. Brass's primary claim focused on the County's policy of releasing prisoners pursuant to court order only after the completion of processing all inmates scheduled for release on that day. Id. at 1198. He also challenged the County's practice of beginning the processing of releases only after all information relating to prisoners scheduled for release on a particular day had been received and entered into the computer system. Id.
The Brass panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County. The panel acknowledged that over-detention after court-ordered release has the potential to violate constitutional rights. See id. at 1200 (). The panel found, however, that the contested policies could not have caused the deprivation of constitutional rights. As to the first policy, the panel held that "Brass did not have a constitutional right to have his release papers processed in any particular order...." Id. As to the second policy, the panel held,
To the extent Brass's claim rests on the County's policy or custom of not starting to process a particular day's releases until it has received all information, including wants and holds, relating to the prisoners scheduled for release, we cannot say the County thereby violated Brass's constitutional rights. To the contrary, we think that that aspect of the County's release program was justified and reasonable in light of the County's problems and responsibilities in processing the large number of prisoner releases it handles.
Here, in contrast to Brass, the plaintiffs do not limit their challenge to the County's specific policies. Rather, as argued in their briefs to this Court, they challenge the policy "in toto ... that simply delays all releases until the system, in its sweet time, and with the resources it chooses ... is ready to make releases." Stated another way, the plaintiffs in this case challenge the implementation of the County's policies, rather than the specific policies themselves. They claim that the County's unreasonably inefficient implementation of its administrative policies amounts to a policy of deliberate indifference to their constitutional rights.
While on first glance this may appear a subtle difference, in fact there is a crucial distinction between the challenge to specific policies in Brass and the challenge to the implementation of the policy ...
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